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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
1.1 The school-to-work transition: overview and definition 
In all modern societies, the transition from education to employment is a 
fundamental step towards adult life. After leaving schools, young people are finally 
ready to apply skills and knowledge learned in formal education, in order to pursue an 
occupational career that meets their preferences and expectations – and, more generally 
– to pursue their life goals. Indeed, if the early stages of work life were not predictive of 
later life course development, the phase of transition from school to employment would 
not be so relevant (Bradley and Nguyen, 2004). However, great deals of economic and 
sociological literature have shown that a bad start into the labour market influences 
negatively later occupational careers (e.g. Barone and Schizzerotto, 2011; Gangl, 2006; 
Gregg, 2001; Luijkx and Wolbers, 2009), and future well being in general (Clark and 
 
Figure 1.1 – Youth unemployment and temporary employment rates in the EU–28 
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Oswald, 1994; Korpi, 1997). Moreover, transitions into employment are often 
connected with other key steps towards adulthood, such as leaving the parental home, 
getting married, and having children (Buchman, 1989; Buchman and Kriesi, 2001; 
Wolbers, 2007a).  
Despite its importance, the school-to-work transition is far from being smooth in 
many developed countries. In 2007, about the 15 per cent of young aged 15-24 were 
unemployed in the European Union, and – among those who had a dependent 
employment – about the 40 per cent have a flexible contract (Fig.1.1). These figures are 
even exacerbated after the 2008 financial collapse and the 2010 sovereign debt crisis: 
nowadays about a quarter of young people in the European Union are unemployed, and 
even a greater proportion compared to earlier periods have a temporary employment. 
However, youth conditions differ considerably among European countries, as showed in 
Figure 1.2. In last two decades, youth unemployment rates were systematically higher in 
southern European countries compared to other areas, and this gap is even wider 
considering post-crises periods. On the other hand, countries from northern and 
 
Figure 1.2 – Youth unemployment rates by geographical areas in the EU–28 
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especially continental Europe seem to perform best and suffered the recent economic 
crisis to a minor extent.  
Trends in aggregate youth unemployment and temporary employment rates even 
underestimate the deterioration of youth’s integration into the labour market in recent 
years. Indeed, during the last decades we also assisted to a great differentiation and 
complexity of the early occupational careers of young people (Raffe, 2013; Ryan, 2001; 
Staff and Mortimer, 2008). Compared to earlier generations, individual trajectories from 
education to a stable and definitive employment are currently more complex, and are 
often constituted by a mixed sequence of events that includes education, training, 
employment, and unemployment spells (Brzinsky-Fay, 2007; Mayer, 2005). 
The growing complexity of early occupational careers challenges the attempts to 
define and study the school-to-work transition in terms of one, clear-cut, and definite 
‘transition’ (Kerckhoff, 1995, 2000; OECD, 2000). Sociologists and economists have 
long dealt with this issue, providing different answers, but none solution. In fact, even if 
there is general agreement about the need to consider the transition from education to 
employment as a ‘period’ instead of a ‘single event’ (Hillmert, 2002), there are great 
discrepancies about the boundaries encompassing this period.  
From a theoretical viewpoint, the school-to-work transition is generally defined as 
the period between the end of compulsory schooling (or initial education) and the stable 
settlement into the labour market (Bradley and Nguyen, 2004; Müller and Gangl, 2003; 
OECD, 1996, 1998; Ryan, 2001). However, empirical studies have typically focused on 
a stricter time-span, by considering the ‘school-to-work’ as the period between the end 
of the last educational experience and the first significant employment (e.g. 
Allmendinger, 1989; Kogan and Müller 2003; Kogan et al., 2011; Shavit and Müller 
1998; Wolbers, 2007b).1 In this thesis, I adopted an intermediate perspective, by 
                                                 
1 The main problem of this strategy is to define ‘the last educational experience’ and the ‘first 
significant job’ in a way that allow comparisons across countries (Raffe, 2013; OECD, 2000). 
However, compared to the first definition – that lets transitions start after the end of compulsory 
schooling – the latter definition makes educational choices after compulsory schooling 
exogenous, thus narrowing the analytical focus. 
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defining the ‘school-to-work’ transition as the period between the main branching point 
in the individual educational path and the first 10-15 years on the labour market. 
Therefore, the focus of the thesis is on the transition from school to the first 
employment and on the early career progression of young Europeans.  
 
1.2 The transition from education to employment as a job-allocation 
problem: micro and macro perspectives 
The process of transition from education to employment can be generally depicted 
as a process of assignment of school-leavers to jobs. On the one hand, once left school, 
individuals are likely to search adequate jobs with respect to their level of schooling, 
aspirations, preferences, and needs. On the other hand, employers are constantly filling 
in vacancies by recruiting job seekers – or by reshuffling their current employees – with 
the very clear intention to hire the most suitable candidate for the vacant positions.2 In 
this setting, a match occurs when a job seeker – a school-leaver in the specific case – 
and an employer convey in establishing an employment relationship. From this point of 
view, the transition from school to employment can be firstly conceived as a micro-
level process in which individuals take decisions according to their opportunity 
structures, preferences, and needs (Kalleberg and Sørensen, 1979; Logan, 1996; 
Sørensen and Kalleberg, 1981).  
However, individuals do not act in a vacuum. On the contrary, employers and 
school-leavers are embedded in social, economic, and temporal context. Macro-level 
factors – e.g. welfare regimes, the overall state of the economy, the legislative 
arrangement, the political climate – come into play by influencing preferences, needs, 
expectations, and more generally the whole opportunity structures of both employers 
and school-leavers, thus influencing their decision-making processes (Kerckhoff, 1995; 
Müller, 2005; Müller and Gangl, 2003).  
                                                 
2 It is worth noticing that the most suitable candidates are not necessarily the ones with the 
highest level of education or abilities. Indeed, criteria of suitability are strictly dependent on 
preferences, strategies, and needs of specific employers. 
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Therefore, the analysis of the processes of transition from education to employment 
requires necessarily a macro-micro perspective that takes into account the interactions 
between the two analytical levels. In what follow, a brief – and not exhaustive – 
discussion of the main research questions arising from the focus on the school-to-work 
transition from a micro and a macro perspective is provided.3 
 
1.2.1 The focus on the micro level 
The overall outcome of the allocation process of school-leavers to jobs is reflected 
in the social stratification of the transition processes in terms of personal characteristics 
and resources, such as – just to make few examples – gender, level of education, work 
experience, ethnic and parental background (Kerckhoff, 1995; Müller, 2005; Müller and 
Gangl, 2003). Therefore, a micro level perspective normally raises questions about 
individual traits and assets that influence the first stages of occupational careers. Are 
men advantaged compared to women? Does education pay off? Are work experiences 
acquired during education useful in the job search process? Are foreigner disadvantaged 
compared to natives? Does social background affect early labour market careers? 
All these questions are at the core of the economic sociology, the sociology of 
education, and the sociology of the labour market. However, in a first moment, research 
was driven by idiosyncratic interests and anchored at the national level (Raffe, 2013). In 
this regard, a huge body of literature on single national contexts has shown that personal 
characteristics matter when entering the labour market (see, among others, Bradley and 
Nguyen, 2004 for a review of studies in UK and US; Cobalti and Schizzerotto, 1994 for 
Italy; Blossfeld, 1987 for Germany; Wolbers, 2000 for the Netherlands). The debate on 
‘inequality of opportunities’ – especially as regards the effects of social origins on 
occupational attainment – offered a natural framework to analyse the school-to-work 
transition, given the importance of this phase for labour market success later in life 
                                                 
3 Next two paragraphs should not be intended as a ‘previous research’ section. Instead, the aim 
is to show the main research questions that arise from the focus on the micro or the macro level, 
and the main approach used when dealing with a macro perspective. 
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(Raffe, 2013). In fact, a significant part of early studies on the school-to-work transition 
within single national contexts was conducted under the broad framework of social 
stratification and intergenerational mobility research, that put particular emphasis on the 
effect of social origins on educational attainment, and, in turn, on the subsequent labour 
market outcomes (the so-called OED association – origin, education, destination).  
The development of life course research and the availability of national longitudinal 
data pushed further the analysis of the transition from school to employment as a micro-
level process (see Mayer, 2009; Mayer and Tuma, 1990; Mortimer and Shanahan, 
2003). In fact – by examining the school-to-work transitions as sequences of individual 
events in single national contexts – the life course perspective enriched the set of labour 
market outcomes under investigation, placing particular emphasis on outcomes such as 
mobility across jobs, or among periods of employment, inactivity, unemployment, and 
further education – as well as the duration of single episodes.4 
 
1.2.2 The focus on the macro level 
Employers’ and school-leavers’ choices are however influenced by macro-level 
factors that are not only antecedent to them but also out of their direct control, such as 
the political climate, the institutional arrangement, the welfare regime, and the state of 
the economy.5 The focus on the macro-level entails two different sets of research 
questions.  
                                                 
4 The emphasis on the duration of the single episodes is pivotal. For example, reliable data on 
the duration of unemployment spells integrates information on flows ‘in and out’ of 
unemployment, thus allowing us to evaluate more correctly the immediate and the potential 
long-term negative consequence of being in unemployment in early career. In fact, high 
unemployment rates are not necessary a problem for individuals if flows ‘in and out’ of 
unemployment are also high, whereas low unemployment could be extremely problematic when 
flow ‘in and out’ are low and unemployment spells long (Ryan, 2001). 
5 It is assumed that macro-conditions – such as economic conjuncture and the institutional 
setting – are exogenous to employers’ and school-leavers’ actions, at least in the short run. 
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On the one hand, a pure macro perspective conceives the school-to-work transition 
as macro-level process, and raises questions about the role of the above-mentioned 
factors in shaping the transition processes at the aggregate level. Some examples of 
research questions rising from this perspective are the following. Does the alignment of 
political systems encourage a smooth transition from education to employment? Are 
vocationally oriented educational systems more efficient in structuring the flows of 
school-leavers into the labour market? Do deregulated labour markets favour the 
integration of young people into the labour force? Is globalisation responsible for the 
diffusion of fix-term contracts in early occupational careers? 
On the other hand, the interest in the macro-level is also reflected in an intermediate 
perspective focused on macro-micro interactions. Such perspective raises questions 
about the role of macro-level factors in moderating the effect of individual traits and 
resources on early labour market careers. Does the vocational orientation of the 
education systems affect the gender wage gap in the early career? Does the level of 
employment protection account for variations in the effects of social origins on 
occupational attainment? Does the effect of education on labour market entry vary 
according to labour market arrangements? Does the size of the ethnic penalty depend on 
the overall economic climate? 
The attempts to answer these questions have naturally lead to cross-country 
comparisons, to the extent that national contexts are characterised with different 
institutional, political, and economic conditions, and a high degree of internal 
homogeneity.6 Therefore – as noted by Raffe (2013) – from the late 80’s on we assisted 
to a ‘comparative turn’ in transition research, that started to describe and explain how 
and why transition processes differ among countries. In a similar vein to what happened 
to studies anchored at the national level, also the ‘comparative turn’ in transition 
research largely reflected the interest of intergenerational mobility and status attainment 
                                                 
6 The degree of internal homogeneity with respect to macro-level characteristics is likely to vary 
cross-nationally. However, for the sake of simplicity, I assume that all countries are internally 
homogeneous with respect of the main contextual characteristics. 
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research in the cross-country variation of the OED association (see Breen and Johnson, 
2005).  
In the last two decades, comparative transition research has spread and – from time 
to time – touched upon different aspects of transition, countries, and macro-level 
characteristics. Despite these sources of variability, two approaches to cross-national 
comparison can be identified.  
The first approach considered macro characteristics only on a theoretical level, by 
comparing small but theoretically relevant number of countries at a time and forgo 
empirically accounting for the effects of macro-level factors (e.g. Allmendinger, 1989; 
Bernardi et al., 2000; Kogan et al., 2011; Marsden and Germe, 1991; Scherer, 2004; 
van de Werfhorst, 2004). The milestone of this approach is the edited volume From 
School to Work by Yossi Shavit and Walter Müller (1998), which analysed in a 
common scheme the association between education and the first occupation in 13 
countries using national datasets.  
The second approach typically compared national contexts using cross-national 
datasets, and in some cases attempted to model empirically the effects of macro-level 
characteristics (e.g. Breen, 2005; de Lange et al., 2013; Kogan and Müller, 2003; 
Verheast and Van der Velden, 2012; Wolbers, 2007b). The best example of this 
approach is the edited volume Transition from education to work in Europe edited by 
Walter Müller and Markus Gangl (2003), which described cross-country variations in 
different aspects of transition processes, and tried to explain empirically these 
differences by the macro-level arrangements.  
Both approaches have strengths and deficiencies that is not appropriate to underline 
at this stage. Rather, it is worth noticing that – all in all – previous research focused on a 
core set of macro-level dimensions. A crude classification of these macro-level 
characteristics distinguishes among cyclical, structural, and institutional factors (de 
Lange et al., 2014; Wolbers, 2007b; van der Velden and Wolbers, 2003). Generally, 
cyclical factors refer to the overall economic climate (e.g. unemployment rates), 
whereas structural factors refer to some general trends affecting all developed countries 
(e.g. globalisation, educational expansions, demographic dynamics). Lastly, institutional 
 9 
factors typically denote the arrangements in the labour markets (e.g. the employment 
protection legislation or the economic structure) and in the education systems (e.g. level 
of standardisation, tracking and vocational orientation). 
 
1.2.3 Where are we? Research questions 
This thesis focuses on the process of transition from education to employment from 
a macro-micro perspective. More specifically – given the distinction among cyclical, 
structural and institutional factors – this work will mainly investigate how institutions 
influence the micro-level process of allocation of school-leavers to jobs.7 A comparative 
perspective will be adopted, in order to disentangle theoretically – by means of 
examples – and parametrically – by means of statistical modelling – the institutional 
influence on the first stages of occupational careers of young school-leavers. Therefore, 
the thesis will combine the two classic approaches to comparative research described in 
the previous section.  
In order to provide a comprehensive view of the school-to-work transition, this 
thesis investigates the influence of the institutional sphere both on the first labour 
market entry and on the occupational progression beyond that point, with a particular 
emphasis on the emergence of social inequalities at early career stages and their 
evolution over the early life course. In particular, my three research questions touches 
upon three main aspects of the school-to-work transition, and are the following: 
1) How do institutions influence the transition from education to the first 
employment? 
2) How do institutions influence the occupational progression of those entering the 
first employment in a temporary position? 
3) How do institutions influence the evolution of social inequalities emerging at 
labour market entry over the early life course? 
                                                 
7 Although the main focus is on the role of institutional characteristics, the role of structural 
characteristics is considered as well in the empirical chapters.  
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The first research question regards the influence of institutions on the transition 
from education to the first significant employment. While previous studies focused 
mainly on consolidated measures of the youth integration into the labour market – such 
as unemployment and temporary employment probabilities vis-a-vis with permanent 
employment – the interest here is on other complementary outcomes, such as the speed 
of entry into the first significant employment and its overall quality (in terms of 
prestige).  
The second research question regards the institutional determinants of the 
occupational progression beyond the first labour market entry. More specifically, the 
interest is on young people who fail in entering their first significant job in a permanent 
position, i.e. on those youngsters whose early careers may be more prone to disruption. 
Therefore, the early career developments of youngsters who experienced a flexible 
labour market entry are analysed looking at two outcomes reflecting their chances of 
integration into the primary segment of the labour market, i.e. the chances of 
occupational and contractual mobility.  
The third research question regards the role of the institutional context in 
moderating the effect of social origin on occupational destinations over the early life 
course. In particular, the interest here is on a pure form of inequality related to family 
background, i.e. the influence that social origin plays beyond what is mediated by 
educational attainment (often referred to as the ‘direct’ effect [see Ballarino and 
Bernardi, 2016]). More precisely, this work questions whether a direct effect of social 
origin emerges already at the onset of the career, and whether this direct effect 
increases, decreases, or remains stable over the early life course. Emphasis is posed on 
the institutional conditions favouring the different scenarios. 
 
1.3 Institutional regimes: a useful analytical concept 
When dealing with the role of institutions in shaping individual actions and 
outcomes, one should bear in mind that institutions do not act in isolation. Indeed, the 
influence of the macro-institutional context on individuals’ decisions is the result of the 
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interplay among different institutional spheres. In this perspective, institutional systems 
are conceived as «interwoven arrangements with high degree of internal 
complementarity» (Bucholz et al., 2009, pp. 67). For this reason, a good starting point 
to analyse the role of specific institutions on the school-to-work transition is to consider 
the overall ‘logics of functioning’ of what have been called ‘transition systems’ (Raffe, 
2008, 2011), or ‘transition regimes’ (Walther, 2006). I will denote these ideal typical 
overall institutional arrangements in terms of institutional regimes. Anyway, I am aware 
that in many cases these classifications are constructed ex post by clustering core groups 
of countries (often two countries only) on the basis of transitions outcomes and 
institutional consonance, thus resulting well suited to describe rather than explain the 
patterns of entry into the labour market. Therefore, the reference to institutional regimes 
and their overall ‘logics of functioning’ (see Raffe, 2008, 2011) will be merely 
instrumental to explain the ways some institutional features could affect the first stage 
of occupational career of young people, and eventually to identify some other 
potentially relevant institutional characteristics overlooked or oversimplified in previous 
research.   
Among the many classifications of institutional regimes, the distinction between 
internal and occupational labour market systems (Marsden, 1986, 1990), and the 
distinction between liberal and coordinated market economies (Hall and Soskice, 2001) 
are of specific interest.  
 
1.3.1 Internal versus occupational labour markets 
A consolidated distinction between institutional regimes divides countries in 
occupational labour market systems (hereafter: OLM) and internal labour market 
systems (hereafter: ILM) (Doeringer and Piore, 1985; Blossfeld and Mayer, 1988; 
Marsden, 1986, 1990, 1997, 1999; Maurice et al., 1986).8 These two kinds of system 
                                                 
8 Some scholars refer to the dichotomy between internal and occupational labour market (e.g. 
Marsden, 1990), whereas others refer to the dichotomy between organizational and 
qualificational spaces (e.g. Maurice et al., 1986; Shavit and Müller, 1998). However, the two 
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differ both in the schools arrangements – which provide skills – and the labour markets 
– which demand such skills. In OLM, the educational systems provide students with 
highly standardized and reliable vocational qualifications. In these contexts labour 
market is segmented by occupations, since jobs are mainly defined by contents and the 
skills required to perform a job are provided within schools. On the contrary, in ILM, 
the educational systems do not provide students with vocational competencies and 
skills, but provide them with general qualifications. In these contexts, labour markets 
are segmented by firms, since vocational training mainly takes place on-the-job and 
within the same firm (Doeringer and Piore, 1985). 
The settings of educational systems and the structures of labour markets in OLM 
and ILM are directly related to some facets of the school-to-work transition via 
mechanisms by which employers hire workers (Gangl, 2003a). These mechanisms 
differ between OLM and ILM, since employers rely on different signals to evaluate job 
applicants. In OLM, the labour force has specific vocational qualifications and skills, 
and thus employers will use educational credentials as reliable signals for screening 
applicants. Conversely, in ILM, educational qualifications are general and not related to 
the contents of jobs, and thus employers will be more likely to evaluate the expected 
productivity of applicants – or the expected training costs – by looking also at their 
work experience.  
In these terms, the ILM/OLM distinction implies specific hypotheses about the 
integration of young people into the labour market (Gangl, 2003a). In ILM, job 
allocations will largely depend on previous work experience, and to the extent that 
school-leavers lack – by definition – work experience, they will be systematically 
disadvantaged in the first stages of their occupational careers. Conversely, in OLM, the 
lack of work experience is less problematic, since job allocations rely on vocational 
certificates, and thus school-leavers have more chances to compete with more 
experienced workers. Therefore, broadly speaking, the school-to-work transition should 
be smoother in OLM than in ILM systems (Maurice et al., 1986).  
                                                                                                                                               
distinctions are largely overlapping and the main arguments are quite similar. Therefore, in the 
text, I will exclusively make reference to the ILM/OLM dichotomy. 
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The smoothness of the transition in OLM should entail a faster transition into the 
first job, a better initial placement, and more stable labour market position in terms of 
occupational and contractual mobility in the early career. In OLM, transitions will be 
faster compared to ILM to the extent that employers can easily screen among applicants 
looking at their educational credentials, and future adjustments are less likely to occur 
(Kogan and Unt, 2008; Scherer, 2005). Moreover, in OLM, standardized educational 
qualifications entail a better initial job-skills match and therefore a better occupational 
position at labour market entry. In turn, better job-skill matches at the onset of the 
career reduce occupational mobility afterwards (Gangl, 2003a; Müller and Shavit, 
1998). 
Conversely, in ILM, transitions will take longer because training on-the-job is 
widespread, and thus employers will accurately screen among applicants to reduce the 
initial training costs. In addition, in ILM, the job-skill match is more gradual and 
employers will always prefer experienced workers, and therefore school-leavers will 
enter the labour market in relatively low occupational positions. However, job mobility 
is likely to be high in initial individual careers, to the extent that increasing work 
experience entails increasing job-skill match (Kerckhoff, 1995; Marsden and Ryan, 
1995). 
The ILM/OLM distinction implies also a general hypothesis about the evolution of 
the direct effect of social origin on occupational attainment over the early life course. 
As stressed above, the high job-skills match at labour market entry in OLM implies no 
need for adjustments afterwards, and results in low level of early career mobility. 
Therefore, in OLM, the likelihood young people will change pathways once entered the 
labour market is rather limited. For this reason, inequalities related to social origin at the 
onset of the work life are likely to remain rather stable over the early occupational 
career.  
Conversely, in ILM, the comparatively higher levels of early career mobility leave 
more room for accumulation or compensation of initial inequalities over the life course. 
On the one hand, accumulation may occur to the extent that offspring from better-off 
families enjoy not only a better placement at labour market entry compared to offspring 
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from worse-off families, but also greater rates of early career progression. On the other 
hand, compensation may occur to the extent that offspring from less-advantaged 
families grow faster compared to their counterparts from advantaged families, for 
example, because the market tends to adjust initial mismatches based on non-
meritocratic principles.  
 
1.3.2 Liberal versus coordinated market economies 
Another meaningful distinction among institutional regimes is to classify countries 
as liberal market economies (hereafter: LMEs) versus coordinated market economies 
(hereafter: CMEs) (Hall and Soskice, 2001). This distinction is framed within the 
‘varieties of capitalism’ school (hereafter: VoC), a broad theoretical approach that is 
interested in the overall institutional configurations and complementarities among 
institutions (Estevez-Abe et. al 2001; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Iversen 2005; Iversen and 
Soskice, 2001; Thelen, 2004). The distinction between LMEs and CMEs takes into 
account the features of educational and training systems, as well as the labour market 
structure. However, the VoC argument pays also great attention to the role of national 
employment protection legislations. 
In the VoC approach, the main feature on which countries are categorized is the 
nature of the coordination between firms and other economic actors. The modes of 
coordination are pivotal since coordination affects the willingness of firms and job 
seekers to invest in skills that are more or less portable across firms (Cusack et al., 
2006; Estevez-Abe et. al 2001; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Iversen and Soskice, 2001). 
Since the investment in specific (non-transferable) skills is risky for both employers and 
workers, it is not likely to occur unless it is somehow protected, e.g. by suitable 
institutional settings (Ostrom, 1990). In turn, the propensity to invest in general 
(transferable) or specific (non-transferable) skills directly influences the production 
strategies of firms.  
In LMEs, coordination depends exclusively on market dynamics, and employee-
employer relationships are not protected by national legislations. This arrangement 
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makes it more profitable and rational for firms and workers to invest in general 
(transferable) skills, since there are virtually no limits in the creation and destruction of 
jobs. In turn, the investment in general skills induces a mode of production based on 
radical innovation since occupational mobility is higher, the hierarchical structure more 
definite, and decision-making processes of managers more wide-ranging. In these 
contexts, education and training systems are required to provide general skills, in order 
to ensure a comparative advantage to firms that pursue radical innovation. Thus, LMEs 
typically combine a more academically oriented education system with a narrower on-
the-job training.  
On the contrary, in CMEs, coordination relies also on non-market forms of 
bargaining and collaboration between the organization of companies, unions, and work 
councils. Moreover, in this setting, the protection of employment relationship is high 
due to stringent employment protection legislation. This mode of coordination protects 
the investment in specific (non-transferable) skills and makes it more profitable for both 
workers and firms to invest in such competencies. In turn, this propensity leads to a 
mode of production based on incremental innovation, since worker-employer relations 
are longer, skill specificity higher, inter-firms collaborations greater, and production 
processes more stable. In these contexts, the educational systems provide specific and 
occupational skills, in order to allow firms to pursue strategies based on incremental 
innovation.  
While the VoC approach offers a sophisticated explanation for self-sustaining 
institutional configurations among countries, it pays less attention to the influence of 
institutional configurations on the micro mechanisms that influence the school-to-work 
transition. However – similar to the OLM/ILM dichotomy - the VoC argument implies 
also a general hypothesis about the position of school-leavers in their early careers.  
The overall institutional arrangement in LMEs is likely to be associated with faster 
but less stable transitions compared to CMEs. Namely, transitions from education to the 
first job are more rapid, but lead to job positions that are held for shorter periods. In 
LMEs, rapid entries into first jobs are ensured by low employment protection, which 
allows employers to reduce the screening of applicants to the extent that employers can 
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easily fire workers (Kogan and Unt, 2008; Scherer, 2005). However, low employment 
protection implies great turnover for the whole workforce and more mobility in general. 
This dynamic is exacerbated for young school-leavers, who in these settings do not have 
occupational skills and are likely to move on the occupational ladder once the right job 
is found. In fact, in these settings, initial good job-person match require more time, 
since the channelling function of education is low. Anyway, in LMEs, labour force 
mobility is not a problem to the extent that both employers and school-leavers are likely 
to invest in general and portable skills, so that employers can easily replace workers in 
case of defections, and workers can easily find new jobs in case of lay-offs.  
Conversely, in CMEs, school-to-work transitions are supposed to be slower but 
more stable when compared to LMEs. Namely, transitions from education to the first 
job take longer time, but lead to job positions which are held for longer periods, thus 
implying low levels of early career mobility. In fact, in CMEs, the strict employment 
protection legislation induces employers to accurately screen applicants, thus increasing 
the time school-leavers need to find a first job (Scherer, 2005; Kogan and Unt 2008). 
However, once school-leavers find jobs, these jobs are likely to be stable to the extent 
that the relationships with employers are legally protected. Moreover, both employers 
and workers have few incentives to break off the employment relationships, since they 
have invested in specific and narrow skills that are not portable across firms and sectors. 
Differences in the levels of early career mobility in LMEs and CMEs are also 
pivotal to derive hypotheses regarding the life course evolution of social inequalities 
that may be visible at labour market entry. 
 As for OLM, also in CMEs there are few incentives to occupational mobility, since 
there is a tight link between education and occupation and the protection of employment 
is high. Therefore, in these contexts, the low extent of occupational mobility does not 
leave any room for compensation or accumulation of the initial disadvantage over the 
early occupational career. Here, the direct effect of social origin on occupational 
attainment at labour market entry is likely to remain more stable over the early life 
course. Conversely, in LMEs, the low restrictions to career mobility leave more room 
for either accumulation or compensation of the initial social inequalities, depending on 
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whether offspring from better- or worse-off families enjoy faster rates of early career 
progression. 
 
1.3.3 The explanatory power of existing taxonomies 
The ILM/OLM and LME/CME dichotomies offer powerful tools for framing the 
school-to-work transition in comparative perspective. Table 1.1 and Table 1.2 show the 
classifications of countries along the ILM/OLM and the CMEs/LMEs taxonomies 
according to the main scholars within each theoretical approach. The two classifications 
are only partly overlapping, since they are based on different classification criteria.9 
Generally, countries such as the United Kingdom, Australia, United States, and 
Ireland are grouped within the ILM systems as well as in LMEs. Indeed, these countries 
                                                 
9 The ILM/OLM dichotomy is based on the vocational orientation of the educational systems 
and the firm-based/occupational-based segmentation of the labour market. The LMEs/CMEs 
dichotomy relies on the different forms of coordination among economic actors. The two 
distinctions are only partly overlapping, and also lead to some contradictory predictions 
regarding the process of entry into the labour market (see par. 1.3.1 and 1.3.2). However, for the 
purpose of this thesis, is not necessary to analyse in depth similarities and contradictions 
between the two dichotomies. Rather, it is more fruitful to underline the common shortcomings 
of the ILM/OLM and LMEs/CMEs distinctions.  
Table 1.1– Classification of countries along the ILM/OLM dichotomy 
ILM OLM 
Australia, United Kingdom, United States, 
Ireland, Japan, France 
Austria, Denmark, Germany, The 
Netherlands, Sweden 
Source: Marsden (1986, 1990, 1999) 
 
Table 1.2 – Classification of countries along the LMEs/CMEs dichotomy 
LMEs CMEs 
Australia, Canada, Ireland, United 
Kingdom, United States 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Japan, The Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Italy 
Source: Hall and Soskice (2001), Busemeyer (2009), Busemeyer and Trampush (2012), and 
Estevez-Abe et al. (2001) 
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combine generalist educational systems, production strategies based on radical 
innovation, and market-based systems of coordination among economic actors, e.g. a 
loose regulation of employee-employer relationships and a weak welfare state. 
Conversely, Continental and Nordic European countries are generally grouped within 
OLM systems and CMEs. In these countries, educational systems are more 
vocationally-oriented, labour markets are more segmented by occupations, and 
coordination among economic actors based on non-market forms of collaboration – e.g. 
due to strict employment protection legislation.  
However, both distinctions are far too parsimonious and hide wide heterogeneity 
within each group of countries (Allen, 2007; Gallie, 2007; Gangl, 2003a; Gangl et al., 
2003; Müller, 2005; Tåhlin, 2009). Moreover, both ILM/OLM and LMEs/CMEs 
dichotomies have been incapable of classifying some national contexts based on 
theoretical reasons – for example, Southern European countries.  
On the one hand, the OLM/ILM distinction does not account for institutional 
configurations of countries such as Spain, Italy, Greece, and Portugal, which are indeed 
characterized by a mixture of features belonging to OLM and ILM (Gangl, 2000, 2001, 
2003a; Müller, 2005). On the other hand, the VoC approach forces some southern 
European countries in the CMEs category relying on the strong role of employment 
protection legislation, even if these southern European countries have very different – 
and lower – macroeconomic performance compared to other CMEs. Yet, great 
heterogeneity can be found among other CMEs based on the agencies actually 
providing vocational and general skills, i.e. schools, professional orders, or firms 
(Busemeyer, 2009; Busemeyer and Trampusch, 2012).  
These shortcomings are even more apparent when the modes of school-to-work 
transitions are considered. In fact, school-to-work transitions have proved to be far more 
difficult in southern Europe than in other European contexts, irrespective of the 
OLM/ILM or LMEs/CMEs distinctions. For example, school-leavers from southern 
European countries face higher unemployment risks (Müller, 2005) and longer job-
search periods (Scherer, 2005; Wolbers, 2007b), are more likely to be trapped in initial 
unsatisfactory job positions (Scherer, 2004), and have much more difficulties in finding 
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stable employment (Barbieri and Scherer, 2009; Reyneri, 2005; Schizzerotto, 2002). 
Figure 1.2 in the first section of this chapter provides further evidence for this claim.  
Moreover, also the labour market prospects of young people within the ILM and the 
LMEs categories differ considerably. For example, the only European countries 
classified as LMEs – Ireland and the United Kingdom – perform very differently with 
respect of consolidated measures of youth integration into the labour market, such the 
youth unemployment rate and the share of young people in temporary employment (see 
Figure A1 in the Appendix). Yet, recent research has shown how France and Germany – 
the two polar cases used to exemplify the ILM/OLM distinction (‘organisational vs 
qualificational spaces’) by Maurice and colleagues (1986) – are indeed much more 
similar than expected when education-occupation linkages are measured in terms of 
heterogeneity of occupational destinations (DiPrete et al., 2016).  
Based on the empirical evidence that school-to-work transitions are more difficult 
in southern European contexts and that great heterogeneity exists among the other 
country groupings, several authors have suggested more articulated taxonomies. For 
example, Gangl (2001, 2003a) suggests classifying South Europe as an ad hoc group of 
countries vis-à-vis with OLM and ILM. The rationale behind this classification is that – 
compared to OLM and ILM – Southern European counties are characterised by low 
levels of educational attainment and the provision of very limited vocational skills at 
school. A similar classification can be found in more recent developments of the VoC 
literature, where Mediterranean countries are included in ad hoc group of countries – 
the so-called ‘Mixed Market Economies (MMEs)’ – on the basis of their low degree of 
institutional consonance (Hall and Gingerich, 2004; Molina and Rhodes, 2007). 
However, although Brzinsky-Fay’s (2007) sequence analysis provide evidence for the 
robustness of these threefold classifications, it can be argued that these taxonomies are 
more suited to describing patterns of labour market entry in Europe, whereas less 
attention is devoted to explaining why these patterns occur. Other taxonomies suffer the 
same problem of ex post rationalisation and – akin to the above-mentioned threefold 
classifications – do not offer insights to explain the peculiar conditions of southern 
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Europe and the wide variability within the other country groupings (e.g. Walther, 2006; 
see Raffe, 2011 for a review).  
 
1.3.4 Some overlooked issues 
The lack of explanatory power of existing taxonomies is likely connected to the 
simplistic view of the role of some institutions and to the omission of other potentially 
relevant institutional characteristics.  
First of all, both the ILM/OLM and the LMEs/CMEs distinctions overlooked an 
important institutional feature: the regulation of product and service markets. This 
institutional feature refers to legal restrictions regarding the supply of goods and 
services within national economies, entailing state regulations and corporatist barriers 
upon entry as well as bureaucratic controls over investments, entrepreneurship, prices 
and fees (OECD, 2014b). As will be argued in detail, this kind of restrictions may have 
a wide relevance for market dynamics in general, and for both the efficiency and 
equality of the job-allocation processes in the early career. 
Second, the role of employment protection legislation is overlooked in the case of 
the ILM/OLM distinction, whereas it is probably oversimplified in the VoC literature. 
Following the VoC argument, firms do not need flexibility and indeed profit from a 
strong employment protection in CMEs. However, in the real world, also firms in 
CMEs – such as Germany or Austria – require some flexibility to cope with short-term 
fluctuations in the labour demand, especially after the structural changes occurred in the 
globalised economy. In strongly regulated and strongly unionised labour markets – such 
as in CMEs – this flexibility was mainly obtained by deregulating the use of fixed-term 
contracts and other forms of atypical employment, but leaving standard contracts largely 
unchanged (Barbieri, 2009). As will be argued, a high differential in the extent to which 
standard and fixed-term contracts are legally protected is one of the main source of 
labour market segmentation in the European context, and may have a strong impact on 
the extent and the quality of career mobility after the first job entry. 
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Third, existing taxonomies understate the ‘ambivalent’ role of trade unionism. In 
particular, the VoC approach mainly conveys a somewhat positive view of unions. 
Indeed, in the VoC approach, unions ensure the matching between the specific skills 
provided by the educational systems and required by the modes of production, and 
protect the investment in such skills by sustaining strong employment protection 
legislations. However, unions are likely to defend more strongly the interest of specific 
social groups, thus contributing to segmentation within labour markets (Lindbeck and 
Snower, 1989). As will be discussed in detail, strong unionism is likely to affect the 
degree of occupational mobility in the early career by supporting rigid labour legislation 
and supporting insiders. However, depending on historical circumstances, unions may 
tolerate processes of flexibilisation in the market domain, thus playing a complex and 
counter-intuitive role in different countries and periods. 
 
1.4 Some new insights on the role of the institutional context 
The literature has examined theoretically the influence of institutions on the school-
to-work transition by considering the type of skills provided and required by the 
educational systems and the labour markets, and the level of coordination among 
economic actors, especially as regards the protection of worker-employment 
relationships. In this thesis, I will partially reconsider the role of the institutional 
features that have been identified in the literature, and will additionally consider the 
effect of relevant institutional traits previously not examined in depth.  
An exhaustive discussion of all potentially relevant institutional features is clearly 
out of the scope of this dissertation. Rather, the focus here is on some institutional 
characteristics that may affect the process of entry into the first employment, the 
chances of career progression after the first job entry, and the chances that social 
inequalities at the career beginning strengthen or weaken with career progression. Three 
issues seem particularly promising for these purposes: i) the national regulations on 
product and service markets; ii) the strictness of employment protection legislation, but 
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framed in the context of the ‘partial and targeted’ forms of deregulation that have been 
implemented in the European context; iii) and the ‘ambivalent’ role of trade unionism.  
As anticipated in the previous section, the regulation of product and service markets 
refers to restrictions regarding the supply of goods and services within national 
economies. The little attention given to this institutional characteristic by sociological 
studies is surprising, given that it may impact on economic performances in general, and 
on the youth integration into the labour market in particular. Broadly speaking, strong 
regulations on product and service markets reduce the overall level of mobility of the 
workforce. Strict restrictions in the product market domain indeed dampen the 
aggregate labour demand, and decrease the number of vacancies available in the 
external labour market (Amable and Gatti, 2004; Nickell, 1999). This dynamic reduces 
the outside-option of workers, thus increasing job stability (Amable and Gatti, 2004). In 
turn, reduction of vacancies and low job turnover stifle the chances of job seekers to 
(re)enter the labour market quickly. These difficulties are particularly pronounced for 
young school-leavers, to the extent that they are outsiders compared to more 
experienced job seekers who have already entered the labour market during their lives 
(De Vreyer et al., 2000; Wolbers, 2007b). Moreover, strong product and service market 
regulations discourage the creation of low-skilled jobs in the service sector, especially 
in women-dominated fields (Krugman, 1994; Pissarides et al., 2005). While potentially 
reducing the overall employment chances for young people, this latter dynamic should 
account for an upgrading of the occupational structure in the long term, and may result 
in higher job-quality for those youngsters who manage to find employment. 
The influence of product and service market regulations on the overall level of job 
mobility may also have important consequences in terms of ‘life course stability’ of 
social inequalities that emerge at labour market entry. On the one hand, high restrictions 
to career mobility – favoured by strong product market regulation – should prevent that 
offspring from better-off families take further advantage from career progression 
compared to offspring from worse-off families, or vice versa. On the other hand, lower 
restrictions to career mobility – favoured by low regulations on the product market – 
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leave more room for either accumulation or compensation of the initial disadvantage 
over the early life course.10 
The taxonomies developed to identify institutional regimes have considered the role 
of labour market regulation, notably in terms of the strictness of national employment 
protection legislations. The attention given to this institutional characteristic is 
reasonable, since the overall level of employment protection may have important 
consequences for the process of entry into the first employment. In fact – due to strict 
regulations in hiring and firing procedures – employers usually extend the screening of 
young applicants without any work experience, since the adjustment costs of a potential 
mismatch are conspicuous (Müller and Gangl, 2003; Scherer, 2005; Kogan and Unt, 
2008). Moreover, in tightly regulated labour markets, school-leavers may be more 
reluctant to accept job offers for underqualified and less-prestigious employment than in 
deregulated contexts, since the possible scarring effect of a ‘bad’ labour market entry is 
more persistent (Gangl, 2003a; Gebel, 2010; Barbieri and Cutuli, 2015).  
However, existing taxonomies understate that regulation of the employment 
relationships does not homogeneously affect all the strata of the labour force. For 
example, in response to globalisation pressure, many European countries implemented 
forms of deregulation ‘at the margins’ that facilitated the volatility of temporary 
employment, while leaving the protection of standard employment largely unchanged 
(Barbieri, 2009; Cahuc and Postel-Vinay, 2002). The disproportionate protection in 
favour of permanent compared to temporary contracts may have important 
consequences for the occupational progression of the youth labour force that 
experienced employment flexibility at labour market entry. In fact, when permanents 
contracts are disproportionally protected compared to fixed-term contracts, these fixed-
term contracts are more likely to be bad jobs used to cope with short-term demand 
fluctuations (Barbieri and Cutuli, 2015; Centeno and Novo, 2012). In this insider–
outsider setting, fixed-term contracts at labour market entry could hamper future career 
                                                 
10 As will be discussed in detail in chapter 4, the low restrictions to early career mobility may 
result in either accumulation or compensation of the initial social inequalities depending on 
other country-specific considerations.  
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upgradings via low human capital-accumulation and bad signalling to future 
employers.11 
Finally, the levels of employment protection may also have important implications 
in terms of life course evolution of social inequalities in occupational attainment. 
Similarly to product market regulation, strong employment protection reduces the 
availability of vacancies and the turnover of the workforce (Bertola and Rogerson, 
1997; Gangl, 2003b), thus reducing the chances of early career mobility for all social 
groups. In this view, strong employment protection may concur to the ‘life course 
stability’ of social inequalities emerging at the onset of the career.  
The last institutional characteristic scarcely oversimplified by previous 
classifications of institutional regimes is trade unionism, which may indeed play an 
ambivalent role for the integration of youth into the labour market.  
While the VoC approach conveys only a positive view of unions, well-established 
theories underline how trade unions can indeed represent an important source of labour 
market segmentation. In particular, insider-outsider theories suggests that unions are 
likely to protect the core and unionised labour force over the interests of those out of the 
labour force or in peripheral positions (Lindbeck and Snower, 1998). Considering 
young labour market entrants, this insider-outsider scenario suggests that those entering 
the labour market with fixed-term contracts are indeed outsiders compared to those 
entering the labour market in permanent positions. However, unions are likely to protect 
the interests of all workers, at least to some extent (Hyman, 2001). Hence, fixed-term 
entrants may indeed be considered insiders compared to young people who never 
entered employment.12 
                                                 
11 However, entering the labour market in a temporary position is often considered better than 
remaining in unemployment, which offers no opportunity for human capital accumulation and 
represents the worst signal for future employers (Gebel, 2013; Steijn et al., 2006). 
12 Similarly, workers in high-ranked occupations may be more protected by unions compared to 
workers in low-ranked occupations – irrespective of their contractual position. Therefore, under 
strong unionism, fixed-term entrants may indeed be considered outsiders compared to their 
counterparts who entered employment with higher occupational status, and insiders compared to 
their counterparts who entered employment with lower occupational status.  
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In this perspective, by protecting the interests of insiders over the interests of 
outsiders, unions may indeed foster career immobility and play an ambivalent role for 
fixed-term entrants: strong unions could hinder their opportunities of upgrading to 
better-off jobs and to permanent contracts – but at the same time – strong unions could 
also protect them from the risk of occupational downgrading and unemployment. 
The implications of strong trade unionism for the evolution of social inequalities in 
occupational attainment over the early career are rather complex. On the one hand, 
strong unionism fosters labour market segmentation and workforce immobility, for 
example, by sustaining strong employment protection and favouring occupational 
closure in the product and service markets. In doing so, strong unionism concurs in 
keeping low the overall level of career mobility, thus reducing the chances of 
youngsters from different social background to take advantage from early career 
progression.13 On the other hand, the extent to which unions keep high restrictions to 
career mobility – for example, by opposing to liberalisation reforms in the market 
domain and by defending the interest of their core members – are likely to vary greatly 
cross-nationally and in light of specific historical circumstances. Crucial in this respect 
is the role of social responsibility of unions in times of economic hardship, and their 
capacity to tolerate unpopular policy measures aimed at fostering economic growth and 
employment levels through market flexibilisation.  
 
1.5 Overview of remaining chapters 
The remaining of the thesis consists of three empirical chapters. Starting from the 
general theoretical considerations discussed so far, each chapter touches upon a specific 
aspect of the school-to-work transition by considering – from time to time – the role of 
a slightly different set of institutional characteristics. Therefore, specific theoretical 
considerations, hypotheses, data issues and methods will be discussed in each chapter. 
                                                 
13 As already stressed in footnote 10 (pp. 22), lower restrictions to career progression may result 
in life course accumulation or compensation of social inequalities emerging at labour market 
entry depend on country-specific considerations.  
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The thesis combines the two main approaches to comparative research on the 
school-to-work transition described earlier (see par. 1.2.2). Chapters 2 and 3 use cross-
national datasets and attempt to model empirically the influence of the institutional 
context. Conversely, chapter 4 uses national datasets and compares only two countries, 
Italy and the Netherlands, chosen for their potential in magnifying the importance of 
several institutional characteristics. An overview of the design and the main findings of 
each empirical chapter is provided below. 
Chapter 2 focuses on the transition from education to the first significant 
employment of young Europeans. Here, the speed of entry into the first employment 
and the quality of the first employment (in terms of prestige) are compared among 
school-leavers from 17 European countries over the period 1995-2009. In addition to 
some classical institutional characteristics considered by previous literature – such as 
the employment protection legislation and the vocational orientation of the education 
system – I also theoretically consider and empirically evaluate the role played by 
regulations in the service and product market domains. In doing so, the chapter answers 
old questions about the importance of labour and educational institutions, and puts 
forward new theoretical arguments regarding the importance of product market 
regulation.  
It is hypothesized that while some institutional features positively affect both of the 
two ‘transition outcomes’ of first labour market entrants (speed of entry and prestige), 
others display opposite effects, reducing the fluidity of labour market access but 
assuring better placement in the occupational hierarchy. In line with the ILM/OLM 
distinction, we expect the vocational orientation of the educational and training system 
to work as an institutional characteristic that facilitates job matching by certifying 
applicants’ competencies and easing labour screening – which should therefore speed 
up labour market entry and enhance the prestige of the first job. On the other hand – due 
to their negative influence on the number of vacancies and turnover levels and their 
positive influence on the occupational structure in the long term – we expect 
employment protection legislation and product market regulation to be at the very basis 
of a macro-level trade-off between speed of entry and average prestige.  
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Combining micro-level data from the EU-LFS 2009 ad hoc module on the school-
to-work transition and macro-level data from international sources, the chapter shows 
that part of the contextual variations in the occupational outcomes of young school-
leavers are explained by institutional diversity. In line with the hypotheses, the higher in 
a context the levels of employment protection and product market regulations are, the 
slower the transitions into first employment and the better the average prestige of the 
job entered are. The vocational orientation of educational systems alone seems to 
enhance both the speed and the quality of the first job entry.  
Chapter 3 focuses on the institutional determinants of the occupational progression 
after the first job entry in the European context. Here, the focus is on the chance of 
contractual and occupational mobility of youngsters entered the first employment with a 
fixed-term position in the period 1995-2009. A well-established stream of research 
argued that fixed-term employment at the beginning of the career undermines 
subsequent occupational progression via low skill-accumulation and bad signalling to 
future employers. However, previous studies usually claim that the extent to which this 
scenario applies depend on the institutional context. The chapter tests this specific 
contention by examining the occupational progression after a fixed-term entry in a 
variety of institutional settings.  
It is hypothesised that the occupational developments after a fixed-term entry 
strongly depend on the actual level of institutionally driven segmentation into the labour 
markets. In particular, the role of two interconnected dimensions of institutionally 
driven segmentation is considered: the gap in the protection of standard and temporary 
contracts, and the degree of unionisation. Both institutional dimensions are argued to 
increase barriers across labour market segments (by protecting insiders and lowering the 
quality of fixed-term employment), thus reducing the chances of contractual and 
occupational mobility after a flexible entry.  
Using EU-LFS data and macro-level data from international sources, the analyses 
shows that the career development after a flexible entry is indeed influenced by the two 
institutional dimensions considered. On the one hand, a strong disproportion in the 
protection of permanent compared to temporary contracts is associated with a higher 
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probability of remaining in a fixed-term position in the early career, whereas it has no 
influence on the probability of occupational mobility. On the other hand, strong 
unionisation has no influence on the chances of contractual mobility after a fixed-term 
entry, while decreases the chances of moving both upward or downward on the 
occupational ladder. Finally, there is some evidence that a shift to a permanent contract 
is more often connected with upward occupational mobility in strongly rather than 
weakly unionised labour markets. 
Chapter 4 examines again the process of entry into the first employment and early 
career progression, but with a specific focus on the direct influence of social origin on 
men’s occupational attainment. Here, the focus is on the influence of institutions on the 
extent of early career mobility and its role for the evolution of social inequalities 
emerging at the onset of the career. Two countries are compared along the last half of 
the 20th century: Italy and the Netherlands. These two countries currently belong to the 
country clusters showing the highest and the lowest level of youth unemployment: the 
southern European and the continental clusters, respectively (see Figure 1.2, par. 1.1). 
However, the institutional contexts of the two countries were more similar in the past 
than in recent years.  Until the 1980s, both countries were characterised by strict 
regulations in the labour and product market domains, which contributed to keep low 
the extent of career mobility. However, their institutional settings started to diverge 
considerably in response to the crisis of the fordist model in the early 80’s.  
It is hypothesised that, in Italy, high market rigidities and the strong opposition of 
unions to liberalisation practises kept low the extent of occupational mobility for the 
whole second half of the 20th century, thus leaving no room for either accumulation or 
compensation of initial inequalities. Conversely, until the mid-70’s, institutional 
restrictions to career mobility and the relatively high occupational boundaries in the 
Netherlands were counterbalanced by an economic structure based on large firms 
offering strong internal career ladders. Moreover, in the Dutch context, a process of 
market liberalization in response to the fordist crises found weak opposition from 
unions, and further increased the extent of career mobility after the 80’s. Here, it is 
hypothesised that the lower restrictions to career mobility have revolved in more 
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chances of life course accumulation (rather than compensation) of initial social 
inequalities.  
Using life-history data from the Italian Longitudinal Household Panel Study and 
the Family Survey Dutch Population, this chapter shows that the direct effect of social 
origin on occupational attainment is extremely stable over the early life course. 
Offspring hailing from advantaged social background enjoys a better occupational 
position at labour market entry, while experiencing similar rates of career progression 
compared to their counterparts from less-advantaged families. This pattern of 
intragenerational stability is found irrespective of institutional and structural restrictions 
to career mobility characterising the two countries and the different periods analysed. 
However, when entering the labour market in the same occupational position, offspring 
from higher social background enjoy higher rates of progression compared to their 
counterparts from less-advantaged families in both Italy and the Netherlands. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
INSTITUTIONS AND THE SCHOOL-TO-WORK 
TRANSITION: DISENTANGLING THE ROLE OF THE 
MACRO-INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT14 
 
 
 
Brief summary 
This chapter explores cross-national variations in young school-leavers’ labour market 
entry process across 17 European countries from 1995 to 2009. The general aim is to 
disentangle the role of the macro contexts by analysing the influence of a series of 
institutional factors on the speed of the school-to-work transition and the prestige of the 
first relevant job. The influence of the vocational orientation of the educational systems, 
the employment protection legislation and the product market regulation are 
theoretically considered and empirically evaluated. Relying on micro-data from the 
2009 Ad Hoc module of the European Labour Force Survey, the role of long-term 
institutional settings and the influence of short-term institutional changes are 
disentangled. Moreover, I test for a possible institutional macro-level trade-off between 
speed and quality of the school-to-work transition. Finally, evidence of significant 
interactions between the employment protection and vocational orientation of the 
educational system and between product and labour market regulation is found. 
 
                                                 
A version of this chapter has been published in Socio-Economic Review DOI: 
10.1093/ser/mww019 (with P. Barbieri and G. Cutuli) 
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2.1 Introduction 
The transition from education to the first employment is a key step towards 
adulthood in all western countries. As argued in the first chapter (par. 1.1), plenty of 
economic and sociological literature showed that poor start in the labour market can 
negatively influence later occupational prospects, while early work life stages are good 
predictors of later life course developments. 
This chapter analyses the institutional determinants of the speed of entry and the 
overall quality (measured as prestige score) of school-leavers’ first significant job in 17 
European countries between 1995 and 2009. Our approach aims to disentangle the 
specific role of several institutional characteristics and some possible interactions 
among them from both a theoretical and an empirical standpoint. We consider the role 
of the vocational orientation of the education and training systems (VET), the 
employment protection legislation (EPL), and the product market regulation (PMR) by 
exploiting institutional variety occurring both across space and along time. In doing so, 
we propose an alternative to strategy of inferring the influence of institutional factors by 
comparing the outcomes of the school-to-work transition in a small set of countries 
characterised by different institutional arrangements considered only at the theoretical 
level (e.g. Brzinsky-Fay, 2007; Scherer, 2005; Shavit and Müller, 1998). 
In the last two decades, the increasing availability of comparative measures of 
institutional factors has been reflected in the increase in the number of studies making 
use of macro-level indicators in the school-to-work transition literature (e.g. Breen, 
2005; van der Velden and Wolbers, 2003; Wolbers, 2007b). Inspired by the taxonomies 
discussed in the first chapter, this stream of research has typically focused on the role of 
employment protection and the vocational orientation of the educational system and 
generally found that school-to-work transitions are smoother in both highly deregulated 
labour markets and highly vocationally oriented systems. However, these studies have 
been mainly cross-sectional and/or assumed within-country institutional stability over 
time. The attempt to ‘longitudinalise’ the analysis of the macro context is a relatively 
recent effort in the school-to-work transition literature. A recent study by de Lange and 
 33 
colleagues (2014) has exploited both sources of institutional variation (between and 
within countries), thus providing a better understanding of the functioning of the macro 
context by simultaneously estimating the role of distinct institutional characteristics. 
While building on the main contributions of the existing studies, I delve further by 
attempting to open the black box of the macro-institutional context in four important 
ways.  
First, I provide a conceptual distinction and a tentative empirical identification of 
the influence of long-lasting institutional settings and short-term institutional changes – 
given by the country average of an institutional characteristic over time and the country-
level yearly deviation from this average, respectively. 
Second – in addition to employment protection and vocational orientation – I enrich 
the set of institutional determinants of the school-to-work transition by analysing a 
feature not yet considered in the literature: the strictness of product and service market 
regulation, which mirrors the amount of restrictions with regard to the supply of goods 
and services in terms of barriers at entry, prices, and fees. It is argued that state 
regulations, corporatist barriers at entry, and bureaucratic controls over investments and 
entrepreneurship influence youth labour market prospects by reducing job growth and 
job turnover while shifting the occupational structure upwards. Moreover, in the 
economic literature, the effects of labour market institutions are often considered 
second-order effects that cannot be evaluated without taking into account product 
market institutions (Bassanini and Ernst, 2002; Bertola, 2014). Therefore, by jointly 
considering regulations in the labour- and product market domains, I explore the net 
effects of these regulative dimensions in shaping the trajectories of young school-
leavers entering the European labour markets. 
Third, I theoretically frame and explicitly model the interactions between a) EPL 
and the strength of VET systems and b) EPL and PMR by using micro-level data. To 
the best of my knowledge, the socio-economic literature only considers these 
interactions at the theoretical level or tests them using exclusively macro-level data (e.g. 
Breen, 2005; Fiori et al., 2012; Scherer, 2005).  
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Last, I make use of the time dimension to control for national idiosyncrasies 
possibly leading to biased conclusions, as has been advised by recent sociological 
literature (e.g. te Grotenhuis et al., 2015).  
The analyses suggest that the average occupational prestige at labour market entry 
is associated with the overall long-term contextual setting related to each of the three 
institutional characteristics (VET, EPL, and PMR), whereas the speed of entry seems to 
be related to both the long-term institutional settings and the short-term institutional 
changes. In particular, a strong VET system facilitates the speed of transition and 
provides a better placement in the occupational hierarchy in terms of prestige. On the 
other hand, regulations in the labour- and product market spheres labour and product 
market regulations lie at the foundation of a macro-level trade-off between speed of 
entry and the prestige obtained in the first significant job: the higher in a context the 
levels of EPL and PMR are, the slower the transitions into employment and the better 
the average prestige of the job entered are. Finally, looking at the speed of entry, we 
find evidence both of decreasing effects of EPL in strong vocationally oriented 
educational systems and of increasing effects of PMR in contexts with strong labour 
market rigidity. 
 
2.2 Institutions, market forces, and young people’s entry into the 
labour market: Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
As stressed in the first chapter of this thesis (see par. 1.2.2), individuals do not act 
in a vacuum. Institutional arrangements set boundaries on individuals’ economic 
actions, thereby influencing employers’ and school-leavers’ decision-making processes. 
Alongside institutions, market forces also strongly influence the matching of school-
leavers to jobs by shaping the productive and occupational structures in general and the 
opportunities for new entrants in particular.  
The economic literature suggests that the general process of occupational upgrading 
raised by technical change largely affects the marginal distribution of occupations 
within national contexts (Acemoglu, 2002; Bauer and Bender 2004; Caroli and van 
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Reenen, 2001). I argue that – in addition to market forces – the marginal distribution of 
occupations is also sensitive to institutional arrangements. More precisely, the process 
of occupational upgrading (and therefore the average prestige of the entry job) is only 
affected by extended exposure to institutional settings, whereas the fluency of the 
transition into employment (speed of entry) is sensitive to both short-term, specific 
institutional changes as well as to long-term settings – as shown by the sociological 
literature (Maurice et al., 1986; Shavit and Müller, 1998).15 
It is argued that while some institutional features positively affect both transition 
outcomes (speed of entry and occupational prestige) of labour market entrants, others 
display opposite effects, reducing the fluidity of labour market access but assuring 
better placement in the social stratification hierarchy. Indeed, I expect a strong VET 
system to work as an institutional characteristic that facilitates job matching by making 
applicants’ qualifications more reliable and easing labour screening – which should 
speed up labour market entry and, in the long term, shift the average prestige of the first 
jobs upwards. 
On the other hand, I expect the two regulatory arrangements (EPL and PMR) to be 
at the basis of a macro-level trade-off between speed of entry and occupational prestige. 
The higher the levels of both labour and product market rigidity, the lower the chances 
to rapidly enter into employment and, in the long term, the better the average 
occupational prestige at labour market entry.  
Given these general expectations, in the following section, I provide a discussion of 
the role of the vocational orientation of the educational system as well as of the roles of 
                                                 
15 As will become clearer in the following pages, the between-country differences in the national 
averages in VET, EPL, and PMR are interpreted as the correlates of the unobserved long-term 
institutional consonance. In other words, I conceptualise the between-country differences as the 
results of long-lasting congruence among contextual factors. Conversely, the within-country 
differences, i.e. the yearly deviations from each of the country averages, are conceptualised ‘by 
construction’ as short-term and independent institutional changes.  
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labour and product market regulation in shaping the outcomes of young people’s entry 
into first employment.16 
 
2.2.1 The role of VET system 
The vocational orientation of the education and training systems – i.e. the extent to 
which they provide specific and easily identifiable occupational skills – is an important 
institutional characteristic that shapes the pattern of transition into the labour market 
(e.g. Allmendinger, 1989; Scherer, 2005; Shavit and Müller, 1998). I contend that 
strong VET will favour faster first labour market entries (Hypothesis 1). Indeed, in 
strong VET systems, school-leavers are already qualified and partly trained to perform 
specific occupations. Employers can thus easily anticipate their expected productivity 
and training costs simply by looking at their curricula. As a result, assignments can be 
completed rapidly since trial/training periods and future adjustments are less likely to 
occur (Blossfeld, 1992; Kogan and Unt, 2008; Scherer, 2005).  
Given that vocational education in most countries takes place in upper secondary 
schools, these mechanisms should work mainly for school-leavers with secondary (and 
possibly vocational) qualifications. However, we argue that school-leavers with more 
general and academic education could also enter the labour market quickly in a strong 
VET system. First, educational systems with strong vocational tracks in secondary 
education generally also offer vocationally oriented tracks in tertiary education (e.g. the 
German system). Second, vocational education is indeed a means of diversification, and 
                                                 
16 Looking at the country-level association of youth unemployment and the low speed of 
transition might suggest that the results of the role of institutional settings can be transferred 
from the former to the latter. However, similar institutional settings and consistent patterns of 
institutional reforms have been accompanied by heterogeneous trends of speed of entry and 
youth unemployment within single countries over time. This finding cautions against assuming 
homogeneous effects of institutional factors (such as labour market institutions) as co-
determinants of both average speed of entry and youth unemployment rates. For instance, 
relaxing employment protection can be expected to shorten transitions (in line with one of the 
hypothesis proposed in this chapter) and unemployment spells without affecting overall youth 
unemployment rates (Noelke, 2015). 
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the enrolment of students in secondary vocational programmes should reduce 
competition among school-leavers with academic backgrounds, thus making their 
qualifications more relevant to employers.  
I also expect that strong VET systems will lead to better-off job positions in terms 
of prestige upon labour market entry (Hypothesis 2). A vast amount of literature 
suggests that vocational education in secondary schools provides a ‘safety net’ for less-
capable and less-academically oriented students by preparing them for well-established 
and recognized working-class occupations (Arum and Shavit, 1995; Müller and Shavit, 
2000). Instead, tertiary graduates should enter free professions and service-class 
occupations – i.e. highly prestigious jobs – in all contexts, irrespective of the existence 
of a strong VET system. Similarly, people with only primary or no education at all 
should enter the least-prestigious job positions requiring the least qualification, 
irrespective of the strength of VET systems. Therefore, once the composition of school-
leavers in terms of education is controlled for, I expect that, in the long term, a strong 
VET system will be associated with higher average prestige in the first jobs and that this 
relation will be mainly driven by the availability of qualified job positions for school-
leavers with secondary education. An additional reason to expect a positive influence of 
a strong VET system on the occupational prestige of the first employment is evident in 
the capacity of vocational education to prevent over-skilling during the initial stages of 
an individual’s career. 
 
2.2.2 The role of EPL 
The setting of normative constraints that govern hiring and firing processes has 
been shown to be a relevant institutional characteristic in shaping the labour market 
entry process of young school-leavers (e.g. Breen, 2005; Wolbers, 2007b). The main 
mechanisms accounting for the detrimental influence of EPL on the speed of entry refer 
to the negative effects on the availability of vacancies (Bertola and Rogerson, 1997), on 
the turnover of the workforce (Gangl, 2003b), and on firms’ adjustment to economic 
fluctuations (Boeri and van Ours, 2013; OECD, 2005).  
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We argue that the norms governing temporary employment (rather than those 
protecting permanent contracts) are particularly relevant in influencing the school-to-
work transition. Given the institutionalised dualism of the European labour markets 
(Barbieri, 2009; Barbieri, Cutuli, 2015; Esping-Andersen and Regini, 2000; Palier and 
Thelen, 2010) and the fact that the lion’s share of labour market entrants end up in 
temporary employment, we expect the strictness of legislation that governs eligibility 
criteria, cumulative duration, and reiteration of temporary contracts to be positively 
related to the length of school-leavers’ job searches as well as to the occupational 
prestige of their first significant job.  
Due to the strict regulations of the hiring procedures, employers extend the 
screening of applicants since the adjustment costs of a potential mismatch are 
conspicuous. This holds especially true for school-leavers, who generally imply 
additional training costs for employers (Kogan and Unt, 2008; Müller and Gangl, 
2003b; Scherer, 2005). On the contrary, potential job mismatches are less pricy when 
EPL is low, and employers can thus take faster hiring decisions. Therefore, in line 
previous literature, I expect school-leavers in context of strong EPL to enter a first 
employment slower compared to school-leavers in context where the EPL is stricter 
(Hypothesis 3). However, institutions do not act in isolation, but rather in interaction 
with other institutional spheres (Hall and Soskice, 2001), especially when they influence 
individuals by means of similar mechanisms. This is true when analysing the influence 
of the employment protection and the vocational orientation on the speed of the school-
to-work transition. In fact, both strict EPL and weak VET systems raise the potential 
costs of replacing an employee once hired. As Breen (2005) and Scherer (2005) have 
pointed out, the higher costs of hiring procedures typical of high EPL labour markets 
are far less problematic for employers when a strong VET system reduces the 
probability of a potential mismatch. In this scenario, fast hiring decisions can even 
occur in the presence of strict employment regulation. Hence, we expect strict EPL to 
decrease the speed of entry especially contexts of weak VET, but less so in contexts 
where the education system is strongly vocationally oriented (Hypothesis 3a). 
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The long-term EPL setting is also likely to influence the quality of school-leavers’ 
first significant job by modifying their opportunity costs and the occupational structure 
to which they are exposed. First, in tightly regulated markets, school-leavers may be 
more reluctant to accept job offers for underqualified and less-prestigious employment 
than in de-regulated contexts since the possible scarring effect of a ‘bad’ labour market 
entry is more persistent (Barbieri and Cutuli, 2015; Gangl, 2003b; Gebel, 2010; Scherer, 
2004). Moreover, it has been shown that a strict regulation of the labour market concurs 
to shifts the occupational structure upwards in the long run, consistently with the 
negative association between the strictness of EPL and the share of low-quality jobs in 
Western countries (Kalleberg, 2011; Nellas and Olivieri, 2012; Streeck, 1992). For 
these reasons, we expect school-leavers to enter the labour market in more prestigious 
positions in countries traditionally characterised by high levels of employment 
protection (Hypothesis 4). 
 
2.2.3 The role of PMR 
PMR refers to formal restrictions on the supply of goods and services within 
economies. More precisely, these restrictions entail both state regulations and 
corporatist barriers upon entry as well as bureaucratic controls over investments, 
entrepreneurship, prices, and fees (OECD, 2014b). While product market regulation is 
necessary in modern economies, excessive regulation comes at a cost: Entrepreneurs 
may be discouraged, monopolies may be rewarded, firms’ innovation and productivity 
may be hampered, and economic growth may therefore be limited (Nicoletti and 
Scarpetta 2005; Parker and Kirkpatrick, 2012). I argue that these dynamics are 
particularly relevant for young job-seekers. In fact, strong PMR discourages new start-
ups and impedes innovation processes in incumbent firms, two of the keys to youth 
entrepreneurship and job-creation for young people. Moreover, more competitive 
product markets boost economic growth, which favours young people’s integration into 
the labour market (O’Higghins, 2010; OECD, 2009). 
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As suggested for the EPL, strong PMR dampens the aggregate labour demand and 
decreases the vacancies available in the external labour market (Amable et al., 2011; 
Amable and Gatti, 2004; Nickell, 1999). This, in turn, reduces workers’ exit options, 
thereby increasing job stability (Amable and Gatti, 2004). A reduction of vacancies and 
low job turnover stifle the chances of all job-seekers to rapidly (re-)enter the labour 
market. These dynamics could especially impact the speed of entry for young school-
leavers to the extent that they are outsiders compared with more-experienced job-
seekers (De Vreyer et al., 2000; Wolbers, 2007b). Based on these arguments, I expect 
that in contexts with a strong PMR school-leavers will take more time to enter a first 
employment compared to school-leavers in context whet PMR is weaker (Hypothesis 5)  
However, it is also important to consider the role of PMR in combination with other 
institutional factors. The socio-economic literature stresses the potential interaction 
between EPL and PMR in influencing the overall employment rate (Fiori et al., 2012). I 
extend this argument to the speed of transition into the first job. In particular, it is 
argued that the benefits of deregulating the product market will be higher when other 
labour market rigidities concur to slow the labour market entry process. In fact, when 
transitions into first employment are slow due to strict labour market regulation, there is 
great room for the beneficial effects of relaxing product market legislation (Hypothesis 
5a). 
Moreover, while decreasing the speed of the transitions into first employment, I 
expect high levels of PMR in the long run to be positively associated with the prestige 
of the first job (Hypothesis 6). Similar to what has been argued for the EPL, the long-
term PMR setting shapes both the opportunity costs for school-leavers and the 
occupational structure to which they are exposed when seeking employment. Indeed, 
the detrimental effects of the strictness of PMR on job mobility may disincentivise 
young people from accepting jobs whose prestige is below their expectations, due to the 
low chances of occupational mobility afterwards. More importantly, tight product and 
service market legislations are associated with a lower expansion of low-quality jobs in 
the long run, especially in the service sector and for women (Krugman, 1994; 
Pissarides, 2005). Therefore, in the long run, strict PMR should increase the expected 
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prestige upon labour market entry by preventing downward shifts in the occupational 
structure and by increasing the selectivity of the job-search.  
 
2.3 Data, variables, and methods 
2.3.1 Data 
I use data from the Eurostat 2009 Labour Force Survey’s ad hoc module ‘Entry of 
young people into the labour market’.17 This module was specifically designed to 
collect comparative retrospective information on the school-to-work transition of 
respondents aged 15-34 in 31 European countries. More precisely, the dataset includes 
information on the transition from the last exit from formal education (defined as every 
educational experience included in the joint UNESCO, EUROSTAT, OECD 
questionnaire – UEO) into the first significant job (defined as the first non-casual paid 
job lasting at least three months).18 
The analyses are based only on the 17 European countries for which reliable micro-
data and comparable macro-indicators are available. Switzerland and Germany are 
excluded from the analysis due to serious concerns about the definition of the first 
significant job and data comparability (see Eurostat (2012) for Switzerland and 
Wingerter (2011) for Germany). However, it can be argued that the exclusion of these 
two ‘apprenticeship’ countries leads to a conservative estimation of the influence of 
vocational orientation of the education system since these two countries traditionally 
show comparatively fast and prestigious entries into the labour market. 
Due to lack of comparable macro-data, I also restrict the analyses to respondents 
whose last exit from formal education was verified after 1995 (the latest exit was in 
2009). After this adjustment and list-wise deletion of missing values, a maximum 
                                                 
17 Other kinds of longitudinal cross-national data, such as EU-SILC, only cover a limited time 
span and are less suited to explore the role of institutions making use of longitudinal variations 
occurring within countries over time. 
18Apprenticeship, unpaid traineeship, summer jobs, and compulsory military or community 
service are not considered first significant employment spells. 
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analytical sample of 105,237 cases remains. Details regarding sample sizes in each 
country and year can be found in the Appendix (Table A1). 
 
2.3.2 Variables 
The first dependent variable is the speed of entry into the first significant job, which 
is given by the transition rate of entering the labour market after leaving formal 
education, i.e. the propensity of finding a job by a certain date assuming that this has not 
occurred before that time (monthly time-spells data).19 
The second dependent variable is the prestige of the first significant job, measured 
by the Standard International Occupational Prestige Scale (SIOPS) elaborated by 
Treiman (1977) and updated and validated by Ganzeboom and Treiman (1996) on the 
basis of the ISCO–88 classification (International Standard Classification of 
Occupation). The index is computed by averaging the subjective evaluation of the 
prestige associated with occupational categories for large samples of population in 60 
countries. The scale scores from a minimum of 12 to a maximum of 80 and is related to 
the ‘general desirability of occupations’ as defined by Goldthorpe and Hope (1974). 
SIOPS represents a standard tool in comparative analyses, and is particularly suited to 
our context since occupational prestige rankings has been shown to be remarkably 
stable over countries and periods (Hout and DiPrete, 2006). 
The three main independent variables are the EPL, PMR, and VET indicators, 
measured at the country-year level. The EPL strictness is measured through the 2013 
OECD index ‘regulation of temporary employment’.20  
To compute PMR, we use the sub-index ‘Business Regulation’ of the overall 
‘Economic Freedom of the World’ index as computed by the Fraser Institute (Gwartney 
                                                 
19 Jobs begun before the last exit from education are treated as if they had begun immediately 
after leaving education. Respondents who never found a significant first job are treated as right-
censored. 
20 However, main results are confirmed using an ‘overall index’ computed as the mean of the 
regulation with regard to ‘temporary employment’ and ‘regular employment’. 
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et al., 2013). This sub-index summarises information for a large set of countries from 
1985 onwards21 with respect to six indicators: i) administrative requirements, ii) 
bureaucracy costs, iii) difficulties in starting a business, iv) extra payments / bribes / 
favouritism, v) licensing restrictions, and vi) cost of tax compliance.22 
The VET index is computed as the percentage of students enrolled in vocational 
programmes in secondary education, irrespective of whether or not these programmes 
combine school- and work-based training (UNESCO data).23 Unfortunately, it was not 
feasible to empirically distinguish between types of VET (e.g. Busemeyer and 
Trampusch, 2012) with a time-varying indicator. Indeed, more detailed measures – such 
as the OECD indicator accounting for the percentage of upper secondary students 
enrolled in programmes that combine school- and work-based training – are not 
available for many country-year combinations.24  
EPL, PMR, and VET indices are normalized to vary between 0 – the theoretical 
minimum – and 1 – the theoretical maximum and matched to individual-level data 
according to respondents’ country and year of exit from the educational system 
(prestige) and according to respondents’ country and year of each monthly spell (speed 
                                                 
21 The sub-index is calculated for each country in a 5-year period from 1990 to 2000 and on a 
yearly basis from 2000 onwards. 
22 Data are freely available here: http://www.freetheworld.com. All these indicators are taken 
from various reports of internationally recognized organizations, such as the World Bank and 
the World Economic Forum. See Gwartney and colleagues [2013, pp. 246–248] for a detailed 
description of all indicators and data sources. 
23 We focus on secondary education since the vast majority of vocational training in all 
countries takes place at this educational level. Moreover, it should be noted that our index of 
vocational orientation provides a conservative test for our hypotheses. Indeed, this broader 
measure also includes programmes that solely offer school-based training and in which the 
specificity of skills is generally lower compared with programmes that combine school- and 
work-based training.  
24 Alternative strategies to consider empirically differences in VET systems, such as including a 
categorical variable that groups countries irrespective of variations occurring over time or using 
a time-fixed indicator, would be in stark contrast to our aim of analysing the role of the 
institutional contexts by distinguishing between the influence of long-term institutional 
arrangements and the effects of short-term institutional changes. 
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of entry). Higher values of the macro indicators entail stricter EPL, stricter PMR, and 
stronger VET systems.25 
A set of individual-level covariates controls for the influence of several personal 
characteristics on the two outcomes of interest, i.e. sex (dummy); parental education 
(high, medium, low); respondent’s level of education (primary and lower secondary, 
upper secondary general, upper secondary vocational, tertiary); and compulsory military 
service after having left school (dummy). Moreover, some model specifications include 
countries’ and school-leavers’ cohort dummies (1995/2000; 2001/2005; 2006/2009). 
 
2.3.3 Methods 
The main contention here is that the overall contextual variation in the outcome of 
interests can be depicted as variation across national contexts and time. As stated 
previously, the aim is to disentangle this overall contextual variation by looking at the 
role of several institutional characteristics in shaping young school-leavers’ labour 
market entry. 
The duration of the transition from education to the first significant job is analysed 
by means of continuous-time transition-rate models run on a person-month dataset. This 
strategy jointly allows for a) including time-varying covariates at the contextual-level 
and b) taking into account right-censored respondents who did not experience the failure 
event during the observation window (i.e. entering a first job). I use piecewise constant 
exponential models, thereby splitting the time axis in J-intervals in order to approximate 
the shape of the baseline hazard over time. More formally, the models have the 
following general form: 
 
                                                 
25 The total unemployment rate and GDP per capita (divided by 5,000, in current USD) – as 
proposed by the World Bank – are used to control for economic fluctuations in each country and 
year of exit from education (prestige) or in each country and year of the monthly-spells (speed 
of entry). Tables with institutional variations over time and correlations among macro-variables 
can be found in the Appendix (Tables A2 and A3). 
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r t( ) = exp a j +bX +dM( ) for t Œ t j,t j+1ÈÎ ˘˚ and j =1,..., J (1) 
 
where αj is the specific constant estimated for each time interval τj; X and M are row 
vectors of individual (time-constant) and macro-level (time-varying) covariates, 
respectively; and β and δ are column vectors of associated parameters assumed not to 
vary across time intervals. In this setting, the role of institutions is investigated in a 
dynamic perspective since macro indicators (M) are allowed to vary on a yearly basis 
through the time-process (within countries and within individuals) until the failure event 
occurs (in this case, entering a job). 
The prestige of the first significant job is analysed by means of linear multilevel 
models where only the intercept is allowed to vary randomly. This strategy allows for 
taking the nested structure of the data into account and for estimating the proportion of 
the total variance of the outcome that is attributable to the individual and the contextual 
level. A two-level structure is adopted whereby individuals (i) are nested in 255 
combinations of country and school-leavers’ cohort (j). More formally, I use several 
specifications of the following general model:  
 
yij = bXij +dMj + (Uj +eij ) for j =1,..., J (2) 
 
where the fixed part of the equation includes a vector of characteristics of the 
individual i (X), a vector of macro-level characteristics of the country-cohort 
combination j (M), and their relative vectors of parameters β and δ. In the random part 
of the equation (in brackets), the error term Uj exclusively includes the random 
intercept, whereas εij represents the residual variation at the individual level. In this 
setting, all macro indicators (M) vary at the higher level of analysis, thus assuming a 
different value for each of the 255 country-cohort combinations. 
It is worth noting how some model specifications rely exclusively on institutional 
variations within countries over time, thus controlling for time-constant unobserved 
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heterogeneity at the macro level.26 We do this both a) by applying country fixed effects 
while including our three macro-level indicators (for the speed of entry, see Model 3 in 
Table 2.1) and b) by discriminating the between-country components of macro-level 
variations – the specific country averages of each macro indicator for the 1995-2009 
period – from the within-country components  – the annual deviations from the specific 
country averages (for both outcomes, see Model 4 in Table 2.1 and 2.3) – as indicated in 
Allison (2009) and Bell and Jones (2015). 
The distinction of the between- and within-components of contextual variations 
allows us to provide separate interpretations of the influence of the long-term 
institutional settings and the effect of short-term institutional changes. The between-
components are computed as country averages for the whole period, and their estimates 
rely exclusively on differences among countries. Therefore, they capture the influence 
of the overall and unobserved contextual arrangement correlated with each of the macro 
variables of interest in the long run, net of the other macro-level covariates included in 
the models. This is how I define the influence of the ‘long-term’ settings associated with 
each institutional variable.  
Estimates of the within-components rely exclusively on annual deviations from the 
relative country averages and suggest the effects of country-specific institutional 
variations (reforms) cleaned up by time-constant unobserved macro confounders. This 
is how I define the effect of ‘short-term’ institutional change. 
 
2.4 Empirical Results 
2.4.1 Entering first job 
                                                 
26 When commenting on the results of models relying exclusively on institutional variation 
occurring within countries over time (fixed-effects models [without interaction terms] and 
models including the between- and within-components), the terms ‘effect’ and ‘impact’ do not 
entail a causal underpinning since the presence of time-varying unobserved heterogeneity at the 
country level cannot be completely excluded. 
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Figure 2.1 shows the Kaplan-Meier failure functions for entering the first 
significant job, estimated per each country and school-leavers’ cohort. These functions 
are easily interpretable, as they display the cumulative shares (Y-axis) of school-leavers 
enrolled in a first significant job at each point in time-process (X-axis, months). A 
vertical dashed line is added at t=12 (one year after the last exit from education) to 
allow for a better interpretation of the results. In line with the differences in 
unemployment rates among country-clusters shown in the first chapter of this thesis (see 
 
Figure 2.1 – Kaplan-Meier failure functions: entry into the first significant job by country 
and school-leavers’ cohort 
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Figure 1.2), the figure shows a remarkable overall contextual variation in the speed of 
entry into the first employment. In the Netherlands, Ireland, Denmark, Austria, and the 
United Kingdom, around two-thirds of the school-leavers from all exit cohorts find a 
first significant job within one year of having left education (with the exception of the 
latest cohort in the UK). However, in Spain and Italy, the proportion of school-leavers 
who succeed in finding a significant job within one year varies from between 25% and 
50%, whereas in Greece, this share is even lower than the 25% for the earliest cohort. 
The other national contexts occupy an intermediate position between these two 
extremes. 
Figure 2.1 also shows significant cross-cohort variations within some countries. 
Generally, school-leavers who left the educational system after 2006 found a first 
significant job faster than earlier cohorts. This is the case in all Southern European 
countries, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Belgium, and Finland. In the 
remaining countries, there are fewer cohort differences in the time school-leavers need 
to enter first employment. 
The determinants of contextual variations in the speed of labour market entry are 
analysed by means of transition-rate models. Table 2.1 displays hazard ratios of 
entering a first job and their significance levels for a set of covariates from four 
different model specifications.27 
Model 1 includes dummies for countries and school-leavers’ cohorts as well as 
relevant individual-level characteristics likely to affect the speed of entry into the first 
job. The rationale behind this model specification is quite simple: If institutions shape 
the transition patterns, then differences among countries and cohorts of exit (that 
subsume institutional variety) should remain significant once individual characteristics 
that influence school-leavers’ labour market entry are controlled for. The estimates 
confirm this scenario since clear cross-national and cross-cohort variations are found net  
                                                 
27 These estimates represent the ratio of the relative propensities for entering a significant job 
within a given month (assuming that entrance has not taken place before) between the categories 
of the independent variables and their reference categories. Where cardinal covariates are 
concerned, the ratios refer to a unit increase in the independent variable. 
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Table 2.1 – Piecewise constant exponential models with time-varying covariates for the 
analysis of the speed of transition into the first job: hazard ratios   Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Baseline         0-3 months 0.15** 0.22** 0.19** 0.64** 
    4-13 months 0.03** 0.04** 0.03** 0.11** 
    >13 months 0.01** 0.02** 0.02** 0.06** 
Female (ref. Male) 0.85** 0.85** 0.85** 0.85** 
Parental education (ref. Primary/lower 
secondary)         Upper secondary 1.09** 1.09** 1.09** 1.07** 
    Tertiary 1.04** 1.08** 1.04** 1.03** 
Level of education (ref. Primary/lower 
secondary)         Upper secondary general 1.53** 1.53** 1.54** 1.55** 
    Upper secondary vocational 1.93** 1.79** 1.93** 1.82** 
    Tertiary 2.29** 2.28** 2.28** 2.29** 
Compulsory military service (ref. No) 0.68** 0.71** 0.69** 0.72** 
Country (Ref. Austria)         Belgium 0.69**  0.86**      Czech Republic 0.56**  0.64**      Denmark 1.01  0.99      Spain 0.57**  0.96      Finland 0.79**  0.90**      France 0.66**  0.99      Greece 0.49**  0.83**      Hungary 0.61**  0.75**      Ireland 0.90**  0.88**      Italy 0.39**  0.53**      the Netherlands 1.17**  1.10**      Norway 0.66**  0.68**      Poland 0.68**  1.05      Portugal 1.01  1.37**      Sweden 0.86**  0.93**      the United Kingdom 1.07*  1.05  School-leavers’ cohort (ref. 1995-2000)         2001-2005 1.17**  1.09** 1.11**     2006+ 1.25**  1.10** 1.14** Macro indicators (time-varying)         Vocational Orientation  0.99 1.19**      Employment Protection Legislation  0.53** 0.59**      Product Market Regulation  0.45** 0.75**  Macro indicators (time-varying)    Between components (95-09 country means)        Vocational Orientation    1.29**     Employment Protection Legislation    0.90**     Product Market Regulation    0.03** Within components (annual dev. from country means)       Vocational Orientation    1.30**     Employment Protection Legislation    0.73**     Product Market Regulation    0.83**      N subjects 105,237 105,237 105,237 105,237 
N events 87,558 87,558 87,558 87,558 
Time at risk 2,584,060 2,584,060 2,584,060 2,584,060 
Significance levels (robust standard errors): ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
Models 2, 3, and 4 control for unemployment rate (15-64) and GDP trends as time-varying covariates 
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of compositional effects due to individual traits.28 On the one hand, independent of the 
period of exit from education, school-leavers from the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom experience the fastest transitions into the first job: As implied by the hazard 
ratios of 1.17 and 1.08, transition rates in these contexts are 17% and 8% higher than in 
Austria (the reference category), respectively. Other countries with relatively high rates 
of entry are Denmark, Ireland, Austria, and Portugal. On the other hand, the overall 
country effect on the speed of transition is negative and relevant for Southern European 
countries (Greece, Italy, and Spain), where the rate of entry is around 50%-60% lower 
than in Austria.  
With regard to cross-cohort differences, the analyses show that, independent of the 
national contexts, transitions are faster for those who have left education in recent years: 
Compared with the 1995/00 school-leavers’ cohort, transition rates are 16% and 26% 
higher for the 2001/05 and the 2006/09 cohorts, respectively.  
However, in this model specification, dummies for countries and cohorts represent 
the overall contextual influence on the rate of transition, thereby capturing not only the 
influence of institutions, but also all idiosyncratic features of the contexts in which 
individuals allegedly begin the job search. 
In Model 2, country and cohort dummies are replaced by time-varying macro 
indicators related to the economic conditions and the institutional settings, thereby 
allowing us to unravel the overall contextual influence on the transition rates and to 
capture the role of specific institutions when confounders related to economic 
conditions are netted out. As expected, EPL is negatively associated with the transition 
rate into first employment. The hazard ratio of .53 implies that a shift from the 
minimum EPL value observed in the data (0.04 – e.g. the UK and Ireland in 2000) to 
the maximum observed value (0.79 – e.g. Greece and Italy in 1995) is associated with a 
38% decrease in the rate of entry into the first job ([0.530.79–0.04–1]*100). 
Together with EPL, PMR is also an important institutional feature in delaying the 
                                                 
28 The coefficients of the individual-level variables are all significant and in line with previous 
studies. 
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transition into first employment. More precisely, higher rigidity in the product market 
increases the time of entering a first significant job. On average, when the PMR 
indicator increases from the minimum (0.12, e.g. Finland in 2000) to the maximum 
observed value (0.60, e.g. Italy in 1995), the hazard rate of entry into a first significant 
job decreases by approximately 32% ([0.450.60–0.12–1]*100). The lack of importance of 
VET in Model 2 could indicate the presence of relevant (and unobserved) macro-level 
confounders. Therefore, to better rule out the confounding role of possible 
unobservables, we provide more stringent tests controlling for time-constant unobserved 
heterogeneity at the macro level in Models 3 and 4. 
Model 3 adds country-and-school-leavers’ cohort fixed effects to the usual set of 
covariates. Interestingly, in this specification, the coefficients related to countries and 
school-leavers cohorts’ are significantly reduced when compared with Model 1. This 
confirms how time-varying macro indicators are able to explain part of the overall 
contextual differences in the speed of transition. Model 3 reconfirms the negative 
effects of stringent EPL and PMR on the transition rate. From a substantial standpoint, 
the estimates imply that when moving from the greatest negative to the greatest positive 
within-country deviation of EPL (0.46–in Italy) and PMR (0.36–in Belgium) observed 
in the data, the transition rate decreases by 22% and 10%, respectively ([0.590.46–
1]*100; [0.750.36–1]*100). Moreover, the fixed effect model shows that – once time-
constant unobserved heterogeneity at the macro level is controlled for – the strength of 
VET system also exerts the expected positive impact on the speed of entry: moving 
from the greatest negative to the greatest positive within-country deviation (0.35–in 
Hungary) implies a 6% increase in the transition rate ([1.190.35–1]*100).  
Model 4 provides a further reliability check and tests the hypotheses about the role 
of the short-term variations and long-term exposures to the institutional characteristics 
by excluding contextual dummies (countries and cohorts) and substituting the overall 
macro indicators with their between- and within-country components. The estimates of 
the within-components indicate the net effects of country-specific, short-term 
institutional changes, whereas estimates of the between-components suggest the 
influence of the overall long-term contextual setting associated with each institutional 
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condition. All estimates of the within-components confirm our expectations (and results 
from Model 3): even when controlling for possible bias due to unexplained differences 
across countries, the within-country changes of institutional variables do influence the 
speed of entry into the first job consistent with our hypotheses. Additionally, estimates 
of the between-components have the same sign and significance compared with 
estimates of the within-components, which confirms the hypothesised sensitivity of the 
speed of entry not only to short-term institutional changes but also to long-term 
institutional arrangements. 
Finally, Table 2.2 depicts the relevant results for the EPL by VET and the EPL by 
PMR interactions added to Model specification 3 in Table 2.1. The table reports 
coefficients instead of hazard ratios in order to ease the interpretation of the results. For 
the sake of brevity, I do not thoroughly discuss each single coefficient. The interaction 
term between EPL and VET is positive. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the 
detrimental influence of the EPL on the speed of entry is less pronounced in contexts in 
which strong VET systems decrease the probability of potential skill-job mismatches. 
On the contrary, the interaction term between EPL and PMR is negative, as 
expected, thus confirming that lowering product market regulation is more effective at 
increasing the fluidity of the entry process in contexts characterised by strict 
employment protection.  
 
Table 2.2 – Transition to first employment: focus on EPL–VET and EPL–PMR interactions: 
coefficients 
   Model 3 (Table 2.1) + EPL*VET 
 Model 3 (Table 2.1) + 
EPL*PMR 
Macro indicators (time-varying)   
Vocational orientation (VET) -0.23*     0.17** 
Employment protection legislation (EPL)  -0.93** -0.07 
Product market regulation (PMR)  -0.26** 0.02 
   Interactions   
EPL*VET 1.33**  
EPL*PMR   -0.96** 
Significance levels (robust standard errors): ** p<0.01, * p<0.05   
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2.4.2 Prestige of the first job 
Figure 2.2 presents the average prestige score of the first job by country and school-
leavers’ cohort. All in all, the figure shows moderate contextual variation. Viewing the 
overall country means (dashed lines), the prestige score of the first job is at the 
maximum level in the Netherlands and Belgium (around 43 points), whereas it is 
relatively low in the United Kingdom and Portugal (around 36 points). The other 
national contexts lie in between, with the Southern European countries scoring lower 
than Central and Northern European countries. However, overall country averages 
conceal a rising trend over time (solid lines): Later cohorts of school-leavers seem to 
 
Figure 2.2 – Average prestige scores (SIOPS) by country and school-leavers’ cohort 
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find more prestigious first jobs compared with earlier cohorts in all countries (with the 
exception of the UK, where average prestige scores are relatively constant over time). 
Needless to say, compositional effects (e.g. changes in the productive and occupational 
structure as well as modified gender and educational composition of the workforce) 
have to be kept in mind when considering these descriptive macro-scenarios. 
To refine the analysis, the determinants of the SIOPS scores of the first job are 
analysed by means of multilevel models. Table 2.3 displays the results from four 
different random intercept specifications, which allows us to explore overall contextual 
differences in general and the role of the institutional settings in particular.29  
Model 1 is a null model without explanatory variables. This model demonstrates that 
there is a statistically significant overall contextual variation in the average prestige 
score of the first job, albeit moderate (6.1). In fact, about 4% (intra-class correlation) of 
the overall variance can be explained by differences across combinations of country and 
school-leavers’ cohorts. 
Once individual covariates (Model 2) are controlled for, the overall contextual 
variation decreases from 6.1 to 2.2. The weight of the contexts (countries and cohorts) 
in explaining the differences among the prestige of the first job obtained by school-
leavers is reduced, even if a small but significant variation across combinations of 
country and school-leavers’ cohorts remains when individual characteristics are 
controlled for. Put differently, we observe the persistence of systematic differences 
across geographical and temporal contexts that – even if limited in magnitude – cannot 
be explained by compositional effects in terms of individual traits and resources. 
Model 3 further explains the residual variance at the country-cohort level by 
including macro indicators for economic fluctuations and institutional characteristics.  
                                                 
29 For the sake of parsimony and in line with a plethora of sociological studies, we assume 
invariant effects of our micro-level variables across contexts rather than explicitly modelling 
heterogeneous effects (random slopes specifications). However, in the models, we intentionally 
include only those individual-level variables whose effects should have the same sign (if not 
similar magnitude) across contexts.  
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The variance decreases from 2.2 to 1.1, thus indicating that part of the residual 
contextual variation is explained by systematic differences in terms of macro-economic 
conditions (GDP and unemployment rate), education, (VET), labour (EPL), and product 
market (PMR) institutions. The estimates related to EPL and PMR suggest that strict 
Table 2.3 – Multilevel models for analysing the prestige of the first job: coefficients 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Level 1 variables - Individuals    
Female (ref. Male) -0.67** -0.67** -0.66** 
Parental education (ref. Primary/lower sec.) 
      Upper secondary 1.42** 1.42** 1.41** 
    Tertiary 
 
3.39** 3.42** 3.43** 
Level of education (ref. Primary/lower sec.) 
      Upper secondary general 3.86** 3.89** 3.89** 
    Upper secondary vocational 3.88** 3.86** 3.84** 
    Tertiary 
 
16.79** 16.81** 16.79** 
Compulsory military service (ref. No) 0.50** 0.46* 0.47* 
     Level 2 variables - Country*School-leavers’ cohort 
  Macro indicators 
       Vocational Orientation 
 
5.27** 
     Employment Protection Legislation 
 
1.47** 
     Product Market Regulation 
 
4.48** 
 
     Macro indicators – Between / Within components 
  Between components (95-09 country means) 
       Vocational Orientation 
  
6.47** 
    Employment Protection Legislation 
  
1.88** 
    Product Market Regulation 
  
9.24** 
Within components (annual dev. from country means) 
       Vocational Orientation 
  
-0.25 
    Employment Protection Legislation 
  
0.31 
    Product Market Regulation 
  
-0.74 
     Constant 39.15** 30.80** 30.27** 29.38** 
     Unexplained variance level 2 6.124 2.281 1.046 0.485 
ICC (intra-class correlation) 0.0395 0.0214 0.00992 0.00463 
     N subjects 87,558 87,558 87,558 87,558 
N country*school-leavers’ cohort 255 255 255 255 
Significance levels: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05  
Models 3 and 4 control for unemployment rate (15-64) and GDP trends 
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regulations in the labour- and product market domains favour jobs of higher prestige at 
labour market entry (even if the influence of EPL is substantially quite limited).30 There 
is also evidence that, overall, a strong VET system is associated with better entries in 
terms of prestige. 
Hence, results from Tables 2.1 and 2.3 confirm the hypothesised macro-level trade-
off originated by the macro regulatory arrangement (EPL and PMR) on the outcomes of 
the school-to-work transition: more regulations yield slightly better occupational entries 
but longer queuing. Moreover, Tables 2.1 and 2.3 confirm that only a strong VET 
favours better entries in terms of both prestige and (shorter) duration of the job search. 
Finally, in Model 4, we replace the overall macro indicators with their between-
country and within-country components. In this way, we exclude possible bias due to 
time-constant unobserved confounders at the country level and, at the same time, we are 
able to draw some tentative conclusions about the influence of the long-term contextual 
setting associated with each institutional condition and the effects of short-term 
institutional changes.  
As hypothesised in Section 2.2 of this chapter, short-term institutional changes do 
not impact on the prestige of first employment. Moreover, the estimates of the between-
components are quite close to estimates from Model 3. This suggests that the influence 
of institutions shown in Model 3 is mainly driven by unobserved macro-characteristics 
strictly related to the stable institutional settings considered. Consistent with our 
expectations, rather than exerting instantaneous effects on the occupational structure, 
the institutional characteristics we consider are connected with wider (and unobserved) 
contextual characteristics that – in the long-term – are associated with the average 
prestige obtained by school-leavers in their first job. 
 
                                                 
30 Additional analyses have shown that PMR has stronger positive effects on the prestige score 
for women than for men (see Table A4 in the Appendix). These results are consistent with the 
idea – mentioned in the theoretical section – that stronger PMR prevents the expansion of low-
skilled, female-dominated jobs in the service sector. 
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2.5 Discussion and conclusions 
This chapter explored the process of individual transition from education to first 
significant employment in 17 European countries from 1995 to 2009. In doing so, I paid 
particular attention to the influence of several institutional characteristics on the speed 
of entry and on the prestige of the first significant job. In line with the overall design of 
the thesis, the contention here is that contextual differences in institutional arrangements 
play a role in explaining part of the observed variation in the patterns of labour market 
entry. In this respect, most existing sociological studies exclusively discuss the role of 
the vocational orientation of the educational system and the employment protection 
legislation, quite often assuming institutional stability over time. Conversely, I 
examined a further relevant institutional characteristic that has not yet been considered 
in the literature on the school-to-work transition: the amount of legal regulation of the 
product and service market. In addition, I jointly evaluated the role of the institutions in 
the empirical models and exploited both the geographical and temporal dimensions of 
the contextual variety. This strategy allowed us to explore the role of institutional 
factors that often correlate with each other and to rule out possible issues due to national 
idiosyncrasies. I also provided a tentative interpretation of the influence of the long-
term contextual settings associated with each institutional characteristic and the effects 
of the specific short-term institutional changes.  
Overall, this chapter has confirmed that part of the variation across countries and 
time-periods in the speed of entry and in the prestige of the first job can be attributed to 
institutional diversities. Table 2.4 summarises the main theoretical expectations and the 
main results. 
The empirical findings are consistent with the idea that the average prestige is not 
influenced by short-term institutional change, but rather by long-standing processes of 
occupational upgrading and is therefore only responsive to long-term institutional 
settings. Instead, the speed of entry seems to be sensitive both to long-term settings and 
to short-term institutional changes.  
The hypothesised trade-off between the speed of entry and occupational prestige 
exerted by the regulatory dimensions of labour and product market is corroborated. 
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Results are consistent with the idea that strict regulations in the domains of labour- and 
product market are responsible for the reduced number of vacancies and low turnover 
rates that cause delayed school-to-work transitions (Hypotheses 3 and 5). At the same 
time, more selective job searches and a relatively undersized low-skilled service sectors 
seem to represent plausible mechanisms accounting for the slightly higher average 
prestige found in contexts characterised by labour- and product market rigidities 
(Hypotheses 4 and 6).  
 
Table 2.4 – Summary of hypotheses and main results 
  
Vocational  Employment  Product market  
orientation protection regulation 
Speed of entry  ✓ ✓ ✓ 
(both short- and long term) HP 1 Increase HP 3 Decrease HP 5 Decrease 
Prestige  ✓  ✓ ✓ 
(only long term) HP 2 Increase HP 4 Increase HP 6 Increase 
 
The vocational orientation of the educational and training system alone seems to 
work as an institutional characteristic facilitating both speed and prestige (Hypotheses 1 
and 2). The results are in line with the literature stressing the capacity of vocationally 
oriented educational systems to reduce the informational asymmetries between demand 
and supply of skills, which are likely responsible for delayed labour market entry 
processes. Moreover, results are also consistent with the expectation that vocationally 
oriented educational systems provide durable support to the labour demand for qualified 
job positions. 
Finally, the chapter have contributed to further disentangling the role of the macro-
institutional context by allowing for explicit interactions among some institutional 
spheres. First of all, the results have confirmed that labour market rigidities end up 
exerting detrimental effects on the speed of entry especially in presence of relevant 
informational asymmetries concerning applicants’ skills (Hypothesis 3a). In line with 
Breen (2005) and Scherer (2005), it is questionable whether strict labour regulations 
have any negative side effects on the speed of transition in contexts with strongly 
vocationally oriented educational systems. From this point of view, a combination of 
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strict employment protection and high vocational orientation seems a viable strategy to 
ensure that the cons of institutional regulation do not outweigh the pros. This 
interpretation is also consistent with the prominent literature on Varieties of Capitalism 
discussed in chapter 1 (Hall and Soskice, 2001), which shows how the combination of a 
strict protection of employment relationships and a strong vocational orientation of the 
educational system leads to an efficient institutional equilibrium and good macro-
economic performance in the long run. This scenario is even more plausible when we 
consider that, in the analyses, it is also found that long-term exposure to strict 
employment protection and strong vocational orientation boosts the average placement 
at labour market entry, allegedly via upgrading of the occupational structure.  
I have also shown that the institutional configurations of labour and product market 
rigidities play a relevant role in predicting the smoothness of the school-to-work 
transition. Indeed, we have seen how both labour and product markets are significant 
sources of rigidity that are negatively associated with the fluidity of the labour market 
entry process. Nonetheless, the interplay between these regulative dimensions comes 
with a twofold implication: first, their additive negative effects are exacerbated in 
contexts characterized by the institutional combination of high labour market rigidity 
and strong product- and service market closure. Second, the marginal utility of 
deregulating one of these two sources of rigidity negatively depends on the amount of 
regulation of the other one (Hypothesis 5a). Once again, this makes evident how cross-
country differences in transitions processes – and more generally in labour market 
performances – cannot be traced back to the influence of a single institutional 
characteristic. Rather, despite the different costs of embracing institutional reforms in 
labour- and product market spheres, there is some evidence that EPL and PMR can be 
conceived as economic substitutes, functional equivalents, and alternative policy levers 
to boost the speed of labour market entry. 
In conclusion, paraphrasing Bertola (2014), I could say that no labour market 
configuration is optimal in all circumstances and from all points of view since markets 
are not as perfect as economists would like them to be, policy-makers are not as 
powerful as they would like to be, and policies that affect market efficiency have 
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different implications for the matching between demand and supply of labour, not 
mentioning the implications for the welfare of distinct social groups, i.e. for the 
distribution of social inequality.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT AT LABOUR MARKET 
ENTRY: LABOUR MARKET DUALISM, TRANSITIONS TO 
SECURE EMPLOYMENT AND UPWARD MOBILITY31 
 
 
 
Brief summary 
This chapter focuses on school-leavers who enter employment with a temporary 
contract in the European context, and examines their probabilities to shift to standard 
employment or unemployment, and their chances of occupational mobility afterwards. I 
argue that two institutional dimensions of insider-outsider segmentation drive the 
career progression after a flexible entry: the gap between the regulation of permanent 
and temporary contracts and the degree of unionisation. The analyses show that a 
disproportionate protection of permanent compared to temporary contracts enlarges 
the probability of remaining in a fixed-term contract, whereas the degree of 
unionisation slightly decreases the chance of moving to jobs with higher or lower socio-
economic status. Finally, a shift to permanent employment after a fixed-term entry is 
more often associated with occupational upward mobility in strongly rather than weakly 
unionised labour markets. 
                                                 
A version of this chapter has been published in Economic and Industrial Democracy, DOI: 
10.1177/0143831X16652946 (with M.H.J. Wolbers) 
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3.1 Introduction 
A consolidated stream of research argues that temporary (or fixed-term) 
employment – as a specific instrument to cope with structural changes in the globalized 
economy – is the new source of social inequality in European labour markets (e.g. 
Barbieri, 2009; DiPrete, 2005; Maurin and Postel-Vinay, 2005). In fact, while some 
commentators argue that fixed-term contracts (hereafter: FTCs) facilitate firms’ 
response to labour demand fluctuations, they are often overrepresented among low-paid 
and low-skilled jobs (Booth et al., 2002; Kalleberg et al., 2000). Moreover, the 
importance of employment flexibility in structuring inequality in Europe is even 
exacerbated in some national contexts, where standard and uninterrupted employment 
careers are the only connection to welfare entitlements, such as unemployment benefits 
or pension schemas (e.g. in Italy, see Barbieri and Scherer, 2009). 
The rising demand for employment flexibility in the European context is reflected 
in the expansion of FTCs among the youth labour force, allegedly the most common 
target for flexibilisation practises (Barbieri, 2009; Blossfeld et al., 2008). In 2013, about 
51% of young employees had a temporary contract in the Southern European countries, 
whereas this figure is slightly lower in continental Europe (40%), and sensibly lower in 
Northern (35%) and Eastern (34%) Europe (see Figure 3.1). However – despite these 
cross-regional differences – in the last two decades the incidence of temporary 
employment among the youth has increased steadily in all European countries. As 
already stressed in the first chapter of the thesis, the percentage of temporary workers 
among the youth in the European Union showed a significant increase from 27% in 
1990 up to 43% in 2013. 
These figures confirm that temporary jobs are part of the early phases of the 
employment career for many young Europeans. Therefore, it becomes relevant to 
examine the career progression of the youngsters who experienced employment 
flexibility at labour market entry. In fact, while being uncertain per se, fixed-term jobs 
at the start of the career could undermine future occupational development via low skill-
accumulation and bad signalling, thus representing a trap for labour market entrants (de 
Lange et al., 2013; Gash and McGinnity, 2006; Gebel, 2010; Giesecke and Groß, 2003; 
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McGinnity et al., 2005; Scherer, 2004). Moreover – and crucially – previous studies 
suggest explicitly that the extent to which this entrapment scenario is likely to apply 
depends on the institutional context (Gash and McGinnity, 2006; Gebel, 2010; 
McGinnity et al., 2005; Scherer, 2004). 
 
Against this background, I focus on a pool of school-leavers who entered their first 
‘real’ job (the first non-casual job lasted at least three months) with a FTC, and examine 
their probabilities to enter standard employment or unemployment/inactivity (versus 
remaining in temporary employment), and their chances of occupational mobility in a 
variety of institutional contexts. Specifically, we question whether institutionally driven 
segmentation into the labour market leads to worse early career developments for 
school-leavers who entered the first employment in FTCs. 
The potential contribution of this chapter to the debate about the diffusion of 
temporary employment among young people is threefold. First, it contributes to the 
stepping-stone vs. trap debate, which considers alternatively FTCs at labour market 
 
Figure 3.1 – Youth temporary employment rates (% of total employees) in the 
EU–28 and in different country clusters in the period 1990-2013 
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entry as entry-port to standard employment or trap into the bad segment of the labour 
market. In fact, this literature often found mixed results depending on the specific 
countries and periods analysed, but the reasons behind these variations are not well 
explored. Second, contrary to existing studies that considered institutional 
configurations only at a theoretical level by focusing on one or a few countries at most, 
this chapter compares a great number of countries (17) and a relatively large time-span 
(1995-2009), in order to parametrise micro-level outcomes on the basis of macro-level 
determinants. Third, the chapter focuses on the role of two interconnected institutional 
dimensions of labour market segmentation: the gap between the regulation of standard 
and temporary contracts and the strength of unions. 
 
3.2 The entrapment argument 
A good starting point to elucidate the entrapment argument is the core-periphery 
model developed by Atkinson (1984). Although somewhat dated, this model still offers 
useful insights for understanding the societal consequences of firms’ distinction 
between permanent and temporary workers. In a nutshell, the model depicts the 
structure of the modern, flexible firm that organises its workforce in a core segment – an 
internalised, highly-skilled, well-paid and secure group of workers – from a periphery 
segment – typically a less-skilled group of workers hired on a temporary basis from the 
external labour market, and used to buffer from demand fluctuations. In this way, firms 
pursue both functional and numerical flexibility. Functional flexibility is guaranteed by 
the high-skill profile of core workers with permanent contracts, whereas numerical 
flexibility is guaranteed by the availability of temporary workers. Nowadays, the 
distinction between permanent and temporary contracts may have become more blurred 
and uncertain than in the 1980s when Atkinson developed his model, thus making 
possible that functional flexibility is also achieved via highly skilled workers hired on a 
temporary basis (Reilly, 1998). However, it is still more common that the core workers 
are offered permanent contracts in order to ensure long-lasting employment 
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relationships and avoid poaching, especially when firms’ initial investment in training is 
conspicuous (Busemeyer, 2009).  
At the aggregate level, this firms’ organizational structure mirrors in the creation of 
a two-tier labour market, where a well-protected and rewarded group of workers in the 
primary segment is neatly separated from a less paid and protected group of workers in 
the secondary segment (Doeringer and Piore, 1985; Kalleberg, 2003). In this 
perspective, temporary workers in the secondary segment are outsiders compared to 
permanent workers – the insiders – in the primary segment (Lindbeck and Snower, 
1989). One constitutive feature of this segmentation is its persistence over the life 
course, since in- and outflows from the two segments are scarce (ibidem). 
Starting from this scenario, the entrapment hypothesis predicts that entering the 
labour market in FTCs, i.e. as outsiders, hinders future career development by means of 
two basic micro-level mechanisms that operate mainly on the external labour market. 
First – from a human capital perspective (Becker, 1962) – temporary jobs in the 
secondary segment may hinder skill-accumulation via poor working conditions and 
little or no formalised (possibilities for) training on-the-job (Cutuli and Guetto, 2013), 
thus making fixed-term entrants less attractive for future employers. Second – from a 
signalling perspective (Spence, 1973) – a flexible entry could represent a bad signal for 
prospective employers: ‘why was the candidate not worth of a permanent position?’ It 
can be argued that flexible entries can be negative signals irrespective of the actual 
quality of the job: it suffices that temporary jobs are considered inferior compared to 
permanent jobs.  
Therefore, the precondition of the entrapment argument is that jobs on FTCs are – 
or are believed to be – part of the secondary segment, i.e. inferior jobs compared to 
standard employment. As a matter of fact, these two conditions are more likely to be 
satisfied if there is actual segmentation in the labour market between insiders’ and 
outsiders’ jobs, with temporary employment being part of the latter. Previous research is 
well aware of this issue, and usually claim that the extent to which the entrapment 
hypothesis is likely to apply depend on the actual level of insider-outsider segmentation 
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within a labour market (McGinnity et al., 2005; Scherer, 2004). I empirically test this 
specific contention. 
In what follows, I focus on two interconnected institutional dimensions of labour 
market segmentation, and I elaborate hypotheses on the role of these dimensions in 
shaping the career progression after a flexible labour market entry in terms of 
contractual and occupational mobility. Contractual mobility is defined by shifts into 
labour market positions that are marked by a different contractual/employment status 
(permanent employment, unemployment, inactivity) compared to temporary 
employment (the origin state). Occupational mobility is defined by moves into job 
positions marked by higher or lower occupational status compared to the first job 
entered after leaving education. 
 
3.3 Institutional dimensions of segmentation: theory and 
expectations 
3.3.1 The gap between the regulation of standard and temporary contracts 
The employment protection legislation (hereafter: EPL) summarises a series of 
institutional measures that regulate hiring and firing practises within national contexts 
(Boeri and van Ours, 2013). More precisely, the EPL for standard employment rules 
hiring and firing practises of permanent workers, whereas the EPL for temporary 
employment regulates specifically the procedures to hire workers on a temporary basis. 
However, while ‘firing’ is a different process compared to ‘hiring’, it can be argued that 
both measures can be read in terms of turnover costs: the stricter the regulation, the 
higher the turnover costs for employers. In fact – from the employer perspective – 
excessive hiring costs for temporary workers increase money loss in case of lay-offs, 
thus also representing firing restrictions.  
The deregulation of employment relationships is one of the main instruments by 
which European labour markets have implemented flexibility in response to 
globalisation pressure. In fact, deregulation of the EPL facilitates hiring and dismissal 
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of workers, thus making it easier for employers to adjust the workforce according to 
demand fluctuations (Bertola and Rogerson, 1997). While boosting productivity growth 
(e.g. Autor et al., 2007), it has been questioned whether the increased flexibility 
reflected in lower job-satisfaction and well-being for workers, exposed to high level of 
uncertainty about their future (Böckerman et al., 2011; Salvatori, 2010).  
However – in practice – the ways European labour markets implemented 
deregulation in employment relationships differ considerably among national contexts. 
In some countries, deregulation became the basic principle of labour market policies, 
whereas in other cases, it was introduced as controlled experiments and directed 
towards specific marginal groups (Regini, 2000). These processes of deregulation at the 
margins usually facilitated the volatility of temporary employment, while leaving the 
protection of standard employment largely unchanged (Barbieri, 2009; Cahuc and 
Postel-Vinay, 2002). Therefore, in many countries, this process of partial and targeted 
deregulation resulted in a disproportionate protection of permanent compared to 
temporary contracts. 
The gap in the protection of permanent and temporary employment (hereafter: EPL 
gap) is nowadays recognized as one of the main institutional factors driving the insider-
outsider segmentation in the labour market (Scarpetta et al., 2010; Barbieri and Cutuli, 
2015; Polavieja, 2003). This is because when permanents contracts are 
disproportionally protected compared to FTCs, employers will tend to use FTCs as 
buffers from short-term fluctuations in the demand for basic tasks, due to their lower 
turnovers costs compared to standard employment. It follows that, when the EPL gap is 
high, jobs on FTCs are more likely to be in the secondary segment of the labour market 
(Centeno and Novo, 2012). As anticipated in the first chapter of the thesis (par. 1.4) and 
in section 3.2 of this chapter, in this insider-outsider setting, FTCs at labour market 
entry could hamper future career upgrading via low human capital accumulation and 
bad signalling.32 However, a fixed-term entry is often considered better than 
                                                 
32 Moreover, in contexts where EPL is disproportionally in favour of permanent contracts 
compared to FTCs, the inferior chances of being laid off ‘without right cause’ of the former can 
be considered a valuable and desirable condition independently of the individual preferences for 
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unemployment, that offers the worst chance of human capital accumulation and 
represent the worst signal for future employers (Gebel, 2013; Steijn et al., 2006). 
In conclusion, high EPL gaps are likely to increase barriers among labour market 
segments and, by this way, to ‘freeze’ early career stages of fixed-term entrants. 
Compared to the situation where EPL is more balanced, fixed-term entrants in the 
context of a high EPL gap should be less likely to move into the primary segment – that 
is prerogative of permanent workers already part of the core workforce – but they 
should also be less likely to move to unemployment – that is prerogative of the even 
‘more’ outsider labour force of whom never entered employment. 
 
3.3.2 The role of unions 
Another institutional dimension related to labour market segmentation is the 
strength of trade unions within a national context (Polavieja, 2003). According to 
insider-outsider theory, unions protect the interest of the unionised core workforce in 
the primary segment, whereas the interests of non-unionised people out of the labour 
market or in peripheral positions have no priority (Lindbeck and Snower, 1989). By 
contracting wages above the efficiency level and favouring institutional measures to 
protect the core workforce, unions maximize the interests of insiders, which has the side 
effect of transferring market risks to outsiders (ibidem).33 In this process, unions bargain 
wages in a way that allows insiders to receive the highest possible wage without eroding 
their employment positions and their welfare benefits. 
While in its early formulation the insider-outsider theory considered employed 
workers as insiders and unemployed workers as outsiders, recent contributions argue 
                                                                                                                                               
long- or fixed-term employment. It follows that – quality of fixed-term jobs being equal – FTCs 
at labour market entry are more likely to be perceived of inferior quality and represent bad 
signals in a context where the EPL gap is high compared to a context where EPL is more 
balanced. 
33 In this sense, deregulation at the margins and unionism are strongly related, since unions are 
likely to support directly dual EPL reforms in order to protect job security of insiders (Rubery, 
1989). 
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that temporary workers can also be considered part of the outsider group, with no or 
with a very limited role in the bargaining process (Eichhorst and Marx, 2012; Rueda, 
2005).  
I argue that – to some extent – fixed-term labour market entrants in contexts of 
strong unionism are even ‘more’ outsiders compared to fixed-term entrants in contexts 
where unions have less market power. However, unions could also help youth 
integration into the labour market by favouring coordination among economic actors 
(Hall and Soskice, 2001), thus fostering also the partial integration of those who started 
to work in fixed-term employment. In this sense, as already anticipated in the first 
chapter of the thesis, unions seem to exert an ambivalent role for the career prospects of 
fixed-term entrants: they could hinder opportunities of upgrading to better-off jobs and 
to permanent contracts – but at the same time – they might also protect them from the 
risk of occupational downgrading and unemployment.  
In fact, in contexts where unionism is weak, young people who entered 
employment in FTCs have the chance to move on the occupational ladder, since there 
are comparatively few restrictions to occupational and contractual mobility – that could 
occur in all directions, however. Conversely, in contexts where unionism is strong, 
young people who entered employment in FTCs have less mobility chances. On the one 
hand, strong unions control the access to core jobs, and therefore impede occupational 
and contractual upgrading after a fixed-term entry. On the other hand, unions are likely 
to protect the interests of all workers (Hyman, 2001) – at least to some extent – and 
therefore fixed-term entrants will be less likely to move to unemployment in contexts of 
strong unionism compared to contexts of weak unionism. Moreover, strong unionism 
might enlarge differences among fixed-term entrants by attaching them specific degrees 
of ‘outsiderness’ on the basis of the quality of the first job they entered. More precisely, 
in contexts of strong unionism, fixed-term entrants can be considered outsiders 
compared to their counterparts who entered employment in higher occupational status, 
and insiders compared to their counterparts who entered employment in lower 
occupational status. In such scenario, school-leavers who entered employment in FTCs 
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might be more protected from occupational downgrading in contexts of strong unionism 
than in contexts of weak unionism.  
All in all, strong unionism is likely to generate or at least to reinforce the 
segmentation of the labour market, thus reducing contractual and occupational mobility 
(in all directions) after a flexible labour market entry.  
 
3.3.3 Hypotheses 
I discussed how both a high EPL gap and strong unions – although by means of 
different mechanisms – generate barriers across labour market segments, thus hindering 
mobility between the primary and secondary segment, but also between the secondary 
segment and unemployment. Therefore, I expect both institutional dimensions of labour 
market dualism to affect similarly the subsequent contractual/employment status of 
fixed-term entrants. With respect to the EPL gap, I expect fixed-term entrants to be 
more likely to remain in temporary employment in the early career in contexts where 
there is a strong EPL gap compared to fixed-term entrants in contexts where EPL is 
more balanced (Hypothesis 1). In a similar fashion, I expect fixed-term entrants to be 
more likely to remain in temporary employment in the early career in contexts of strong 
unionism compared to fixed-term entrants in contexts where unions are comparatively 
weaker (Hypothesis 2). 
However, the theoretical discussion leads to slightly different predictions of the 
effects of the two institutional dimensions on the probability of occupational mobility. 
Regarding the EPL gap, low human capital accumulation and bad signalling might 
prevent fixed-term entrants to move their way up on the occupational ladder in contexts 
where permanent employment is disproportionally protected compared to temporary 
employment. Therefore, I expect fixed-term entrants to be less likely to upgrade on the 
occupational ladder in contexts where there is a strong EPL gap compared to fixed-term 
entrants in contexts where EPL is more balanced (Hypothesis 3). Nevertheless, the 
effects of the EPL gap on the probability of downward occupational mobility are largely 
unpredictable – at least on the basis of our theoretical discussion.  
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Regarding the role of trade unions on the probability of occupational mobility after 
a fixed-term entry, predictions are more in line with the idea of ‘frozen’ early careers 
when unions have strong market power. Indeed, strong unions are likely to protect the 
access to insider jobs, but, at the same time, unions are likely to attach different degrees 
of ‘outsiderness’ to fixed-term entrants, thus preventing them from downgrading to 
even worse occupational positions later in life. For these reasons, I expect fixed-term 
entrants to be less likely to both up- and downgrade on the occupational ladder in 
contexts of strong unionism compared to contexts where unions are comparatively 
weaker (Hypothesis 4). 
The last hypothesis tries to relate the two labour market outcomes considered: 
contractual and occupational mobility after a fixed-term entry. Contract type and 
occupational status are two important characteristics for the evaluation of the overall 
quality of a job. However, some individuals might have a preference for job stability, 
whereas others might strive for their socio-economic status. Nevertheless, as 
extensively discussed in the theoretical framework of the thesis, individual preferences 
and choices are shaped and constrained by structural, cyclical and institutional factors 
(see par. 1.2.2 in the first chapter). For example, individuals may have fewer 
opportunities to choose between type of contract and occupational status when high 
unemployment rates reduce the vacancies available on the labour market, or when – 
given the occupational structure – high status jobs require long-lasting employment 
relationships.34  
In this respect, I argue that the institutional dimensions of the insider-outsider 
segmentation we considered are two of the main factors constraining individual 
preferences and choices. Indeed, when labour market segmentation is weak, FTCs are 
not necessarily bad jobs in the secondary segment, and therefore, fixed-term entrants 
with a specific preference for temporary employment can upgrade on the occupational 
ladder without necessarily upgrading to a permanent position. In this context, a weak 
                                                 
34 For example, when both firms and workers have to protect the initial investment in firm-
specific skills (see Busemeyer, 2009). 
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positive or even no association between contract type and occupational upgrading can 
be expected. 
Conversely, when the insider-outsider segmentation is strong, FTCs are often 
overrepresented among low-status occupations in the secondary segment, whereas 
permanent contracts are often attached to high-status jobs in the primary segment. In 
this context, a contractual upgrading after a fixed-term entry is more likely to come 
along also with an upgrading in terms of occupational status, and vice versa. Therefore, 
I expect a stronger positive association between contractual and occupational upgrading 
after a fixed-term entry in contexts with a strong EPL gap compared to contexts where 
EPL is more balanced (Hypothesis 5). In the same fashion, I expect a stronger positive 
association between contractual and occupational upgrading after a fixed-term entry in 
contexts of strong unionism compared to contexts where unions are comparatively 
weaker (Hypothesis 6). 
 
3.4 Research design 
3.4.1 Data 
This chapter uses data from the standard Eurostat 2009 Labour Force Survey 
combined with data from the ad hoc module ‘Entry of Young People into the Labour 
Market’ already used in chapter 2. This combination of data provides specific 
retrospective information on both the first relevant job obtained after leaving formal 
education and the current occupational position (in 2009) of people aged 15-34 in 31 
European countries.35 As for chapter 2, I analyse only the 17 European countries for 
which comparable macro-indicators and reliable micro-data were available.36 
                                                 
35 The first relevant job is defined as the first non-casual paid job lasting at least three months. 
Apprenticeship, unpaid traineeship, summer jobs and compulsory military or community 
services are not considered as first significant employment spells. 
36 They are Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain and Sweden. 
As in chapter 2, Switzerland and Germany are excluded from the analysis due to concerns about 
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I restricted the overall sample to young people who entered the labour market for 
the first time in temporary employment, in order to focus on contextual differences in 
the early occupational careers of flexible labour market entrants. In compliance with the 
definition of the ‘school-to-work transition’ given in the very beginning of the thesis 
(see par 1.1 in chapter 1), this chapter only focuses on early career mobility by looking 
at the first 15 years (maximum) after the first labour market entry. Therefore, the 
empirical analysis is restricted to respondents whose last exit from formal education is 
between 1995 and 2009.  
Unfortunately, the ad hoc module collected information on the contract type of the 
first job exclusively for those who changed the first employer, i.e. for those who moved 
on the external labour market.37 However, in our case, this selection should not be 
problematic, since the micro-level mechanisms behind the entrapment argument (low 
skill-accumulation and bad signalling) operate mainly with respect to new potential 
employers rather than to the same employer. Therefore – given the focus of the chapter 
on the role of institutions via these specific mechanisms – the external labour market is 
the most appropriate circumstance to study contextual variations in the entrapment 
dynamics. 
After these selections and list wise deletion of missing values, the overall sample 
includes a maximum of 20,050 cases for which we have data both on individual and 
contextual characteristics. 
 
3.4.2 Variables and methods 
The first dependent variable is the contractual mobility between the first significant 
job and the employment situation at the moment of the interview (in 2009). The current 
                                                                                                                                               
data comparability (see Eurostat [2012] for Switzerland and Wingerter [2011] for Germany). 
The United Kingdom is excluded due to very limited number of cases.  
37 In any case, the questionnaire specifically asked the contract offered by the first employer 
after all possible probation periods.  
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employment status is measured by distinguishing four categories: temporary 
employment, permanent employment, unemployment, and inactivity.38 
The second dependent variable is the occupational mobility between the first 
significant job and the current job in terms of occupational status. Occupational status is 
measured by means of the International Socio-Economic Index (ISEI) (Ganzeboom et 
al., 1996) on the basis of information from the ISCO-88 classification. Upward and 
downward moves are defined as moves of at least six percentage points on the ISEI 
scale. The final variable includes three categories: upward mobility, downward 
mobility, and stability. 
The main independent variables refer to two different institutional dimensions of 
labour market segmentation: EPL gap and union strength. Both variables are measured 
at the country-year level and matched to individuals according to their year of exit from 
the first job, allegedly the moment when they re-started the job search.39 
The EPL gap is measured as the difference between the employment protection for 
standard and temporary employment in a given country and year. Positive values of the 
index indicate insider-outsider segmentation, whereas the value of 0 indicates that 
permanent and temporary jobs are equally protected, i.e. no segmentation.40 Figures for 
the EPL strictness for regular and temporary contracts are taken from the relative time-
series released by the OECD in 2013. We use the difference instead of the ratio, since 
the EPL gap argument is essentially about differences in turnover costs between 
temporary and permanent workers, which are by definition very low in both cases when 
                                                 
38 Self-employed and family workers at the moment of the interview are excluded from the 
analysis due to low number of cases in most countries. However, their inclusion in the 
‘permanent employment’ or in the ‘temporary employment’ categories does not substantially 
change the main results.  
39 Due to empty cells in three country-year combinations (Denmark 1995, Norway 1995 and 
1996), the analysis is based on 252 effective country-year combinations and not 255.  
40 Negative values could occur when FTCs are more protected than permanent contracts. 
However, since insider-outsider segmentation by type of contracts refers to situations where 
permanent contracts are disproportionally protected compared to FTCs, negative values of the 
index are imputed to 0, i.e. no segmentation.  
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both indices approximate the value of 0, even in presence of strong positive values of 
the ratio.  
Union strength is approximated by the OECD ‘union density index’, which 
measures the percentage of wage and salary earners that is member of a trade union 
over the total amount of wage salary earners in a given country and year. Although 
union density may be an imperfect and incomplete measure of strength, it still 
represents a critical resource for unions’ power (Visser, 1992; Piazza, 2005; Sullivan, 
2009). Unfortunately, an alternative measure of union strength, such as the coverage of 
collective wage agreements, is simply not available longitudinally for many of the 
countries considered.  
Both independent institutional variables are normalized to vary between 0 and 10, 
which represents the overall theoretical range of variation. 
In the last part of the empirical analysis, the focus is on the contextual 
heterogeneity in the relation between contractual and occupational mobility. Here, the 
main independent variable is the shift to a permanent job, which measures whether 
fixed-term entrants are integrated in standard employment at the moment of the 
interview (1=yes).  
A series of individual-level characteristics that are likely to affect the probability of 
contractual and occupational mobility after a fixed-term entry is controlled for. More 
precisely, we include in all models the variables sex, age, parental education (high, 
medium, low), level of education (primary or lower secondary, upper secondary, 
tertiary), field of study of the highest level of education attained (general, social 
sciences and humanities, natural sciences and technical disciplines, health and welfare), 
and a cardinal variable measuring the time since the last exit from the education system 
(until the year of the interview).  
Unfortunately, some relevant characteristics concerning the first job are not 
available, such as the sector of employment, and – in this respect – field of study 
represents only a weak proxy. We exclude from the models the ISEI score of the first 
job, since the low quality of temporary jobs in segmented labour markets is cause and 
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part of the mechanism (the human capital mechanism) that could explain the reduced 
contractual and occupational mobility patterns in those contexts.41  
In addition to individual-level variables, a large set of macro-level factors are 
considered in order to control for contextual differences that are possibly correlated both 
with the institutional dimensions of segmentation and the outcomes of interest. As for 
the institutional variables, also these variables are matched to individual data according 
to the national context and the year of exit from the first job.  
The total unemployment rate and the GDP per capita (USD - divided by 5,000) are 
used to control for cyclical and structural economic factors, respectively. Figures for 
these measures are taken from the World Bank. The total share of temporary workers 
over the overall amount of employees, as measured by OECD data, is used to account 
for the diffusion of temporary employment in different countries and years, which may 
itself explain the higher or lower propensities of having FTCs later in life. The inclusion 
of this variable is particularly important, since a relevant number of studies found a 
positive association between our institutional dimensions of segmentation and the 
diffusion of temporary employment, particularly for young people (see Hipp et al., 
[2015] for a review).  
The difference between the youth and total unemployment rate is used as a measure 
of age divide in the distribution of labour market risks. In fact, there are good reasons to 
believe that the two institutional dimensions of segmentation are positively related to 
the relative disadvantage of all the young workers compared to the more experienced 
labour force (e.g. Barbieri, 2009). Therefore, I include the age divide variable in order 
to ensure that the effect of the institutional dimensions of interest hold for fixed-terms 
                                                 
41 In doing so, I provide a conservative test of our hypothesis, which predicts a negative 
relationship between the degree of segmentation and the probability of moving upward. Indeed, 
on the one hand, higher segmentation entails lower quality of FTCs, whereas, on the other hand, 
those who entered the first employment in low quality jobs have inherently the higher 
probability of moving upward. Therefore, excluding the ISEI of the first job might even result in 
a positive association between segmentation and the probability of moving upward, an outcome 
starkly in contrast with our initial hypothesis (the same rationale applies with regard to the 
probabilities of moving downward). 
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entrants in particular, and not for all young people in general. The higher the value of 
the index, the more young people are disadvantaged compared to more experienced 
workers. Descriptive statistics for all variables used are reported in Table 3.1. 
Given the categorical nature of our dependent variables, multinomial logistic 
regression models with macro-area fixed effects are estimated (Southern, Northern, 
Continental, and Eastern European countries).42 In this setting, the identification of the 
partial associations of interest relies on cross-country and longitudinal variations 
occurring within each specific macro-area, i.e. in a context of relative ‘similarity’ 
among countries. In this way, we rule out the possible confounding effects of time-
constant factors at the macro-area level for which we are unable to include specific 
macro-indicators at the country-year level (such as the generosity of welfare 
provisions).  
 
 
                                                 
42 Results for the Small-Hsiao tests for the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption 
(IIA) can be found in the Appendix (Tables A5, A6, A7).  
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Table 3.1 – Description of the variables (N=20,050 – unless specified otherwise)         
  Min Max Mean SD     Min Max Mean SD 
DEPENDENT 
         Contractual mobility 
    
Level of education 
       Temporary 0 1 0.23 
  
    Primary or lower secondary 0 1 0.21 
     Permanent 0 1 0.48 
  
    Upper secondary 0 1 0.49 
     Unemployment 0 1 0.18 
  
    Tertiary 0 1 0.30 
     Inactivity 0 1 0.11 
  
Field of study  
   Occupational mobility (N=13,833) 
   
    General programs 0 1 0.31 
     Upward 0 1 0.37 
  
    Social sciences and humanities 0 1 0.37 
     Downward 0 1 0.22 
  
    Hard sciences and tech.disc. 0 1 0.25 
     Stability 0 1 0.41 
  
    Health and welfare 0 1 0.07 
 MAIN INDEPENDENT – CONTEXTUAL (N=252) 
    
Age in 2009 17 32 27.14 4.14 
EPL gap  0 4.68 1.48 1.29 
 
Time since last exit from education 0 14 7.27 3.84 
Unions strength 0.75 8.31 3.68 2.13 
 
Macro European regions a 
   MAIN INDEPENDENT – INDIVIDUAL 
    
    Southern 0 1 0.40  Shift to permanent (N=13,833) 
   
    Northern 0 1 0.13      No 0 1 0.32 
  
    Continental 0 1 0.27      Yes 0 1 0.68 
  
    Eastern 0 1 0.20  CONTROLS – INDIVIDUAL 
    
CONTROLS – CONTEXTUAL (N=252)    Sex 
     
Total unemployment rate 2 23 8.40 4.13 
    Male 0 1 0.48 
  
Age divide (youth unemp – total 
unemp) 1.1 23.20 10.06 5.39 
    Female 0 1 0.52 
  
GDP per capita 0.72 19.04 5.18 3.15 
Parental education 
    
% Temporary employment 3.56 35.01 12.64 6.79 
    Primary or lower secondary 0 1 0.50 
  
EPL regular 2.12 7.64 4.18 1.10 
    Upper secondary 0 1 0.33 
           Tertiary 0 1 0.17               
Notes:  a Southern: Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal.  Northern: Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden.  Continental: Austria, Belgium, The Netherlands, France, 
Ireland. Eastern: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic. 
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3.5 Findings 
3.5.1 Contractual mobility 
Table 3.2 reports the empirical results from the multinomial logistic regression 
models analysing the log odds of entering standard employment (left panel) and 
unemployment (right panel) versus remaining in temporary employment after a flexible 
entry.43 
Model 1 is a baseline model that shows the impact of a series of individual-level 
covariates once overall differences across European macro-regions are controlled for. 
This model clearly shows that women who entered the market in flexible employment 
are less likely to move to permanent jobs rather than remain in FTCs compared to their 
male counterparts (b= –0.18). Moreover, this propensity increases both with parental 
education and especially the level of education of school-leavers. Yet, the time between 
school-leaving and the year of interview – which can be interpreted roughly as labour 
market experience – is positively associated with the likelihood of obtaining a 
permanent contract rather than remaining in a temporary position (b=0.15). However, 
looking at the log odds of being unemployed rather than in temporary employment, we 
generally found neither statistical nor substantial significant associations. A noteworthy 
exception is the level of schooling: indeed, tertiary education seems to significantly 
prevent fixed-term entrants to enter unemployment rather than remaining in a temporary 
position later in life. 
In Model 2 – in addition to individual variables and macro area fixed-effects – I 
include several macro-level confounders: the total unemployment rate, the GDP per 
capita, the percentage of temporary workers in the labour force, and a variable 
measuring the age divide in the labour market. This specification allows us to explore 
the role of the abovementioned macro-level variables, even if one should bear in mind 
that it is not specifically designed to systematically evaluate the role of these contextual 
                                                 
43 Results for being ‘inactive vs. temporary employed’ text can be found in the Appendix (Table 
A8). 
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Table 3.2 – Multinomial logistic models to analyse contractual mobility after a fixed-term entry: Permanent employment and Unemployment VS Temporary 
employment 
  Permanent VS Temporary    Unemployment VS Temporary  
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 Female (ref. Male) -0.18*** -0.19*** -0.18*** -0.19*** -0.18***  -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 Parental education (ref. Primary/lower sec.)              Upper secondary 0.29*** 0.25*** 0.22*** 0.25*** 0.22***  0.08 0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.03     Tertiary 0.20* 0.20* 0.18* 0.20* 0.18*  0 -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 Level of education (ref. Primary/lower sec.)              Upper secondary 0.45*** 0.45*** 0.39*** 0.44*** 0.38***  -0.16 -0.2 -0.32*** -0.2 -0.32***     Tertiary 0.56*** 0.68*** 0.57*** 0.68*** 0.57***  -0.58** -0.67*** -0.88*** -0.66*** -0.88*** Field of study (ref. General programmes)              Social sciences and humanities 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.07  -0.11 -0.06 0.05 -0.06 0.05     Hard sciences and technical disciplines 0.10 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.12  -0.05 -0.01 0.08 -0.01 0.08     Health and welfare -0.08 -0.10 -0.07 -0.10 -0.07  -0.81*** -0.77*** -0.70*** -0.77*** -0.70*** Age in 2009 0.02** 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 Time since last exit from education 0.15*** 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.09***  0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 Macro indicators (country*year)              Total unemployment rate 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.06***   0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11***     Age divide (youth – tot unemp) -0.05** -0.08*** -0.05** -0.08***   -0.06* -0.11*** -0.06* -0.11***     GDP per capita -0.09** -0.12*** -0.08** -0.12***   0.11* 0.03 0.11* 0.03     % Temporary employment -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.60***   -0.03** -0.05*** -0.03** -0.05***     EPL regular  -0.07  -0.06    -0.13  -0.14     Epl-Gap   -0.12**  -0.13**    -0.26**  -0.25*     Unions strength   0.03 0.03     -0.02 -0.02             Constant -1.61*** 0.62 1.98*** 0.53 1.80***  0.51 0.2 2.74** 0.27 2.85*** Observations 20,050 20,050 20,050 20,050 20,050  20,050 20,050 20,050 20,050 20,050 Macro Area FE YES YES YES YES YES   YES YES YES YES YES 
Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (clustered standard errors)          
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characteristics. First, the higher the unemployment rate, the higher the propensity of 
moving out of fixed-term contracts, and especially of moving to unemployment. 
Second, the higher the GDP per capita, the lower the likelihood of moving to permanent 
employment rather than remaining in FTCs. This finding may sound counterintuitive, 
but it might be the result of a lower preference for permanent contracts in wealthier 
national systems, where the future might be perceived overall less uncertain. Third, the 
higher the overall share of temporary workers in the labour force, the higher the 
propensity of remaining in temporary employment rather than moving to permanent 
jobs or to unemployment. Fourth, the higher the age divide on the labour market, the 
higher the likelihood of remaining in temporary employment after a flexible entry.  
In Models 3 and 4, I add to the previous specification all macro-level confounders 
and the two institutional variables of interest considered separately. These models allow 
us to examine the role of specific institutions when individual and other macro-level 
confounders are controlled for. Model 3 examines the role of the EPL gap, and therefore 
it includes also the EPL index for regular contracts to avoid estimates being completely 
driven by the overall level of employment protection. This model shows that a 
disproportionate protection of permanent compared to temporary contracts – 
independently of the overall level of protection – comes along with a lower propensity 
of moving out of temporary employment after a fixed-term entry. In fact, both the 
likelihood of having permanent jobs (b= –0.12) and being unemployed (b= –0.26), 
rather than having FTCs, decrease significantly as the EPL gap increases. In other 
words – consistently with hypothesis 1 – institutionally driven segmentation in terms of 
EPL gap comes with higher contractual immobility for fixed-term entrants.  
Model 4 examines the role of union strength on the probability of moving out of 
temporary employment towards permanent employment or unemployment versus 
remaining in temporary employment. Contrary to hypothesis 2, the model shows no 
statistically significant effects of union strength. Therefore, I can conclude that the 
strength of unions does not affect the likelihood of moving neither to permanent 
employment nor to unemployment after a flexible labour market entry.  
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Finally, Model 5 jointly tests the role of the two institutional dimensions of 
segmentation when controlling for all other covariates. This model provides a further 
test of the hypotheses, and establishes whether the two institutional dimensions of 
segmentation exert separate effects on the outcome of interest. This model fully 
confirms the results from previous specifications: higher EPL gaps are accompanied 
with higher contractual immobility after a flexible entry independently of union strength 
(both towards permanent employment and towards unemployment), whereas unions 
seem not to exert a relevant role in this regard.  
 
3.5.2 Occupational mobility 
Table 3.3 presents the empirical results from the multinomial logistic regression 
models analysing the log odds of moving upward (left panel) and downward (right 
panel) versus remaining stable on the occupational scale after a flexible entry. The 
analytical sample is limited to people who are employed at the moment of the interview. 
Model 1, once again, starts with the inclusion of individual-level variables and the 
macro-area dummies. This model shows that the propensity of moving upward is higher 
for men compared to women, whereas the propensity of moving downward seems not to 
differ across gender. Interestingly, the log odds of moving upward (b= 0.03) or 
downward (b= 0.03) rather than remaining stable increases as an individual’s potential 
labour market experience increases, thus suggesting that labour markets tend to adjust 
initial skill-job mismatches during the first stages of the occupational career. Finally, 
level of education seems generally to protect from downgrading risks, but is not 
associated with the log odds of upgrading further on the occupational scale. This result 
is consistent with better educated school-leavers having better skill-job matches and 
higher socio-economic positions at labour market entry, also among fixed-term entrants. 
In Model 2, the effects of the individual-level variables are jointly estimated with 
contextual characteristics such as cyclical and structural economic factors, the overall 
share of temporary workers, and a variable measuring the age divide in the labour 
market. Although not specifically intended to detect systematically the role of the 
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Table 3.3 – Multinomial logistic models to analyse occupational mobility after a fixed-term entry: Upward and Downward mobility VS Stability 
  Upward VS Stability     Downward VS Stability   
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 Female (ref. Male) -0.12* -0.12* -0.12* -0.12* -0.12*  0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 Parental education (ref. Primary/lower sec.)              Upper secondary 0.08 0.09** 0.09** 0.08* 0.09**  -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05     Tertiary 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06  0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 Level of education (ref. Primary/lower sec.)              Upper secondary 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.1 0.1  0.04 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.07     Tertiary -0.05 -0.02 0 -0.01 -0.01  -0.38** -0.38*** -0.40*** -0.36*** -0.40*** Field of study (ref. General program)              Social sciences and humanities -0.11 -0.12* -0.12 -0.12* -0.13  -0.13 -0.13 -0.12 -0.15* -0.12     Hard sciences and technical disciplines -0.22** -0.23** -0.24** -0.24** -0.24**  -0.15 -0.16 -0.15 -0.17* -0.15     Health and welfare -0.63*** -0.66*** -0.67*** -0.67*** -0.67***  -0.72*** -0.75*** -0.74*** -0.76*** -0.74*** Age in 2009 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 Time since last exit from education 0.03* -0.01 0 -0.01 0  0.03** 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 Macro indicators (country*year)              Total Unemployment rate 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07***   0.05** 0.05* 0.05** 0.04*     Age divide (youth unemp - total unemp) -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.05***   -0.04** -0.05*** -0.04** -0.04***     GDP per capita -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.09*** -0.09***   -0.04 -0.04 -0.04* -0.06**     % Temporary employment -0.02 -0.01 -0.02* -0.02**   0 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01     EPL regular  0.00  -0.04    0  -0.07     Epl-Gap   0.02  0.06    -0.03  0.02     Unions strength   -0.05 -0.07**     -0.09*** -0.11***             Constant -0.69*** 0.51 0.35 0.73 0.83  -0.25 0.28 0.46 0.64 1.19* Observations 13,833 13,833 13,833 13,833 13,833  13,833 13,833 13,833 13,833 13,833 Macro Area FE YES YES YES YES YES   YES YES YES YES YES 
Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (clustered standard errors)       
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above-mentioned contextual features, it is worth to take a closer look at the results. 
First, school-leavers who entered the labour market in FTCs seem more likely both to 
upgrade and to downgrade on the occupational scale in times of bad economic 
circumstances than in times of low unemployment. This result clearly indicates 
polarisation in the mid-term occupational outcomes of fixed-term entrants in times of 
economic downturns. However, structural factors – such as the GDP pro capita – are 
positively associated with occupational ‘immobility’ after a fixed-term entry. Finally, 
the overall share of temporary workers in the labour market seems not to be associated 
with the propensity of moving on the occupational ladder afterwards.  
In Models 3 and 4 I test hypotheses 3 and 4 by adding separately the two indicators 
for the institutional dimensions of labour market segmentation. As for contractual 
mobility, Model 3 examines the role of the EPL gap, and therefore includes also a 
variable indicating the EPL strictness of regular contracts to avoid estimates being 
completely driven by the overall level of employment protection. This specification 
clearly shows that a disproportionate protection of permanent contracts compared to 
FTCs does not affect the propensity of moving upward or downward on the 
occupational scale after a fixed-term entry. Therefore, hypothesis 3 cannot be supported.  
In Model 4, I test hypothesis 4 against the data by including the union strength 
indicator. Interestingly, net of other individual and macro-level confounders and 
comparing similar countries, there is a negative association between the degree of 
unionisation and the likelihood of moving downward (b= –0.09) on the occupational 
ladder, and a negative (b= –0.05), but not statistically significant association with the 
likelihood of moving upward. This result provides only partial support for hypothesis 4, 
which predicted less occupational mobility in contexts of strong unionism compared to 
contexts of relatively weak unions.  
Finally, Model 5 provides a further test for our research hypotheses by estimating 
simultaneously the effects of the EPL gap and union strength. On the one hand, even 
controlling for the role of unions, disproportions in the protection of regular and 
temporary employment are not associated with the propensity of moving on the 
occupational ladder. On the other hand, the hypothesis about the role of unionism finds 
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more robust corroboration when the legislative arrangement in terms of protection of 
permanent and temporary contracts is taken into account: the higher the union strength, 
the higher the occupational immobility after a fixed-term entry. 
 
3.5.3 Are contractual and occupational mobility systematically related? 
Table 3.4 once again reports the results from the multinomial logistic regression 
models analysing the log odds of moving upward (left panel) and downward (right 
panel) versus remaining stable on the occupational scale, but the focus now is on the 
relation between contractual and occupational mobility. Also in this case, the analytical 
sample is limited to people who are employed at the moment of the interview. 
Model 1 includes only a key variable detecting whether respondents shifted to a 
permanent job or not, and the individual-level variables and macro-area fixed effects as 
controls. This model shows that the likelihood of being upward mobile rather than 
immobile is higher for fixed-term entrants who shifted to a permanent contract 
compared to fixed-term entrants who remained in a temporary position (b=0.22) – net of 
relevant individual-level characteristics and overall contextual differences among 
European macro-regions. In the same vein, a shift to a permanent contract is negatively 
associated with the propensity of moving downward rather than remaining stable (b= –
0.20). Therefore, generally speaking, contractual and occupational upward mobility 
after a fixed-term entry seem to be strictly related. This scenario is fully confirmed once 
heterogeneities within macro-regions in terms of cyclical, structural, and institutional 
factors are controlled for (see Model 2). 
In model 3 and 4 I specifically test hypotheses 5 and 6 by adding an interaction 
term for the variable indicating a shift to permanent employment and the indicators for 
the EPL gap and union strength, respectively.44 Since the substantive interest is the 
                                                 
44 I am aware that interpretation of interaction effects in nonlinear models is not straightforward. 
As shown in Ai and Norton (2003), in some cases interaction effects in nonlinear models could 
not be equal to marginal effects both in terms of sign and statistical significance. However, this 
problem can be solved computing and interpreting main and interaction effects in multiplicative 
terms or switching to predicted probabilities (Buis, 2010). The results presented in the chapter 
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association between contractual upgrading and the likelihood of moving upward, results 
regarding the likelihood of moving downward are not discussed. The results are as 
follows. On the one hand (see Model 3), the main effect of the variables detecting a shift 
to a permanent job is positive and significant (b=0.20), while its interaction coefficient 
with the EPL gap is nearly 0. Therefore, contrary to hypothesis 5, a shift to permanent 
employment seems to come along with a higher propensity of upward mobility in all 
contexts, and not specifically in contexts where the insiders-outsider segmentation in 
terms of the EPL gap is stronger. On the other hand (see Model 4), the coefficient of the 
interaction term with union strength is positive and significant (b=0.04), and the main 
effect of this variable is positive, but not statistically significant. This suggests that, in 
line with hypothesis 6, contractual and occupational upgrading are more likely to come 
together in more segmented rather than less segmented labour markets, at least when 
insider-outsider segmentation in terms of union strength is considered.  
Finally, model 5 confirms previous findings by estimating the two interaction terms 
simultaneously: upward mobility and contractual upgrading come together irrespective 
of the EPL gap, but their positive association is stronger in more segmented markets in 
terms of union strength. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
do not change substantially when coefficients are interpreted on a multiplicative scale or when 
the predicted probabilities are computed. 
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Table 3.4 – Multinomial logistic models to analyse the relation between contractual and occupational mobility after a fixed-term entry: Upward and Downward 
mobility VS Stability 
  Upward VS Stability     Downward VS Stability   
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 Female (ref. Male) -0.12* -0.12* -0.12* -0.12* -0.12*  0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 Parental education (ref. Primary/lower sec.)              Upper secondary 0.07 0.08* 0.08** 0.07* 0.08*  -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04     Tertiary 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 Level of education (ref. Primary/lower sec.)              Upper secondary 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09  0.06 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.08     Tertiary -0.07 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02  -0.36** -0.38*** -0.38*** -0.33** -0.38*** Field of study (ref. General program)              Social sciences and humanities -0.11 -0.13 -0.13* -0.13* -0.13*  -0.13 -0.12 -0.12 -0.15* -0.12     Hard sciences and technical disciplines -0.23** -0.25** -0.24** -0.25** -0.25**  -0.15 -0.15 -0.14 -0.17 -0.15     Health and welfare -0.63*** -0.68*** -0.67*** -0.67*** -0.68***  -0.72*** -0.74*** -0.74*** -0.77*** -0.75*** Age in 2009 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 Time since last exit from education 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01  0.04*** 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 Macro indicators (country*year)              Total unemployment rate 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.06***   0.05** 0.05** 0.05** 0.05**     Age divide (youth unemp - total unemp) -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05***   -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.04** -0.04***     GDP pro capita -0.08*** -0.07** -0.08*** -0.08***   -0.06** -0.05* -0.05* -0.06**     % Temporary employment -0.02* -0.01 -0.02* -0.02*   -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02     EPL regular -0.04 0.01  -0.04   -0.08 -0.01  -0.08     Epl-Gap  0.06 0.03  0.07   0.01 -0.05  0     Unions strength -0.07**  -0.09* -0.11**   -0.11***  -0.11*** -0.13***             Shift to permanent (ref. No) 0.22*** 0.20*** 0.20** 0.08 0.08  -0.20*** -0.22*** -0.25*** -0.30*** -0.33*** Interaction Macro*Shift to permanent             Epl-Gap*Shift to permanent 0.00  -0.01    0.02  0.02     Unions strenght*Shift to permanent 0.04** 0.05**     0.03 0.03             Constant -0.74*** 0.66 0.17 0.7 0.77  -0.22 1.40** 0.67 0.84 1.47** Observations 13,833 13,833 13,833 13,833 13,833  13,833 13,833 13,833 13,833 13,833 Macro Area FE YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES YES Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (clustered standard errors)      
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3.6 Discussion and conclusions 
This chapter examined the early career stages of flexible labour market entrants in a 
context of institutional variety. In particular, I focused on two institutional dimensions 
of labour market segmentation – the EPL gap and union strength – as determinants of 
contractual and occupational mobility after a fixed-term entry. The topic received great 
attention in the last two decades, as the share of fixed-term employment has generally 
increased among young people, and the occupational trajectories of those who enter the 
labour market in a flexible position are not well explored in comparative perspective.  
The empirical findings provide some insights on the entrapment hypothesis. More 
precisely, the chapter demonstrated that, once entered the labour market in FTCs, the 
probabilities of moving to different contractual and occupational positions on the 
external labour market largely depend on the actual level of insider-outsider 
segmentation. The higher this segmentation, the larger the likelihood to be ‘entrapped’ 
into the contractual and occupational position obtained immediately after school-
leaving. Previous studies provide some theoretical support for this claim (e.g. 
McGinnity et al., 2005; Scherer, 2004), but they lack in providing systematic empirical 
evidence (for an exception, see Barbieri and Cutuli, 2015).  
I have shown how a disproportionate protection of permanent contracts compared 
to FTCs ‘freezes’ the early occupational careers after a fixed-term entry. In fact, in the 
context of a strong EPL gap, fixed-term entrants are more likely to remain in a fixed-
term position rather than moving to permanent employment or to unemployment 
compared to a context where the EPL gap is low. In substantive terms, the probabilities 
of remaining in a fixed-term position increase of approximately 14 percentage points 
moving from contexts with no EPL gap (0) to contexts where the EPL gap has the 
maximum value (4.68) observed in the data (see Figure 3.2). However, the gap in the 
protection of permanent and temporary employment does not account for any influence 
on the likelihood of upgrading or downgrading in terms of socio-economic status. 
Conversely, the strength of unions does not impact on the probability of contractual 
mobility, while slightly influencing the chance of obtaining a job with a different socio- 
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economic status compared to the first one. More precisely, moving from the minimum 
(0.75) to the maximum (8.31) observed value of union strength, the probabilities of 
moving upward and downward on the occupational scale decrease of approximately 6.5 
and 9 percentage points, respectively (see Figure 3.3). 
Moreover, I tried to relate the process of contractual and occupational mobility in a 
single framework. The analyses provided evidence that contractual and occupational 
upgrading after a flexible entry is likely to come together. However, a shift to 
permanent employment after a fixed-term entry more often leads to upward mobility in 
segmented rather than non-segmented labour markets, at least when segmentation in 
terms of union strength is concerned. As Figure 3.4 shows, in contexts where union 
strength is at the minimum observed value (0.75), shifting to a permanent contract after  
a fixed-term entry increases the probability of upward mobility of 5 percentage points 
approximately, whereas in contexts where union strength is at the maximum observed 
value (8.31), this increase is up to 10 percentage points. This is understandable, since in 
 
Figure 3.2 – Predicted probabilities and 95% confidence intervals (Table 3.2, model 
5) of being in temporary contract, permanent contract, or unemployment after a 
flexible entry for different levels of Epl gap (dashed parts indicate extrapolation) 
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contexts where strong unionism increases barriers across labour market segments 
permanent contracts are often overrepresented among high-status jobs. 
 
All in all, these results underscore the importance of distinguishing different aspects 
of the insider-outsider segmentation on the labour market, both theoretically and 
empirically. Indeed, when focusing on two institutional dimensions of the segmentation 
by type of contract – the EPL gap and union strength – there is evidence that the two 
dimensions do not equally impact on the outcomes considered, and that they exert 
separate, specific, and independent effects. This result, although not perfectly in line 
with the hypotheses, is understandable if we consider that the mechanisms by which we 
predicted similar effects differ considerably between the two institutional dimensions of 
segmentation. 
The obtained results may have a wider relevance for scholars and policy makers. 
On the first point, the chapter contributes to the long-lasting debate about the possible 
 
Figure 3.3 – Predicted probabilities and 95% confidence intervals (Table 3.3, model 
5) of moving upward, downward, or remaining stable on the occupational scale for 
different level of Union strength (dashed parts indicate extrapolation) 
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detrimental occupational consequences of flexible employment in the beginning of the 
career. In fact, I demonstrated in this chapter that the extent to which fixed-term 
contracts at the entry influence future career advancement on the external labour market 
depends on the actual level of institutionally driven segmentation. More specifically, 
this finding could contribute to explain why previous studies analysing the 
consequences of temporary employment at labour market entry found mixed results 
when focusing on different countries and periods, often marked by very different 
institutional arrangements.  
 
The relevance for policy makers lies in the chance to modify the current 
institutional settings in order to boost the efficiency of labour markets. In fact, a more 
balanced protection of permanent and temporary contracts and less union strength seem 
to increase the mobility across labour market segments (both in terms of contract type 
and occupation), and – by this way – could improve the efficiency of the job-allocation 
 
Figure 3.4 – Predicted probabilities and 95% confidence intervals (Table 3.4, model 
5) of moving upward on the occupational scale comparing subjects who shifted to 
permanent contracts and subjects who remained in temporary contract for different 
levels of Union strength (dashed parts indicate extrapolation) 
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process in the early career. However, while more balanced employment protection 
legislation could represent a viable policy leverage to boost efficiency, the degree of 
unionisation cannot be considered as a specific target for public policy. Indeed, union 
membership often reflects the democratic nature of the bargaining structures in Western 
countries. Therefore – as far as efficiency is the primary goal of policy makers – the 
results suggest, that in strongly unionised contexts, an adequate combination of policies 
and institutional arrangements should promote adequate initial skill-job matches, since 
in these contexts any initial mismatch seems hardly adjustable afterwards. 
Finally, it is important to discuss four possible limitations of this chapter and 
suggestions for future research. First of all – although offering some insights on the 
contextual determinants of entrapment dynamics – the research design does not allow 
us to draw any specific conclusions about the integrative potential of FTCs on the 
internal labour market. In fact, data limitations prevented the examination of contextual 
variations in the functioning of FTCs as extended probation periods, possibly followed 
by permanent contracts with the same employers. Conditionally on the availability of 
better cross-country data at the individual level, future research would benefit from 
examining jointly the contextual determinants of the stepping-stone and the entrapment 
scenarios. 
A second point concerns the cross-sectional nature of the data used in this chapter, 
which prevented the analysis of multiple moves after the first, flexible labour market 
entry. As recalled in the very beginning of the thesis (see par 1.1, chapter 1), compared 
to earlier generations, occupational trajectories after the first labour market entry are 
currently more complex, and are often constituted by a mixed sequence of events that 
includes education, training, temporary employment, permanent employment, and 
unemployment spells. Unfortunately – given the focus on the role of contextual 
characteristics – these issues are hardly manageable due to unavailability of comparable 
full employment-history data for a wide set of countries.  
Third, future research would benefit from considering possible heterogeneities in 
the effects of institutionally driven segmentation for the career progression of fixed-
term entrants. For example, women could be particularly affected by strong unionism, 
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since they are traditionally underrepresented in work councils compared to men. Yet, 
strong unionism and unbalanced employment protection legislation could impact more 
strongly in sectors of employment where unions are more active and labour legislation 
more effective. 
Fourth, the chapter analysed the role of unions at the national level. However, the 
degree of unions’ centralisation is likely to differ cross-nationally. Cross-country 
variation in the extent to which unions bargain at the national, industry, or workplace 
level could have significant implications for the relation between union strength and the 
career progression after a flexible entry. While some degree of simplification in 
measuring concepts is unavoidable in empirical research, taking into account the cross-
country variation in the levels at which unions bargain seems a promising area for 
future research on the topic.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE DIRECT EFFECT OF SOCIAL ORIGIN ON MEN’S 
OCCUPATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN THE EARLY LIFE 
COURSE: AN ITALIAN–DUTCH COMPARISON45 
 
 
 
Brief Summary 
The chapter examines the direct effect (on top of education) of social origin on 
occupational attainment over the early life course of Italian and Dutch men in the 
period 1950–2005. Based on cross-country and cross-cohort comparisons, I explore the 
role of several contextual characteristics favouring the direct transmission of social 
advantages. Early employment careers are reconstructed using the ‘Italian 
Longitudinal Household Panel Studies’ (1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005) and the ‘Family 
Survey Dutch Population’ (1998, 2000, 2003). Multilevel growth curve analyses are 
used to understand whether the direct effect of social origin at labour market entry 
increases, decreases or remains stable over the first 10 years of occupational career. 
Empirical results show that, in both countries, the direct social origin effect is rather 
stable over historical and biographical time. Independently of structural and 
institutional conditions influencing the extent of career mobility, offspring hailing from 
advantaged social background enjoys a better occupational position at labour market 
entry, while experiencing similar rates of career progression compared to their 
counterparts from less-advantaged families. However, when entering the labour market 
in the same occupational position, offspring from the service class enjoys higher rates 
of progression compared to their working class counterparts. Groups of mechanisms 
behind these patterns are discussed. 
                                                 
A version of this chapter is in preparation for journal submission  
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4.1 Introduction 
A noteworthy result of intergenerational social mobility research is that social 
origin strongly influences occupational destinations, and that large part of this gross 
effect is mediated by educational attainment. However, several studies pointed out that 
social origin plays a role above and beyond what is mediated by education, and that the 
extent of this ‘direct’ effect varies cross-nationally (Ballarino and Bernardi, 2016; Breen 
and Luijkx, 2004). Relatedly, it is widely advocated – and sometimes unduly assumed 
(Goldthorpe and Bukodi, 2011) – that the direct effect of social origin has weakened 
over historical time, and that educational credentials have become increasingly 
important for successful occupational careers compared to the direct influence of social 
origin.  
The alleged secular decline in the importance of the direct effect of social origin on 
occupational destinations is likely responsible for the less attention given to this issue in 
favour of the study of inequality of educational opportunities and the study of returns to 
educational qualifications in comparative perspective. However, the association 
between social origin and occupational destinations among people with the same level 
of schooling possibly represents the most undisputable form of inequality, and evidence 
regarding the secular tendency towards its decline is still scant (Goldthorpe and Bukodi, 
2011). Indeed, even assuming that the process of educational attainment is completely 
meritocratic, the existence of disparities in the occupational destinations of people with 
the same schooling but different social origin strongly challenge the idea of education as 
a means to equalize people lives (Ballarino and Bernardi, 2016).  
Comparative intergenerational social mobility research typically focused on social 
inequality, looking cross-sectionally at limited time points in the biography of 
individuals – being the first occupation, the occupation at a certain age, or the 
occupation at later stages of the career (e.g. Blau and Duncan, 1967; Breen, 2004; 
Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992). While this research paid great attention to how the first 
job mediates the overall relation between social origin and occupational destination, the 
role of career mobility has often been downplayed, not least due to unavailability of 
comparable life history data. 
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However, while interesting per se, early career mobility might have also important 
implications for intergenerational reproduction of inequality, as argued by relatively 
recent developments in the literature (Barone and Schizzerotto, 2011; Manzoni et al., 
2014; Hillmert, 2015). Uneven occupational paths from the first job onwards could 
indeed strengthen or mitigate social inequality at labour market entry, and, therefore, 
career mobility is important for the evaluation of the overall process of social 
stratification in a given society (ibidem).  
When focusing on the direct influence of social origin on occupational attainment, 
‘bringing in’ the role of early career mobility allows the examination of the evolution of 
initial disparities (on top of education) over the early life course. As argued in the first 
chapter of this thesis, this gives the opportunity to analyse whether parents play a direct 
role in their children’s occupational attainment at labour market entry, and whether this 
effect persists, vanishes or increases beyond that point. In fact, the direct influence of 
social origin on occupational attainment not only depends on social inequality at the 
career onset, but also on the capacity of parents to influence their offspring’s rates of 
career progression.  
This chapter examines this issue looking at early careers (i.e. the first 10 years since 
labour market entry) of men who entered employment in the period 1950–95 in Italy 
and the Netherlands. Although women would be equally interesting, there are reasons to 
believe that mechanisms of inter- and intragenerational social mobility work differently 
by gender.46 Therefore, women deserve specific theoretical consideration and analyses, 
and would be a nice target for a separate chapter. 
While differing considerably in their economic and occupational structure, both 
countries traditionally belong to the conservative welfare regime, and – until the early 
80’s – they were characterised by rigid labour markets and employment-related welfare 
entitlements (Esping-Andersen, 1990). However, the institutional settings of the two 
countries started to diverge considerably in response to the overcoming of the fordist 
                                                 
46 Moreover, severe problems of selection into employment across the two countries and 
especially across cohorts would severely undermine the interpretability of the findings.  
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model in the early 80’s. A widespread process of labour market flexibilization, the rise 
of an activating welfare, a different role of the industrial relation system, and – as 
suggested by the literature (Muffels and Luijkx, 2008) – some progress in favour of a 
flexicurity model, made the institutional context of the Netherlands more and more 
diverging from the immobile and traditional Italian one. 
For these reasons, by comparing Italy and the Netherlands over the last half of the 
20th century, the chapter offers fruitful insights on the role of contextual characteristics 
impacting career mobility, and their importance for the direct influence of social origin 
on an individual’s occupational attainment. As discussed in the introduction chapter of 
the thesis (see par. 1.3 and 1.4), several institutional characteristics may indeed foster or 
hamper the individuals’ chances of career mobility, thus impacting on the labour market 
capacity to modify the stratification usually observed at labour market entry. In this 
way, the chapter builds on previous literature that integrates inter- and intragenerational 
mobility perspectives by focusing specifically on the direct effect of social origin, and 
by exploring the role of institutional and historical contexts. 
Apart from the substantive interest in the intragenerational evolution of the direct 
social origin effect, this strategy overcomes some potential shortcomings of previous 
research on this topic. If social origin directly influences patterns of career growth, then 
comparisons among studies focusing on ‘snapshots’ of inequality at different career 
points could lead to biased substantive conclusions about societal variations and 
historical trends in the importance of the direct social origin effect. Moreover, if 
intragenerational evolutions of the direct social origin effect differ systematically across 
countries and periods, even comparative studies based on inequalities observed at the 
same points in the individuals’ life courses could be misleading.  
In the first part of the theoretical section of this chapter, I outline several 
mechanisms underlying the existence of the direct effect of social origin on 
occupational destinations, some reasons behind the supposed historical decline of this 
direct effect in Western countries, and core previous findings regarding the Italian and 
the Dutch context. In the second part, I introduce the importance of career mobility for 
the evolution of the direct social origin effect over the early life course. The theoretical 
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section concludes by presenting the Italian and the Dutch context and by outlining 
specific hypotheses. Then, sections reporting details on data, variables and methods, 
discussion of the empirical results, and conclusions will follow.  
 
4.2 Theoretical framework 
4.2.1 The direct effect of social origin across countries and historical time: 
 mechanisms and previous findings 
The existing literature pointed out several mechanisms trough which social origin 
might have a direct influence on occupational destinations (Ballarino and Bernardi, 
2016; Erikson and Jonsson, 1998; Hallsten, 2013). The most obvious lies in social 
capital and similar micro-level relational resources (Barbieri, 1997; Granovetter, 1973; 
Lin, 1999). Indeed, offspring from high parental background benefit from personal 
contacts and social relationships that may be more valuable on the labour market 
compared to social resources offered by worse-off families. Moreover, independently on 
educational attainment, pupils from better-off families may develop better non-cognitive 
skills – or soft skills – that are highly rewarded by employers, such as self-confidence, 
social savoir-faire, perseverance, conscientiousness and extraversion (Bowles and 
Gintis, 1976; Brunello and Schlotter, 2011; Heckman et al., 2006). In this scenario, it 
may simply be the case that statistical discrimination plays a role: employers 
discriminate people with a low social background, because they are “unfit” for the 
specific characteristics of the “post-fordist” production, and therefore less productive. 
The same discrimination, however, may be found even when there are no clear-cut 
efficiency reasons at its basis (Becker, 1971; Sørensen, 2005). Of course, offspring from 
advantaged families may be more sensitive to occupational success and strive for their 
occupational status, also irrespectively of their school level, i.e. they may be socialised 
at home to higher aspirations. Last, the direct inheritance of family business and other 
material as well as immaterial resources strictly connected to working activities – such 
as plants, pieces of machinery, or pools of costumers – may be at the basis of a direct 
intergenerational reproduction of social advantages.  
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With regard to the evolution of the direct influence of social origin over historical 
time, several arguments support the expectation of a secular decline. First of all, 
modernization theories (Bell, 1973; Blau and Duncan, 1967; Treiman, 1970) postulate 
that increasing market competition induces employers to avoid inefficient person-job 
allocations possibly leading to market failures, thus increasingly forcing them to rely on 
meritocratic criteria in the hiring procedure. Therefore, modernization over historical 
time should be associated with decreasing importance of the direct influence of social 
origin and increasing importance of educational qualifications for occupational 
attainment. Second, the size of those occupational sectors more prone to the direct 
inheritance of material resources, such as the agricultural sector, craftsmanship and 
family-business in general, has decreased during the 20th century. This leaves less room 
for the inheritance of the family business and therefore direct intergenerational 
transmission of the social status. Third, it has been argued that modernization has 
occurred also on the cultural ground: meritocratic principles have widespread among 
employers not only to avoid market failure, but also in compliance with a general shift 
from particularistic to universalistic values in Western countries (Parsons, 1951; West, 
1973).  
Despite these considerations, empirical evidence on the existence of a direct effect 
of social origin on occupational attainment and a secular trend toward a decline in the 
importance of this direct effect is mixed and often contested (e.g. Breen and Luijkx, 
2004; Goldthorpe, 2001; Warren et al., 2002). A recent book edited by Ballarino and 
Bernardi (2016) consistently finds evidence of a substantial direct effect of social origin 
on the occupational status of the first and current job in all European countries analysed 
(14 in total), Italy and the Netherlands included. Interestingly, the direct social origin 
effect is somewhat stronger in the former than the latter country. However, while in 
Italy and in the vast majority of other national contexts the direct effect of origin on 
occupational attainment is rather stable over historical time, in the Netherlands a 
decreasing trend is found (see Tolsma and Wolbers, 2016).  
Regarding Italy, these results are in line with previous studies that always found a 
substantial and persistent direct effect of social origin on occupational destinations over 
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historical time, independently of how parental background is measured and the career 
point in which occupational attainment is observed (Barone et al., 2011; Barone and 
Guetto, 2016; Schizzerotto, 2001). Conversely, previous findings from the Netherlands 
are far from being unanimous. On the one hand, some studies questioned whether there 
is a direct effect of social origin at all in the Dutch context. For example, van de 
Werfhorst (2002) found no direct effect of origin class to destination class for men aged 
25–65. On the other hand, studies that find evidence of a direct social origin effect 
report either declining importance or persistency over historical time. When focusing on 
origin class to destination class at age 35, Ganzeboom and Luijkx (2004) found both a 
substantial direct effect and a trend towards declining importance in the period 1970–
1999. This result confirms previous findings from De Graaf and Kalmijn (2001) for the 
cohorts who entered the labour market in the period 1923–1984. Conversely, focusing 
on the cohorts entering the labour market between the 1950s and the 1970s, Wolbers 
and colleagues (2011) found historical persistency in the direct influence of fathers’ 
occupation on sons’ occupation measured at first labour market entry, and ten and 
twenty years (of working experience) afterwards. In the same vein, Tolsma and Wolbers 
(2010a, 2010b) found no decline when looking at the direct effect of social origin on the 
first and the current (or last) job, respectively. Conversely, the same authors find some 
signs of declining direct intergenerational transmission of occupational status looking at 
the birth cohorts 1931–80 (Tolsma and Wolbers, 2014). 
Most of these studies examined the direct influence of social origin looking at a 
‘snapshot’ of an individual’s occupational career or limited career points at best (for an 
exception, see Barone and colleagues, 2011). As recalled in the introduction, this cross-
sectional view of intergenerational social mobility may lead to misleading results if 
social origin directly influences the chances of career growth. Career mobility – 
occurring typically in the first years of labour market experience – is therefore 
important for a proper evaluation of the direct influence of the family of origin on 
offspring’s occupational success.  
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4.2.2 Career mobility and the evolution of the ‘direct effect’ in the early life 
 course 
Career mobility pertains to movements of individuals across the occupational 
structure during their life course. These movements occur both along the vertical and 
the horizontal dimensions of the occupational structure, and usually concentrate in the 
early work life stages (Rosenfeld, 1992). Previous literature has shown that men’s 
careers often involve early upward moves on the occupational ladder until a steady state 
is reached, usually around their thirties (Barone and Schizzerotto, 2011). A possible 
explanation of this pattern is that over-skilling at labour market entry is often adjusted 
during the early career: when a match is found, further career mobility is scant 
(Sicherman and Galor, 1990). Although the adequacy of this explanation depends on the 
institutional contexts and in particular on the labour market fluidity and the efficiency of 
the job-matching process (which affect the extent of over-skilling at labour market 
entry), other explanations seem to confirm this pattern. Indeed, the marginal value of 
specific human capital acquired on the job decrease with seniority, and promotions on 
the internal labour market usually concentrate among younger employees (Mincer, 
1974; Kerckhoff, 1995; Marsden and Ryan, 1995). 
However, other micro-level dynamics might influence the patterns of career 
growth. Abilities and motivation do play a role in increasing the chances of reaching the 
top of occupational hierarchies even when starting from the bottom, and high levels of 
education could be associated with high rates of career growth when starting in non-
adequate job positions, or with low rates of progression when starting at the top. Indeed, 
the Blau-Duncan model of occupational status attainment (Blau and Duncan, 1967) 
already stressed the role of ceiling effects: when starting at the top of the occupational 
hierarchy, the chances of further ascendance are reduced since there is un upper-limit to 
occupational progression (see also Sørensen, 1975). 
Social origin could also play a relevant role (above and beyond what is mediated by 
education). Compared to offspring from the working class – and level of education 
being equal – offspring hailing from the upper classes may not only differ in the first 
placement on the occupational hierarchy, but also in the shape of career progression. 
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Different patterns of career growth, in turn, account for the evolution of the initial 
penalty/advantage over the early work career. The direct effect of social origin could 
either vanish after first labour market entry, or persist (and even increase).  
A reduction of the effect of social origin may be expected to the extent that initial 
penalties are based on non-meritocratic criteria and upgrading on the occupational 
ladder is indeed meritocratic: in this scenario, initial mismatches would indeed 
disappear once employers observe the ‘real’ productivity of employees at the 
workplace. Moreover, as young workers move away from first labour market entry, 
their resources and social networks would increasingly depend on their own job 
experience rather than on their families of origin (Mare, 1980). A third reason to expect 
a reduction of the direct effect of social origin lies in the role of ceiling effects: if pupils 
hailing from the upper classes enjoy better placement at labour market entry, possibly at 
the top of the occupational hierarchy, then their chances for further improvements are 
severely constrained. In this scenario, young people from less-advantaged families 
might have the chance to catch up. 
The opposite scenario is however possible. To begin with, the literature underlined 
how small penalties in the beginning of the career could indeed mirror in bigger 
penalties over the life course due to a process of cumulative disadvantage (DiPrete and 
Eirich, 2006). Furthermore, upgrading on the internal labour market could be indeed 
governed by non-meritocratic and non-efficient principles (see Wolbers et al., 2011, p. 
430), thus leaving room for the direct influence of parental resources on offspring’s 
career progression. This latter scenario is even reinforced if we consider that offspring 
from upper classes are often not able to reproduce the status of their parents 
immediately at labour market entry, and they are therefore ‘forced’, or ‘helped’, to grow 
until this stage is reached (Härkönen and Bihagen, 2011; Hillmert, 2011). In this 
‘counter-mobility’ perspective (Goldthorpe et al., 1987), higher aspirations, better soft 
skills and better social contacts of offspring from advantaged families might indeed 
have more importance at later career points than at labour market entry. For example, 
social contacts and inherited material resources may become useful to come up the hard 
way after an initial period at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy. Yet, returns to 
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soft skills are more likely to take place after a period on the labour market, since their 
beneficial effects should result from fruitful every-day interactions with employers and 
colleagues. 
 
4.2.3 The role of the context: Italy and the Netherlands compared 
Italy and the Netherlands differ considerably in their economic and institutional 
structures. The Italian productive structure is largely based on small firms, usually in the 
form of family business inherited from one generation to the next. Consistently, non-
formal channels of recruitments – such as strong ties with parents, family, and friends – 
were and are still the most frequent and efficient way to find a job in the Italian context 
(Barbieri, 1997; Reyneri, 2005). In addition, corporatism among liberal professions is 
traditionally pronounced in Italy, and consequently both legal and less-formal 
restrictions keep the access to professional occupations non-transparent and subject to 
direct inheritance (Barone et al., 2011).  
Although the Netherlands has never been the classic industrial country (Visser and 
Hemerijck, 1997), Dutch economy was dominated by large multinational enterprises 
until the 1970s (van Zanden, 2005). Subsequently, their importance has declined in 
favour of smaller firms in the service sector and in favour of public employment 
(ibidem). Consistently, the chance of social origin to influence hiring procedures and the 
chance of direct inheritance of family businesses might have been limited by the formal 
and standardised channels of recruitments, typical of large firms and the public sector 
(van de Werfhorst, 2011). 
Structural and institutional characteristics also contribute to the extent of early 
career mobility in the two countries. As anticipated in the first chapter of the thesis (see 
par. 1.3.1), in occupational labour markets, the educational system provides students 
with highly standardized and reliable vocational qualifications that are directly useful to 
perform specific occupations (Doeringer and Piore, 1985; Maurice et al., 1986). In these 
contexts, early career mobility is reduced, since skill-job matches are usually reached 
around labour market entry (Gangl, 2003a; Shavit and Muller, 1998). In internal labour 
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markets (ibidem), the education system provides more general qualifications, while 
more specific competencies are provided directly by firms. In these contexts, substantial 
career advancements usually take place within firms as seniority increases. However, 
internal labour markets require large firms, where newcomers are trained on the job and 
subsequent career advancements are regulated by formal, standardised, and bureaucratic 
procedures (Kalleberg and van Bueren, 1996; Weber, 1922). Conversely, in contexts 
with an economic structure governed by small and medium firms, internal career 
ladders are ‘structurally’ constrained (Kalleberg and Mastekaasa, 1998; Barbieri and 
Bison, 2004). This is especially true when small firms coincide with family businesses, 
where meritocratic principles of career advancements are subordinated to direct 
inheritance. 
Compared to Italy, the Netherlands can be considered an occupational labour 
market. However, vocational qualifications are not a formal prerequisite to enter 
specific occupations to the same extent as in other countries, such as Germany. In fact, 
the Netherlands is often considered a country with ‘intermediate’ occupational 
boundaries (de Graaf and Ultee, 1998; Shavit and Muller, 1998). Moreover, until the 
1970s, the Dutch economy strongly relied on large enterprises offering substantial 
training on the job and large opportunities for advancements on internal career ladders.  
Italy does not fit perfectly either in the occupational or the internal labour market 
category (Gangl, 2003a; Muller, 2005). On the one hand, the Italian educational system 
is academically oriented and offers very general competencies (Triventi and Trivellato, 
2009; Passaretta and Triventi, 2015). On the other hand, small firms characterising the 
Italian productive structure offer very limited internal career ladders and, if anything, 
very limited training on the job (Reyneri, 2005). Moreover, an uneven path of 
modernisation confined Italian southern regions to an agricultural economy that has 
been largely subsidised by the State until the beginning of the 1970s, when a process of 
internal migration moved hundreds of thousands of young, unqualified, males to enter 
the fordist economy in the northern part of the country. None the less, a non-negligible 
proportion of young farmers managed to spend their entire career in agricultural 
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occupations with no or very limited chances of occupational progression even in a 
context of rapid industrialisation (Barbieri, 2011; Barone et al., 2011).  
Notwithstanding these general differences affecting the levels of career mobility, 
the institutional contexts of the two countries were more similar in the past than in 
recent years. Until the 1980s, both countries were characterised by strict labour market 
regulation, strong control over professional occupations and settlement of new 
businesses, as well as employment-related welfare entitlements (Esping-Andersen, 
1990). These rigidities contributed to keep relatively low the extent of workforce 
mobility. In fact, strict protection of employment relationships and strong state 
regulations over investment, entrepreneurship and professional activities generally 
decrease the number of vacancies and turnover levels, thus fostering job stability 
(Bertola and Rogerson, 1997; Gangl, 2003b; Amable and Gatti, 2004; Nicoletti and 
Scarpetta, 2005).  
However, the institutional settings of the two countries started to diverge 
considerably with the crisis of the fordist model in the early 1980s. On the one hand, the 
Netherlands reacted to the rising unemployment rates by largely flexibilising labour and 
products markets, thus favouring job-creation, lowering job-tenure, and considerably 
increasing workforce turnover (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997). These measures were also 
complemented by more universalistic welfare entitlements, such that nowadays some 
authors suggest including the Netherlands in the ‘flexicurity’ model typical of the 
Scandinavian countries (Muffels and Luijkx, 2008). In this respect, crucial was the 
social responsibility of trade unions. In fact, trade unions supported – or at least 
tolerated – unpopular policy measures aimed at fostering job-growth, among which a 
process of wage-moderation that allowed shifting economic resources from ‘passive’ to 
‘active’ labour market policies (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997). These institutional 
changes led to more competitive labour markets without fostering segmentation 
between permanent and temporary workers, thus favouring opportunities for career 
advancement particularly for the youngsters. 
Conversely, the Italian reaction to the crisis of the fordist arrangement was 
institutional inertia until the mid-1990s. Flexibility was introduced as a partial and 
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controlled experiment only afterwards and was not accompanied by universalistic 
welfare measures, thus failing in fostering job-creation and turnover levels (Esping-
Andersen and Regini, 2000; Regini, 2000). Crucial in this respect was the role of trade 
unions, which employed their veto-power to defend standard employment as the bulk of 
social security and prevented institutional reforms in the economic domain. 
 
4.2.4 Hypotheses 
I now develop specific expectations about i) the relative importance of the direct 
effect of social origin on occupational attainment in the two countries; ii) the extent of 
early career mobility across countries and historical periods; and iii) the consequences 
of early career mobility for the evolution of the direct effect of social origin over the 
early life course across countries and cohorts. 
As suggested in the previous section, in Italy, the prevalence of small and medium 
firms, the relevance of non-formals channels of recruitment, and the strong corporatism 
of liberal professions favoured the direct inheritance of family business and left large 
room for a direct influence of social origin on occupational destinations. Conversely, in 
the Netherlands, the standardized and formal recruitment processes typical of large 
firms and public employment put severe constraints to a direct influence of social 
origin. Hence, I generally expect a stronger direct effect of social origin on occupational 
attainment in Italy compared to the Netherlands (Hypothesis 1). 
The chapter also discussed how structural and institutional characteristics in the two 
countries may have affected the extent of early career mobility along the last half of the 
20th century. Strong rigidities in the economic domains kept relatively low the extent of 
career mobility until the early 80’s in both countries. However, the prevalence of small 
firms offering no or very little opportunities for career advancement kept lower the 
extent of early career mobility in Italy compared to the Netherlands, where the 
economic structure based on larger firms and public employment counterbalanced the 
‘intermediate’ occupational boundaries typical of the Dutch system. However, in the 
beginning of the 80’s, a process of market deregulation in reaction to the crises of the 
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fordist model found weak opposition from Dutch trade unions, and resolved in 
increasing workforce mobility nad greater opportunity for career advancement for 
young people. Conversely, the Italian reaction to the economic crises was institutional 
inertia.  
Based on structural institutional differences between the two countries, I expect the 
levels of career mobility being generally lower in Italy compared to the Netherlands and 
that this gap has even increased after the institutional reforms occurred in the Dutch 
context during the early 1980s (Hypothesis 2). In fact, in the Netherlands, early career 
mobility (and especially upward mobility) should have increased for men entered the 
labour market after institutional reforms occurred in the early 1980s compared to earlier 
cohorts. Conversely, in Italy, the low levels of career mobility of young men should 
have remained largely unchanged over historical time.  
Finally, I also discussed how early career mobility could strengthen or weaken the 
direct effect of social origin on occupational attainment at labour market entry (see par. 
4.2.2). However, many of the dynamics underlying the compensation and the 
accumulation scenarios are plausibly at work at the same time. The evolution of the 
direct social origin effect in the early career is therefore the result of contrasting 
mechanisms, possibly resolving in intragenerational stability. In principle, this applies 
to both the Italian and the Dutch contexts, even though different opportunities for career 
mobility in the two countries lead to more nuanced expectations.  
In Italy, although parents may want to help their offspring beyond the first job 
search, this willingness should be severely constrained by institutional and structural 
characteristics that limit early career mobility for all social groups – in all historical 
periods considered. For the same reasons, offspring from less-advantaged families 
should have few chances to compensate the initial disadvantage with steeper career 
growth. Therefore, in the Italian context, I expect strong initial disparities to remain 
quite stable over the early career for all labour market entry cohorts analysed 
(Hypothesis 3). In fact, in Italy, high restrictions to early career mobility make plausible 
that a great part of the intragenerational stability of the direct effect of social origin is 
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the genuine result of limited chances of career progression for all social groups, rather 
than the results of contrasting mechanisms.  
Conversely, in the Netherlands, institutional and structural constraints to career 
mobility are traditionally lower than in Italy, and this should reflect in higher chances 
for the direct effect of social origin to vary over the early life course. Given structural 
and institutional characteristics increasing the overall level of career mobility in the 
Netherlands, I hypothesise an accumulation scenario to be at the stake. Even if better 
initial placements of youngsters hailing from upper classes account for lower 
progression afterwards (ceiling effects) and that meritocratic principles regulating career 
advancements tend to dissolve initial inequalities, I believe that counter-mobility 
processes are likely to offset these mechanisms of intragenerational compensation. 
Indeed, in the Dutch context, offspring from upper classes do not necessarily need to 
reproduce the status of their parents immediately at labour market entry. Here, low 
restrictions to career mobility allow them to accept first jobs that score below their 
expectations – although not “bad jobs” – only because those jobs are expected to be 
transient, and further progression on the occupational ladder are expected afterwards. 
These counter-mobility processes should even be more likely after labour market 
policies occurred in the early 1980s, which removed some of the institutional 
restrictions on career mobility. For these reasons, in the Netherlands, I expect the direct 
effect of social origin to increase over the early career, and even more so for young men 
entered the labour market after the 1980s (Hypothesis 4).  
Compared to previous literature, the chapter proposes some advancement in 
disentangling the role of the contrasting mechanisms at the basis of the intragenerational 
evolution of the direct effects of social origin. In this respect, I split the overall direct 
effect of social origin on the rate of career progression into two components: a) the 
influence of social origin on the rate of career growth that is mediated by the first job 
placement (that itself influences further chances of progression); b) the influence of 
social origin on the rate of career growth beyond the first job placement (i.e. the ‘true’ 
direct effect of origin on the rate of career progression). In doing so, the chapter 
questions whether social origin directly determines occupational attainment above and 
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beyond what is mediated by the first job placement (and education), and whether the 
intragenerational evolution of the direct social origin effect is indeed the results of 
contrasting mechanisms operating at the same time.  
 
4.3 Data, variables and methods 
4.3.1 Data and variables 
The data used for the empirical analyses are from five waves of the ‘Italian 
Longitudinal Household Panel Studies’ (ILFI, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005) and three 
waves of the ‘Family Survey Dutch Population’ (FSDP, 1998, 2000, 2003). Both 
datasets collected life course information on nationally representative samples of the 
population, thus allowing for the reconstruction of full employment careers. I restricted 
our analyses only to men who started their career by the age of 35 and after WWII in 
both countries.  
Based on these data, I built two person-month datasets where information on the 
occupational positions held by men are observed in each month after the first labour 
market entry up to 10 years afterwards (with no gaps). Career duration refers to the time 
since the first ‘real’ labour market entry, i.e. the first job of at least three months 
obtained after the attainment of the highest level of education. The occupational 
position in each month-spell is measured by the International Socio-Economic Index 
(ISEI) of occupational status elaborated by Ganzeboom and Treiman (1996) on the basis 
of the ISCO88 occupational categories. Episodes of unemployment and inactivity are 
dropped from the sample. After list-wise deletion of missing cases on all relevant 
variables, the overall sample includes 434,980 and 315,912 person-months observations 
for 3,261 and 2,374 Italian and Dutch men, respectively.  
The chapter focuses on the early work histories of three broad labour market entry 
cohorts: 1950–65, 1966–80, and 1981–95. Individuals who entered the labour market 
after 1995 are not included, since the observation window for their early work histories 
would be too narrow. Although it is possible that some individuals left the labour 
market prior to 10 years after first entry, the analyses are almost entirely based on 
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observed early careers: on average, individuals from each entry cohort in both countries 
are observed for a period of 9–10 years. I distinguished broad entry cohorts since the 
sample size in each country is modest, and therefore more detailed classifications would 
significantly decrease the reliability of the empirical analyses. Early careers of the first 
cohort almost entirely developed during the economic boom after WWII (1950-1975); 
the second cohort experienced both the economic downturn at the turn of the 1970s and 
– in the case of the Netherlands – the first years after important labour market reforms 
(1966–1990); the last cohort developed the early career starting from the 1980s 
onwards, i.e. during a period of institutional inertia in Italy and entirely after labour 
market reforms occurred in the Netherlands (1981–2005). 
Social origin is measured as the highest social class between those of fathers and 
mothers when respondents were 15 years of age. I use a parsimonious three categories 
version of the EGP class scheme (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992) that distinguishes: a) 
the service class (I, II); b) the self-employed, white collars, and high-level technicians 
(III, IV); and finally the working class (V, VI, VII). This parsimonious threefold 
classification entails a clear and comparable hierarchy.  
Respondents’ highest level of education is measured as a time-fixed variable. In 
both countries, respondents with lower secondary education or less are included in the 
‘low’ category, those with upper secondary education are included in the ‘intermediate’ 
category, and those with tertiary education in the ‘high’ category. Although the Dutch 
educational system traditionally has two large vocational tracks (at the level of upper 
secondary education and at the level of tertiary education, non-university colleges), I 
adopted this three-fold classification for two reasons. First, including a different number 
of predictors in the models for the Netherlands and Italy would severely undermine the 
comparability of our results. Second, increasing the number of predictors would results 
in excessive extrapolation in the statistical model, since sample sizes within detailed 
educational categories would be too narrow. A straightforward consequence of this 
decision is that – given social inequalities in the access to vocational versus general 
education and heterogeneities in the occupational returns to those qualifications (Shavit 
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and Müller, 1998) – the direct effect of social origin on occupational attainment in the 
Netherlands might be slightly inflated in our empirical models.47  
 
4.3.2 Methods 
The analyses are performed via growth curves modelling (Halaby, 2003). While 
belonging to the broader family of hierarchical models, these models account multiple 
time-observations (level-1) nested within individuals (level-2) – in our case, monthly 
observations of ISEI scores along individuals’ working careers. This strategy is 
particularly adequate in our contexts, since it allows the assessment of the role of time-
invariant characteristics (such as parental social class and education) on both the 
‘average’ occupational attainment, and the development of occupational status over the 
early life course.  
A series of models with an increasing level of complexity are estimated separately 
in each country. Our basic model has the following general form:  
 
ijy = 0b + 1b ijcar + 2b ij
2car + 3b jorig + 4b jeduc + 5b jentrycohort + 0 ju + 1 ju + ije( ) (1); 
 
where the ISEI score at time i for individual j is regressed on a linear and a quadratic 
term for career duration, and three time-invariant predictors measuring social origin, the 
highest level of education attained, and labour market entry cohort. The random part of 
the equation (in brackets) includes a variance component for the intercept (μ0j), a 
variance component for the slope of linear career duration (μ1j), and a time-varying 
residual error term (εij). In this setting, the ‘average’ career path and its variability 
across individuals is modelled. In fact, in this setting, each individual is allowed to have 
his own growth parameters (intercept and slope), i.e. an individual-specific ISEI at 
career start and an individual-specific rate of linear career progression. 
                                                 
47 However, using a more detailed classification that distinguished vocational and 
general/academic education both at upper secondary and tertiary level in the Dutch context 
results in slightly lower, but equally statistically significant direct effect of social origin.  
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I start with a null model (M1) that decomposes the total variance in ISEI scores in 
its between- and within-individual components, where the latter quantity is a good 
overall measure of early career mobility occurring in each country (both upward and 
downward). Moreover, the intraclass correlation computed from the two quantities will 
inform us about the importance of overall differences between individuals relative to 
differences over time (career mobility) in explaining the total variance in the ISEI 
scores. Then, I add to the null model the variables measuring career duration both in 
linear and quadratic form, and the random slope for linear career duration (M2). This 
model will allow specific cross-country comparisons in the average ISEI at labour 
market entry and in the extent and shape of early careers progression. Moreover, the 
reduction of the within-variance components and the covariance between intercepts and 
slopes will inform us about the importance of career duration for occupational 
advancements, and the presence of ceiling effects. In the following two models (M3 and 
M4), I include social origin, labour market entry cohort, and level of education, in order 
to examine their impact on the ‘average’ occupational attainment over the early career, 
with a particular emphasis on the role of the direct effect of social origin. I then include 
interaction terms between labour market entry cohort and social origin, and labour 
market entry cohort and level of education, respectively (M5). This model will allow us 
to examine historical changes in the role of the direct effect of social origin and level of 
education for the ‘average’ occupational attainment in the early work life. Finally, the 
first part of the analyses concludes by inspecting whether the role of career duration for 
early occupational advancement differs over historical periods characterised by very 
different economic and institutional arrangements in each country (this is done by 
adding interactions between the linear and quadratic terms for career duration and 
labour market entry cohort, see M6). 
In the second part of the analyses, I add to equation 1 the three-way interaction 
between social origin, labour market entry cohort, and the linear and quadratic term for 
career duration, on the one hand, and the three-way interaction between level of 
education, labour market entry cohort, and the linear term for career duration on the 
other. This model detects in each country and labour market entry cohort: a) the direct 
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effect of social origin on occupational attainment at labour market entry; and b) the 
direct effect of social origin on the rate of early career progression. In this specification, 
the lower order interaction terms between education and labour market entry cohort 
account for the (cohort-specific) portion of the total effect of social origin at labour 
market entry that is mediated by educational attainment. The higher order interaction 
terms between level of education, labour market entry cohort, and linear career duration 
account for the (cohort-specific) portion of the total effect of social origin on the pace of 
career progression that is mediated by rates of (linear) career growth typical of high-, 
intermediate-, and low-educated labour market entrants. In this way, we are able to 
understand whether in each country and cohort there is a direct social origins’ penalty at 
the beginning of the career, and whether this direct initial penalty persists, increases, or 
vanishes during the early career. 
In the third part of the analyses, I add to the previous model the ISEI of the first job 
interacted with linear career duration variable and labour market entry cohort. In this 
way, the ‘overall’ direct effect of social origin on the rate of career progression in each 
country and cohort is decomposed in a) an indirect effect through the first job 
placement, and b) a ‘true’ direct effect, the latter reflecting the importance of counter-
mobility processes, social networks, soft skills, employers’ discrimination, aspiration, 
and direct inheritance beyond what is mediated by quality of the first job entry.  
In the second and the third part of the analyses, average marginal effects in 
graphical forms are presented, in order to allow for a straightforward interpretation of 
cross-country and cross-cohort differences.  
 
4.4 Empirical results 
4.4.1 The role of career progression, entry cohort, social origin, and 
 education for occupational attainment 
Table 4.1 shows the results of the growth-curve models where the ISEI score is 
regressed on a series of time-varying and time-invariant covariates in the two countries. 
In the null model (M1), the within-variance is remarkably higher in the Netherlands 
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(40) compared to Italy (14), thus suggesting a higher degree of early career mobility in 
the former than in the latter country. Moreover, the intraclass correlations that can be 
computed from the two random coefficients ([Within/(Within+Between)]) show a 
remarkable degree of permanence in occupational attainment in both countries, although 
great cross-country differences can be detected. The intraclass correlation in Italy shows 
that only the 7% of the total variation of men’s ISEI scores is attributable to 
occupational mobility over the early career (both upward and downward) rather than 
differences between individuals, whereas in the Netherlands this share is substantially 
higher, around 17%. These results are in line with our expectations and previous 
research showing Italy as one of the countries with the lowest level of career mobility 
(Barone et al., 2011).48 
M2 includes the linear and quadratic terms for career duration, and is used to 
explore the role of career duration for a men’s occupational advancement. In line with 
H2, the estimated coefficients show that opportunities for career progression are more 
limited in Italy compared to the Netherlands. After 10 years on the labour market, the 
ISEI of Italian men are expected to increase on average by approximately 2 points 
([0.307*10]–[0.009*100]), whereas the expected average increase for Dutch men is 
almost double, around 4 points ([0.565*10]–[0.017*100]). The negative quadratic terms 
for career duration show that each additional year of career increases occupational status 
at a decreasing rate: this result supports the existence of a ‘maturation point’ over 
individuals’ work careers (Barone and Schizzerotto, 2011; Manzoni et al., 2014). 
Moreover, in both countries, the within-variance components are approximately halved 
compared to M1 (14.2 versus 6.7 and 40.7 versus 21.7), thus showing that around the 
50% of the occupational mobility over time is explained by a curvilinear 
                                                 
48 I found a lower level of occupational mobility compared to Barone and colleagues (2011), 
even if the analyses solely focus on the early career, i.e. the period when career mobility is 
usually higher. This difference is understandable, since I limited the analyses to men, who 
usually are characterised by a higher degree of occupational stability in countries where the 
‘male breadwinner model’ is dominant.  
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Table 4.1 – Growth curve models for analysing ISEI scores: Focus on average career progression and on the role of social origins and education across entry cohorts 
(Italy: N individuals=3,153; N monthly-spells=354,524 – Netherlands: N individuals=2,340, N monthly-spells=264,060) 
  ITALY   THE NETHERLANDS 
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
 
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
Career duration 0.307*** 0.307*** 0.307*** 0.307*** 0.175*** 
  
0.565*** 0.565*** 0.565*** 0.565*** 0.336*** 
Career duration2 -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 0.002* 
  
-0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.002 
Entry Cohort (ref. 1950-1965) 
               1966-1980 
  
3.747*** 0.159 -0.004 -0.476 
   
2.774*** 1.002* 0.335 -0.128 
    1981-1995 
  
5.131*** -0.404 0.262 -0.023 
   
3.091*** -0.138 -1.792 -2.937** 
Social Origins (ref.V,VI,VII)
                Medium (III,IV) 
 
3.842*** 1.326*** -0.345 -0.345 
   
3.093*** 0.862 -0.048 -0.052 
    High (I,II) 
  
16.291*** 6.209*** 6.200*** 6.200*** 
   
10.105*** 4.154*** 4.969*** 4.967*** 
Education (ref. <upper sec.) 
                Upper secondary 
  
11.341*** 14.602*** 14.603*** 
    
6.466*** 6.240*** 6.243*** 
    Tertiary 
   
32.523*** 35.149*** 35.150*** 
    
20.398*** 18.493*** 18.497*** 
Interaction Social Origins*Cohort 
               Medium (III, IV)*1966-1980 
  
2.416*** 2.415*** 
     
1.946 1.949 
    Medium (III, IV)*1981-1995 
  
2.184** 2.182** 
     
0.708 0.709 
    High (I, II)*1966-1980 
   
-0.474 -0.475 
     
-0.609 -0.607 
    High (I, II)*1981-1995 
   
0.277 0.272 
     
-1.34 -1.344 
Interaction Education*Cohort 
               Upper secondary*1966-1980 
  
-3.223*** -3.225*** 
     
-0.003 -0.006 
    Upper secondary*1981-1995 
  
-5.020*** -5.021*** 
     
1.209 1.199 
    Tertiary*1966-1980 
   
-3.879** -3.880** 
     
0.955 0.952 
    Tertiary*1981-1995 
   
-3.241* -3.245* 
     
4.140*** 4.126*** 
Interaction Career*Cohort 
                Career duration*1966-1980 
   
0.187*** 
      
0.186** 
    Career duration*1981-1995 
   
0.190*** 
      
0.436*** 
Interaction Career2*Cohort 
                Career duration2*1966-1980 
   
-0.012*** 
      
-0.013*** 
    Career duration2*1981-1995 
   
-0.021*** 
      
-0.028*** 
              Intercept 39.397 38.196 32.171 30.197 30.186 30.453 
 
46.646 44.462 38.33 34.001 34.655 35.261 
Variance Between (level 2) 192.273 210.291 186.233 103.468 102.064 102.041 
 
206.992 247.185 227.289 171.416 170.881 170.776 
Variance Within (level 1) 14.243 6.704 6.704 6.704 6.704 6.7 
 
40.751 21.761 21.761 21.762 21.762 21.755 
Variance slope (career dur) 0.99 0.99 0.988 0.988 0.987 
  
2.429 2.427 2.417 2.416 2.41 
Covariance intercept-slope -4.121 -4.095 -4.147 -4.099 -4.094    -9.84 -9.908 -10.65 -10.659 -10.635 
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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trend of career progression. Finally, the negative covariance between the intercept and 
the slope of career duration shows the presence of ‘ceiling effects’ in both Italy and the 
Netherlands: the higher is the initial placement on the job market, the lower is the rate 
of career growth.  
Adding the labour market entry cohort and social origin variable in M3, results in 
substantially decreased between-variance components in both countries: this means that 
differences in occupational attainment are largely explained by these two variables. The 
constant terms shows that immediately after WWII the average socio-economic position 
in Italy was sensibly lower compared to the Netherlands (approximately by 6 points on 
the ISEI scale [38–32]), whereas, starting from this baseline, coefficients of the labour 
market entry cohorts dummies show that in both countries the ‘average’ placement has 
improved considerably afterwards. These results are compatible with the idea that the 
occupational structure in Italy was downward-shifted compared to the Netherlands for 
all periods considered. Taken together, the results from M2 and M3 underlie that not 
only Dutch men generally start their career with higher occupational status compared to 
Italians, but they also seem to benefit from a greater pace of occupational progression in 
the first 10 years of their career.  
Looking at the role of social origin, it is clear how advantages mainly concentrate 
among the service class, whereas differences between the middle and the lower classes 
are more limited. Moreover, while differences between the middle and the lower classes 
are similar in the two countries (around 3 points), the positive effect of having parents 
from the service class (I, II) rather than the working class (V, VI, VII) is much more 
pronounced in Italy (16 points) compared to the Netherlands (10 points). Therefore, the 
service class seems able to maintain a stark advantage compared to the working class in 
both countries, but especially in the Italian context.  
M4 confirms how the total effect of social origin on occupational attainment is 
mediated by educational attainment – although a significant direct effect of social origin 
remains in both countries. More precisely, the estimates show that almost approximately 
two-third of the total effect of having parents from the service class rather than the 
working class (see M3) is mediated by educational attainment in both countries, 
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whereas the remaining one-third is attributable to a direct influence of social origin. In 
line with H1 and previous literature, this direct effect seems slightly larger in Italy than 
in the Netherlands, especially if we consider that the direct effect for the Dutch case 
might be slightly inflated (see par. 4.3.1). Conversely, the direct advantages of having a 
‘middle’ versus a ‘low’ social origin is limited in magnitude and pertains only to the 
Italian case: this latter result underlies that the main social cleavage pertains those at the 
top of the class structure – on the one hand – and all other social classes – on the other. 
Worth noting is that, in both countries, the effect of education is substantially larger 
compared to the direct influence of social origin. Moreover, the coefficients of labour 
market entry cohort dummies drop almost to zero when adding the level of education, 
thus suggesting that the occupational upgrading across cohorts shown in model 3 is 
entirely captured by the process of educational expansion.  
In M5, both social origin and educational attainment are interacted with labour 
market entry cohort. This model allows us to examine whether the direct effect of social 
origin (and that of education) has changed across cohorts. Estimates provide mixed 
signs of modernisation looking at the second half of the 20th century. On the one hand, 
the most important result in our context is that the direct effect of having parents from 
the service class is quite constant across cohorts in Italy, whereas in the Netherlands, a 
non-statistically significant decline is observed comparing the entry cohort 1981–95 
with the earlier cohorts. Moreover, while among the first cohort in Italy we do not find 
any direct effect of having parents from the intermediate rather than the working class, 
in the successive two cohorts a small direct effect seem to be in place (around 2 ISEI 
points). These results disconfirm modernisation theory, which predicts decreasing direct 
intergenerational transmission of advantages over historical time. On the other hand, 
higher education seems to pay more for Dutch men entered the labour market after 
1980. Given that a process of credential inflation occurred in the Dutch context (van der 
Ploeg, 1996), this latter result suggests that meritocracy has gained importance in the 
job-allocation process over historical time. Finally, in Italy, the absolute pay-off to 
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educational qualifications decreases across cohorts, in line with recent findings 
(Ballarino and Scherer, 2013).49  
M6 adds to the previous model interactions between the labour market entry cohort 
dummies and two terms for career duration. This model is used to understand whether 
the role of career duration for the early occupational advancement differs across 
successive cohorts of labour market entrants, net of cohort-specific compositional 
effects in terms of social origin and level of education. In Italy, the limited rates of 
career progression are very similar across cohorts, in line with H2: although statistically 
significant, differences between the last two cohorts and the first one are substantially 
trivial (the average increases after 10 years of career is around 1.9, 2.6 and 1.7 ISEI 
points for the first, the second, and the third cohort respectively).50 Results for the 
Netherlands offer a different picture and also confirm H2: while the difference in the 
growth rates between the first and the second cohort is very limited (10 years of career 
lead to an increase of 3.1 and 3.7 ISEI points, respectively), Dutch men entered first 
employment after the reforms occurred in the 1980s seem to enjoy a faster rate of career 
progression compared to pre-reforms cohorts. Here, the average increase after 10 years 
of career is around 4.7 points.51 All in all, in compliance with our expectations, these 
results confirm that the pace of career progression is higher for Dutch- compared to 
Italian men in all entry cohorts, and that this gap has even increased in coincidence with 
institutional changes and labour market reforms introduced in the beginning of 1980s in 
the Netherlands. Substantively, these latter results imply that initial class inequalities 
                                                 
49 This latter trend is probably connected to changes in the marginal distribution of education 
and occupation leading to a strong process of credential inflation in the Italian context, but it 
may also be affected by changes in the allocation mechanism in the labour market over 
historical time (caught by relative returns to education). 
50 First cohort (1.95) = 0.175*10+0.002*100; second cohort (2.62) = (0.175+0.187)*10+(0.002–
0.012); third cohort (1.75) = (0.175+0.190)*10+(0.002–0.021)*100. 
51 In the Netherlands, the interactions between the labour market entry cohort dummies and the 
two terms for career duration are jointly significant (Wald tests for joint significance: χ2 =87.53, 
df=4, p=0.00). A further inspection of the single interaction coefficients show that differences 
are only significant when comparing the first labour market entry cohort to the following two 
cohorts.  
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should be more likely to change over the early life course in the Netherlands, and 
especially for the cohorts entered the labour market after the 1980’s. 
 
4.4.2 Early career progression and the direct effect of social origin across 
 countries and cohorts: accumulation, compensation or stability?  
In the previous section, I found that the direct effect of social origin on 
occupational attainment is rather persistent over historical time in both countries. This 
result strongly contradicts modernization theories, which postulated a secular trend 
towards a decline in the importance of social origins for occupational destinations. 
However, we only provided a ‘snapshot’ of the direct social origin effect by looking at 
the ‘average’ occupational attainment along one’s early career. This leaves open the 
question of whether the direct effect of social origin emerges at the career onset and 
whether (and how) differences in the paces of career progression of people from 
different social origin account for a compensation, accumulation or stability of the 
initial penalty over the early career (independently of educational attainment).  
Figure 4.1 reports the estimated average differences in ISEI scores along the early 
career for people hailing from the service class (I, II) and the intermediate class (III, IV) 
compared to the working class (V, VI, VII) across countries and cohorts. Cohort-
specific controls for level of education and their interactions with career duration are 
included.52 The starting points of the lines represent the direct effect of social origin at 
labour market entry (at career=0), whereas the slopes represent the evolution of the 
direct social origin effect over the first 10 years of career. If confidence intervals 
overlap the zero-line, the direct effects of hailing from the service and intermediate 
class compared to the working class are not statistically significant. If confidence 
intervals relative to each comparison do overlap widely along the career, 
intragenerational changes in the direct social origin effect are not statistically 
significant. 
                                                 
52 Full table with original coefficients are in the Appendix (Table A9). 
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Figure 4.1 confirms some general findings from Table 4.1. Firstly, the direct social 
origin effect is rather stable across successive entry cohorts in both countries: social 
origins still influence occupational destinations. Secondly, the direct effect of having 
parents from the top of the class hierarchy is generally higher in Italy compared to the 
Netherlands. Thirdly, while in the Netherlands advantages seem limited to youngsters 
hailing from the service class, in Italy also having parents from the intermediate rather 
than the working class offers an advantage for the cohorts entered the labour market 
after 1965. This latter result suggests the Italian social structure being more hierarchical 
compared to the Dutch one, where only those hailing from the service class enjoy a 
 
Figure 4.1 – Growth curve models: predicted average differences in ISEI along the first 10 
years of occupational career (and 95% confidence intervals) comparing youngsters hailing 
from the service and the intermediate classes with youngsters hailing from working class. Net 
of educational attainment 
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substantial advantage compared with those hailing from the bottom of the class 
hierarchy.  
Moving to the role of career mobility for intergenerational reproduction of 
inequality, the figure shows strong persistency of the direct social origin effect over the 
early life course. The direct effect is evident already at labour market entry and remains 
stable over the first 10 years of career. This result applies both to Italy and the 
Netherlands, and to almost all labour market entry cohorts considered. Therefore, level 
of education being equal, neither youngsters hailing from the service class nor 
youngsters hailing from the intermediate class enjoy different rates of career 
progression compared to youngsters hailing from the working class, in both countries. 
The substantive conclusion drawn from this evidence is that career mobility does not 
account for any accumulation or compensation of direct inequality over the early life 
course. 
The first entry cohort (1950–65) in the Netherlands is the only exception to this 
scenario of intragenerational stability. Here, the direct benefits of having parents from 
the service rather than the working class (which are higher in the beginning of the 
career: around 8 ISEI points), significantly decrease during the early work life until 
reaching – after 10 years – the level observed for the two successive cohorts in the same 
country (around 4 ISEI points). These results offer mixed support for our hypotheses, 
which expected intragenerational stability in Italy (H3) and accumulation in the 
Netherlands (H4).  
Worth noting is that this scenario of intragenerational stability of the direct social 
origin effect holds irrespective of differences in the rates of career mobility that we 
found between the two countries and across the three labour market entry cohorts. In 
Italy, the low level of career mobility we found for the whole period considered seems 
to justify the absence of differences in the patters of career growth, consistently with 
H3. Conversely, contrary to H4, the higher chances of career mobility found in the 
Netherlands, and especially for those entered the market after 1980, seems to have 
developed quite homogeneously and without favouring any social class in particular.  
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4.4.3 Explaining the intragenerational stability of the direct effect: do
 parents play a role beyond the first job? 
The persistency of the direct social origin effect along the early life course does not 
imply that parents do not play any role beyond the first placement of their offspring on 
the labour market. Indeed, contrasting mechanisms either pushing toward accumulation 
or compensation over the early career could be at work at the same time. 
Figure 4.2 reports the evolution of the direct social origin effect over the first 10 
years of career (as in Figure 4.1) once cohort-specific controls for the ISEI score of the 
first job and its interaction with career duration are included as covariates. Intuitively, 
this specification cancels out the direct effect of social origin at labour market entry 
(when career=0), and allows examining differences in the early career trajectories 
comparing people hailing from different social classes but with the same level of 
education who entered first employment in job positions characterised by the same ISEI 
score. In this way, we are able to see whether the direct effect of social origin extends 
above and beyond what is mediated by the first occupation. We only report the contrast 
between the service and the working class, since estimates of the differences between 
the intermediate and other classes are neither statistically nor substantially significant.53 
Hence, the main differences occur between youngsters hailing from the top of the class 
structure and those hailing from the bottom.  
In both countries and entry cohorts – with the exception of cohort 1950–65 in the 
Netherlands – social origin seems to play a direct role in affecting the early career 
beyond what is mediated by the occupation attained at labour market entry. Indeed, 
when comparing individuals with the same level of education who entered first 
employment in the same position, descendants from the service class show a higher rate 
of early career progression compared to descendants from the working class. After 10 
years of career, the higher rates of progression of youngsters hailing from the service 
class lead to an advantage of approximately 2 to 3 ISEI points in Italy (cross-cohort 
                                                 
53 The figure including the contrasts between the intermediate and the working class and the 
table with original coefficients are in the Appendix (Figure A2 and Table A10, respectively). 
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difference are substantially negligible) and 2 to 4 points in the Netherlands (for the 
second and third cohorts respectively). 
Although these results should be handled with caution (in same cases, differences 
are statistically significant at the 10% level)54, the analyses show how the direct effect 
of social origin cannot be solely traced back to its effect at labour market entry in 
neither of the two countries. When having the same educational level and first entering 
the labour market in the same occupation, pupils hailing from the service class enjoy a 
higher rate of career progression compared to their counterparts from the working class. 
                                                 
54 In Italy, the p values of the differences in ISEI scores after ten years of career are .085, .075 
and .054 for the three successive cohorts, respectively. In the Netherlands, p values for the 
cohorts 66–80 and 81–95 are .058 and .000, respectively. 
 
Figure 4.2 – Growth curve models: predicted average differences in ISEI along the first 10 
years of occupational career (and 95% confidence intervals) comparing youngsters hailing 
from the service and the working class. Net of educational attainment and ISEI at labour 
market entry 
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In other words, there is evidence that, both in Italy and the Netherlands, social origin 
still plays a role not only above educational attainment, but also beyond what is 
mediated by the first placement in the occupational structure. Interestingly, the role of 
social origin beyond the first occupational position seems stronger for Dutch men from 
the post-reforms cohort compared to the earlier labour market entry cohorts (4 versus 2 
ISEI points after 10 years of career, respectively) – although this difference is not 
statistically significant. Hence, if anything, it seems that increased chances of 
occupational mobility favoured by Dutch labour market reforms after the 1980s has 
coincided with increased chances of the upper classes to directly influence the rate of 
upward career mobility of their descendants, rather than with increased chances of less-
advantaged offspring to recover the initial penalty.  
Why then is the direct effect of social origin stable over the early life course when 
the first job is not considered, as shown in Figure 4.1? The answer lies in the initial 
advantages of individuals from a higher social origin. As shown by the negative 
covariance between intercepts and slopes in Table 4.1, a higher ISEI at labour market 
entry is indeed associated with a lower rate of career progression, i.e. a ceiling effect is 
in place. The negative sign of the lower order interactions between career duration and 
the ISEI score of the first job in both countries further confirms the presence of ceiling 
effects (see Table A10 in the Appendix). Given that those starting higher in the 
occupational hierarchy enjoy lower rates of progression (even if they end up higher), 
and that persons hailing from the service class enjoy better initial placement net of 
educational attainment (see Figure 4.1), it logically follows that individuals from the 
service class are more prone to ceiling dynamics.  
In sum, the intragenerational stability of the advantage of offspring from the service 
class observed in Figure 4.1 is the result of contrasting forces counterbalancing each 
other in both countries. On one hand, a better placement at the onset of the career – 
typical of offspring from the service class – represents a structural constraint that has to 
be taken into consideration when evaluating the chances of further career advancement. 
On the other hand, consistently with a counter-mobility perspective, the role of 
discrimination, non-cognitive skills, aspirations, habitus and social capital, and direct 
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inheritance of material resources seem to gain increasing importance during the early 
work life, thus disproportionally favouring descendants from the service class. 
 
4.5 Discussion and conclusions 
I examined the direct influence of social origin on occupational attainment of 
Italian and Dutch men who entered the labour market between 1950 and 1995. Contrary 
to most previous studies, I adopted a dynamic perspective looking at the evolution of 
the direct social origin effect across the early life course, namely, the first 10 years after 
labour market entry. This strategy allows us to understand whether the direct effect of 
social origin on occupational attainment appears at the onset of careers, and whether 
this effect increases, decreases or remains stable in the early life course. Moreover, I 
explored some mechanisms behind the intragenerational evolution of the direct social 
origin effect, in order to understand whether parents play a role beyond the labour 
market entry of their offspring. 
Consistently with previous studies, and in line with our theoretical expectations, the 
direct effect of social origin on the ‘average’ occupational attainment over 10 year of 
career is generally larger in Italy compared to the Netherlands. This result confirms 
previous findings for Italy, and speaks in favour of studies reporting a sizeable direct 
effect of social origin in the Dutch context. Moreover, the direct social origin effect 
seems rather stable over historical time in both countries. This persistency questions 
whether theories of economic and cultural modernization offer a valuable synthesis of 
the processes occurred in Western countries over the 20th century. However, the 
analyses focused only on post WWII-period, and we know from previous studies that a 
great part of the decline is due to the comparison of pre- and post-war labour market 
entry cohorts. 
I have also shown that early career mobility varies greatly cross-nationally. In Italy, 
the prevalence of small firms, the importance of agriculture sector in southern regions, 
the strong corporatism of liberal professions, and the traditionally strong restrictions on 
labour and product markets substantially limit the opportunities for career growth. 
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Conversely, notwithstanding occupational boundaries are stronger in the Netherlands 
compared to Italy, the Dutch economic and institutional structure seems to offer wider 
opportunities for early occupational upgrading. Here, large enterprises offering wide 
opportunities for career advancement were crucial until the 1970s, and both the early 
shift to a service-based economy and the importance of public sector fostered the 
opportunities for occupational progression. Moreover, starting from the 1980s, 
institutional reforms in response to the crisis of the fordist model found weak opposition 
of Dutch trade unions. These reforms in the economic domain allowed higher flexibility 
on labour and product markets, and have resulted in higher chances of early career 
mobility for Dutch men who entered the market after 1980. Instead, consistently with 
the institutional inertia of Italian context, I found no changes in the low chances of 
men’s early career mobility along the last half of the 20th century. 
Notwithstanding these cross-country and cross-cohort differences in the levels of 
early career mobility, our results indicate that – level of education being equal – 
offspring hailing from upper classes always enjoyed similar rates of career growth 
compared to offspring from less-advantaged families. Hence, the direct effect of social 
origin is visible at the onset of one’s career, and then remains stable over the first 10 
years on the labour market. In other words, descendants from the service class enjoyed 
and continue to enjoy a substantial ‘life course’ occupational advantage compared to 
offspring from the working class. As said, this holds in both countries and for almost all 
cohorts, i.e. in contexts characterised by different institutional restrictions to early 
career mobility. Hence, it seems that early career mobility does account neither for 
accumulation nor for compensation of the initial penalty.  
While this scenario of intragenerational stability was expected in Italy (given the 
generally high restrictions to career mobility for all young people), it also holds for the 
Netherlands. In the Dutch context, career mobility is generally higher, and the market 
flexibilisation occurred in the 1980s further increased the level of career mobility, but 
had no implications for the distribution of career opportunities among social classes.55  
                                                 
55 An exception to this pattern is the cohort of Dutch men who entered the labour market in the 
period 1950–65. Here, the direct effect of social origin is higher at the onset of career and then 
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More generally, our results question whether increasing efficiency in the economic 
domain affects the extent of social inequality. Indeed, Italy is traditionally a rigid 
market economy, where liberalization is often advocated as an instrument to reduce 
market failures and to increase meritocratic person-job matches. However, our results 
suggest that even in countries with lower restrictions to occupational mobility – such as 
the Netherlands – abscriptive advangates at labour market entry are hardly equalised by 
the mechanisms underlying the occupational progression. 
I also tried to shed some light on the mechanism producing the stability of the 
direct effect of social origin over the early career. I postulated that the mechanisms 
underlying the accumulation or compensation scenarios are possibly at work at the same 
time, such that the intragenerational stability we observe is the result of contrasting 
dynamics. I also expected this latter scenario being more likely in the Dutch context, 
where the lower restrictions to career mobility leave more room for disproportionate 
chances of occupational progression among social classes.  
In this respect, my results show how social origin plays a direct role on career 
opportunities beyond what is mediated by the first occupation at labour market entry – 
in both countries and for the majority of the entry cohorts considered. Indeed, 
individuals from the service class seem to benefit from higher rates of career 
progression compared to equally educated counterparts from the working class who 
entered the first job with the same occupational status. This result might indicate the 
presence of counter-mobility mechanisms favoured by socially stratified unobservables 
(such as non-cognitive skills, aspirations, and social contacts) becoming particularly 
                                                                                                                                               
decreases substantially over the first 10 years on the labour market. This pattern reflects the 
lower rate of career growth of individuals hailing from the service class compared to the 
working class, the latter being able to partly recover the initial disadvantage in the early life 
course. This latter result exemplifies the benefits of analysing intergenerational social mobility 
from a life course perspective. When only looking at social inequality at labour market entry, in 
our empirical results one would conclude that the direct effect of social origin is declining over 
historical time in the Netherlands. However, a pattern of historical persistency is found when 
looking at the direct social origin effect after 10 years on the labour market. Part of the 
inconsistencies of previous findings on the Dutch case could be due to this caveat.  
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effective after the labour market entry. Yet, it may also be that employers discriminate 
young workers from low-origin families when it comes to assign promotions, or that 
inherited material resources are exploited only after probation periods in low-ranked 
positions (e.g. in a family business).  
Strikingly, the role played by the class background along the career seems stronger 
in contexts characterised by higher economic efficiency (less regulation and more 
mobility) – that is, in the Netherlands compared to Italy, and for post- compared to pre-
reforms cohorts in the Dutch context. Again, this result suggests that increasing 
deregulation and liberalisation in the economic domain does not automatically translate 
in increasing equality. On the opposite, it seems that high market efficiency gives the 
service class the possibility to further push their offspring’s careers beyond the first 
labour market entry. However, ceiling effects are at work in such situation, and 
counterbalance this additional advantage enjoyed by offspring from the service class.  
The result of these two contrasting forces, interestingly enough, is the stability of 
the initial advantages over the early work life. Whether this persistency is the result of a 
precise and voluntary strategy of service class families aimed at counterbalancing 
ceiling effects and maintaining a constant, life course advantage compared to working 
class families is an issue to be explored. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
 This thesis examined the process of entry into the labour market and the early 
occupational development in comparative perspective. In particular, I explored the role 
of several institutional characteristics in affecting the entry into the first employment, 
the occupational progression after a flexible labour market entry, and the emergence and 
the evolution of class-based inequality over the early occupational career.  
Starting from the theoretical distinctions between Internal vs Occupational labour 
markets and Coordinated vs Liberal market economies, I illustrated how several 
institutional characteristics may affect the process of entry into the labour market. These 
classifications offer a nice overview of the role of the vocational orientation the 
education systems and the employment protection legislation. Nonetheless, these 
specific taxonomies – as well as other classifications of institutional regimes – have 
been incapable of classifying Southern European countries, and of explaining variations 
in the modes of the school-to-work transition within each country grouping. In the 
theoretical chapter, I argued that these deficiencies are likely connected to the simplistic 
view of some institutions and the omission of other potentially relevant institutional 
characteristics. 
I argued that three specific additional issues may indeed help explain contextual 
variations in the school-to-work transition processes in the European context: the 
strictness in the regulation of product and service markets, the extent to which 
deregulation of employment relationship has been partial and targeted, and the 
ambivalence in the role of trade unionism. In the empirical chapters, these three 
additional issues have been considered alongside traditional institutional characteristics 
identified by previous literature on the school-to-work transition, such as the 
employment protection legislation and the vocational orientation of the education 
system. 
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5.1 Key findings 
In the first empirical chapter (chapter 2), I analyzed the speed of entry and the 
quality of first employment in a variety of European countries. Here, I confirmed some 
well-established results in the literature and tested new hypotheses about the importance 
of institutional features not considered so far.  
The main finding is that the strictness of employment protection legislation and 
product market regulation seem to come along with a macro level trade-off between 
speed and quality. Indeed, strong restrictions in the labour- and product market domains 
delay the transition from education to the first job, but – in the long run – ensure better 
initial placements in the occupational hierarchy. The vocational orientation alone seems 
to favour both the speed of entry and the quality of the first employment. 
While some of these findings are well established in previous research, I added to 
existing literature in three ways. First, I considered a relevant institutional characteristic 
not considered so far by sociological literature, i.e. the regulation on the service and 
product market. Second, I provided a more stringent empirical test for the role of the 
above-mentioned institutional characteristics by controlling for the possible 
confounding effect of national idiosyncrasies. Third, I provided a theoretical and 
empirical distinction between the influence of the long-term contextual setting 
associated with each of the three institutional features and the influence of short-term 
institutional changes. With regards to this latter point, the chapter provided evidence 
that the speed of entry is influenced by both short-term institutional changes and the 
long-term institutional settings associated with three institutional characteristics 
considered, whereas the quality of the first employment is only sensitive to long-term 
institutional arrangements.  
Finally, the chapter also underlined the importance of considering the interactions 
between different institutional spheres from both a theoretical and an empirical 
standpoint. In line with the theoretical argument put forward by Breen (2005) and 
Scherer (2005), I showed that the detrimental effect of strong employment protection 
legislation on the speed of transition is indeed far less visible in contexts where the 
educational systems provide students with well-recognized educational qualifications. 
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This result is consistent with the theoretical mechanisms underlying the influence of 
employment protection legislation and the vocational orientation: employers may 
indeed avoid long screening processes aimed at reducing the cost of a potential job-
person mismatch when applicants’ skills are certified by the educational system.  
With regard to the possible interactions between labour and product market 
legislations, the chapter underlined how the negative consequence of strict regulations 
in the product market are indeed exacerbated when also the labour regulations are tight. 
This result is consistent with the idea that the benefit of deregulating the product market 
is higher when strong employment protection concurs in delaying the transition from 
education to employment. From a substantive point, this result suggests labour- and 
product market regulations being two alternative policy leverages to boost the speed of 
transition into the first employment. 
In chapter 3, I examined the occupational progression of youngster entered the 
labour market with a fixed-term contract, i.e. those youngsters whose occupational 
destinies may be more at risk of disruption. Indeed, it is often claimed that fixed-term 
employment at the beginning of the career undermines subsequent career progression – 
an idea usually recalled as the entrapment hypothesis. Relatedly, the stepping stone vs 
trap literature usually claims that the extent to which this entrapment scenario applies 
depends on the actual level of segmentation within a labour market. The chapter 
contributed to this debate by examining whether fixed-term entrants experience worse 
occupational progression in contexts of strong labour market segmentation than in 
contexts of weak segmentation.  
Two related dimensions of labour market segmentation are theoretically considered 
and empirically evaluated: the gap in the protection of permanents and temporary 
contracts, and the strength of trade unions. The main finding is that strong EPL gap and 
strong unionism fosters barriers across labour market segments and decreases the 
chances of contractual and occupational upgrading after a flexible labour market entry. 
In particular, fixed-term entrants are more likely to remain in fixed-term employment in 
the early career when permanent contract are disproportionally protected compared to 
temporary contracts. Moreover, youngsters entered the first employment in a fixed-term 
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position are less likely to move on the occupational ladder in contexts of strong 
unionism than in contexts of weak unionism. Finally, there is also evidence that a shift 
to permanent contract is more often associated with upward mobility in strongly rather 
than weakly unionised labour markets.  
Two broad take-home messages arise from these findings. First, the disproportion 
in the protection of temporary compared to permanent contracts represents a significant 
source of labour market segmentation independently on the level of protection of 
permanent contracts. Therefore – in addition to the overall level of employment 
protection – the disproportion per se is an important dimension deserving specific 
consideration when focusing on labour market issues, especially in the case of youth 
studies. Second, unions exert an ambivalent role when protecting the interest of insiders 
over the interests of outsiders. This ambivalence is rather clear in the case of young 
people entering the first employment in a fixed-term position, that – in the case of 
strong unionism – have low chances of both upward and downward occupational 
mobility. Therefore, while often claimed to defend the interest of all workers, trade 
unions may in practise favour certain social groups at the expense of others.  
In the last chapter, I examined the emergence of class-based inequalities on 
occupational attainment at labour market entry, and their evolution over the early 
occupational career. In particular, the focus was on the more ‘pure’ form class-based 
inequality, i.e. the influence of social origin on top of educational attainment. The 
comparison between the Italian and the Dutch contexts over the second half of the 20th 
century offered useful insights to interpret the role of institutions for the evolution of 
class-based inequality in the early life course.  
The main finding is that the direct effect of social origin on occupational attainment 
is extremely stable over biographical and historical time. Although stronger in Italy than 
in the Netherlands, a direct effect of social origin is visible at the onset of the career and 
then remains virtually constant up to 10 years after the first labour market entry, in both 
countries. This result confirms the loci of intergenerational reproduction being generally 
located at labour market entry rather than at later points in the biographies of 
individuals.  
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What is more, this scenario of intragenerational stability of class-based inequalities 
regards both Italy and the Netherland and almost all labour market entry cohorts 
analysed.  This latter result is particularly interesting, since the extent of early career 
mobility is substantially higher in the Netherlands compared to Italy, and especially for 
the Dutch cohorts entered the labour market after 1980. Therefore, it seems that 
institutional and structural characteristics affecting the level of career mobility have 
weak implications for the distribution of career opportunities among different social 
groups. Moreover, the strength of the direct social origin effect is indeed similar across 
successive cohorts of school-leavers, thus questioning whether there has been any 
meritocratic modernization of the job-allocation process in the last half of the century. 
In broad terms, these results entail at least two important conclusions. First of all, 
modernization theories and theories predicting the end of class barriers found no 
confirmation. These theories generally postulate that meritocracy has gained increasing 
importance in the job-allocation processes at the expense of inheritance, and that class-
based inequalities are constantly vanishing moving towards post-modern societies. 
However, a direct effect of class background on the occupational destination is still 
there, and seems not to have weakened during the last half of the 20th century.  
Second, increasing efficiency in the labour market domain does not necessarily 
translate in decreasing class-based inequalities over the early occupational career. 
Indeed, low restrictions to career mobility fostered by liberalisation reforms neither 
coincide with lower class-based inequality at the career start, nor account for the 
reduction of these inequalities with occupational progression. It is therefore 
questionable whether liberalising the market domain is a viable solution in order to 
dismantle existing class-based inequalities in the job-allocation process. 
 
5.2 Concluding remarks 
This work confirmed the importance of the institutional context in shaping the 
school-to-work transition in Europe. Institutions not only influence the speed and the 
quality of the first labour market entry, but also the occupational destinies after a first 
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flexible entry and the way the parental background is associated with early labour 
market success.  
While confirming the importance of classic institutional characteristics – such as 
the employment protection legislation and the vocational orientation of the education 
system – this work underlined the importance some other additional issues. First of all, 
the regulation in the product and service market domain is a relevant piece of the puzzle 
when it comes to explain contextual variations in the occupational patterns of young 
Europeans. In fact, product market regulation affects the transitions from education to 
the first employment on top of the employment protection legislation. Moreover, as far 
as the speed of entry is concerned, the negative role of product market regulation is 
particularly pronounced when also employment relationships are strictly protected. 
Hence, product market regulation may help in explaining the considerable length of the 
transition from education to the first employment found in Southern European 
countries, where both labour and product market regulations are traditionally strict.  
The second relevant issue is again the employment protection legislation, but in the 
context of the partial and targeted form of deregulation of employment relationships 
that have been implemented in response to globalisation pressures. Strong disproportion 
in the protection of permanent and temporary contracts has been shown to increase 
labour market segmentation and to foster career immobility after a flexible labour 
market entry. Crucially, this disproportion explains variations in the extent to which 
fixed-term entrants remain trapped in fixed-term employment within the country-
clusters considered. Hence, it can be concluded that the EPL gap is an important 
determinant of the variability in the outcomes of the school-to-work transition across 
countries that are similar in many other respects.  
Finally, the thesis underlined that trade unionism plays a complex role which is far 
from being clear-cut and unambiguous. Strong union indeed fosters labour market 
segmentation and occupational immobility after a fixed-term labour market entry. As 
far as fixed-term entrants are concerned, strong unionism not only impedes 
opportunities of upgrading, but also the risk of further downgrading on the occupational 
ladder. Moreover, the comparison between Italy and the Netherlands also showed how 
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trade unions indeed reacted very differently to liberalisation pressures, thus impacting 
differently on the extent of career mobility. This latter consideration suggests that 
contextual variations in the extent to which unions defend their corporatist interests 
against market reforms may indeed explain some of the variability in the patterns of 
early occupational progression found in Europe. 
A final important consideration regards the persistency of class-based inequalities 
across both biographical and historical time. While influencing the degree of career 
mobility to a considerable extent, the institutional characteristics considered in this 
thesis do not influence the distribution of career mobility among descendants of 
different social classes. Again, this latter consideration suggests that liberalisation 
reforms in the market domain do not offer any answers to the attempt of abating 
ascriptive inequalities in Western societies. 
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Table A1 – Sample size by country and school-leaving cohort combinations (N=105,237)      1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
AUSTRIA 230 232 227 282 285 298 322 311 310 330 356 336 381 529 112 
BELGIUM 124 170 141 202 224 218 204 209 213 221 228 238 280 266 43 
CZECH REP. 408 414 393 393 417 360 379 418 423 364 360 388 335 359 221 
DENMARK 39 41 49 66 72 87 110 93 109 137 180 238 288 383 86 
SPAIN 523 571 567 710 762 821 762 805 796 873 883 887 892 861 475 
FINLAND 53 59 77 96 130 159 142 182 235 234 270 309 321 436 304 
FRANCE 199 272 344 443 404 453 449 436 417 400 425 460 514 548 262 
GREECE 502 577 579 658 615 614 570 575 532 582 530 445 452 451 53 
HUNGARY 495 553 536 603 556 605 534 582 599 657 637 649 584 701 106 
IRELAND 425 449 545 645 662 626 574 624 604 655 640 680 746 727 313 
ITALY 1065 1035 1146 1103 1050 1094 1052 1020 1085 1167 1166 1176 1161 1172 217 
THE NETHERL. 213 265 323 420 468 535 563 634 682 750 763 866 921 914 400 
NORWAY 88 91 127 132 118 155 169 187 209 211 237 231 254 327 136 
POLAND 343 340 351 397 353 462 396 460 464 517 554 555 544 588 100 
PORTUGAL 214 223 243 293 277 285 245 284 266 307 342 361 371 498 91 
SWEDEN 154 154 182 243 261 337 294 328 377 421 496 559 610 691 437 
UTD KINGDOM 88 104 121 108 121 115 120 125 100 111 111 86 49 96 16 
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Table A2 – Institutional variations over time: Vocational orientation, Employment protection legislation, and Product market regulation  
 AUSTRIA BELGIUM 
CZECH 
REP. DENMARK SPAIN FINLAND FRANCE GREECE HUNGARY IRELAND ITALY NETHERL. NORWAY POLAND PORTUG. SWEDEN 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
  VOCATIONAL ORIENTATION 
1995 0.394 0.533 0.443 0.277 0.25 0.293 0.284 0.157 0.395 0.097 0.431 0.485 0.319 0.475 0.123 0.314 0.185 
1996 0.394 0.537 0.46 0.278 0.278 0.293 0.287 0.16 0.368 0.094 0.427 0.48 0.331 0.472 0.133 0.31 0.184 
1997 0.394 0.521 0.424 0.271 0.235 0.299 0.275 0.166 0.367 0.093 0.426 0.412 0.339 0.452 0.129 0.31 0.173 
1998 0.379 0.504 0.366 0.264 0.15 0.291 0.25 0.166 0.043 0.102 0.381 0.309 0.304 0.448 0.126 0.261 0.134 
1999 0.349 0.488 0.34 0.269 0.135 0.307 0.254 0.131 0.055 0.111 0.375 0.334 0.316 0.442 0.121 0.309 0.194 
2000 0.35 0.471 0.363 0.281 0.126 0.335 0.254 0.162 0.051 0.12 0.144 0.337 0.329 0.439 0.118 0.303 0.199 
2001 0.351 0.454 0.387 0.29 0.136 0.354 0.249 0.181 0.057 0.129 0.154 0.348 0.323 0.434 0.141 0.316 0.196 
2002 0.352 0.438 0.392 0.271 0.143 0.361 0.247 0.215 0.065 0.138 0.16 0.341 0.318 0.339 0.144 0.295 0.207 
2003 0.349 0.421 0.39 0.265 0.134 0.373 0.249 0.188 0.065 0.146 0.154 0.346 0.323 0.303 0.138 0.281 0.192 
2004 0.379 0.405 0.389 0.274 0.139 0.282 0.262 0.179 0.135 0.155 0.376 0.519 0.33 0.252 0.141 0.271 0.229 
2005 0.384 0.404 0.392 0.27 0.157 0.286 0.264 0.192 0.136 0.159 0.37 0.514 0.327 0.236 0.165 0.274 0.234 
2006 0.387 0.408 0.394 0.268 0.156 0.288 0.194 0.177 0.136 0.16 0.37 0.462 0.326 0.235 0.167 0.28 0.182 
2007 0.387 0.416 0.384 0.265 0.16 0.291 0.199 0.16 0.136 0.162 0.371 0.465 0.323 0.245 0.183 0.293 0.186 
2008 0.389 0.417 0.387 0.26 0.161 0.293 0.2 0.159 0.141 0.165 0.369 0.469 0.311 0.261 0.221 0.305 0.134 
2009 0.396 0.417 0.392 0.259 0.157 0.298 0.198 0.157 0.144 0.172 0.363 0.472 0.3 0.276 0.25 0.316 0.125 
  EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION LEGISLATION 
1995 0.219 0.771 0.083 0.229 0.542 0.208 0.604 0.792 0.104 0.042 0.792 0.229 0.521 0.125 0.562 0.295 0.042 
1996 0.219 0.771 0.083 0.229 0.542 0.208 0.604 0.792 0.104 0.042 0.792 0.229 0.531 0.125 0.562 0.295 0.042 
1997 0.219 0.771 0.083 0.229 0.542 0.208 0.604 0.792 0.104 0.042 0.792 0.229 0.531 0.125 0.469 0.24 0.042 
1998 0.219 0.396 0.083 0.229 0.542 0.26 0.604 0.792 0.104 0.042 0.604 0.229 0.531 0.125 0.469 0.24 0.042 
1999 0.219 0.396 0.083 0.229 0.542 0.26 0.604 0.792 0.104 0.042 0.604 0.156 0.531 0.125 0.469 0.24 0.042 
2000 0.219 0.396 0.083 0.229 0.542 0.26 0.604 0.792 0.104 0.042 0.542 0.156 0.5 0.125 0.469 0.24 0.042 
2001 0.219 0.396 0.083 0.229 0.542 0.26 0.604 0.792 0.104 0.042 0.542 0.156 0.458 0.125 0.469 0.24 0.042 
2002 0.219 0.396 0.083 0.229 0.542 0.26 0.604 0.792 0.104 0.042 0.396 0.156 0.458 0.125 0.469 0.24 0.042 
2003 0.219 0.396 0.083 0.229 0.542 0.26 0.604 0.792 0.104 0.042 0.333 0.156 0.458 0.042 0.469 0.24 0.062 
2004 0.219 0.396 0.083 0.229 0.542 0.26 0.604 0.458 0.188 0.104 0.333 0.156 0.458 0.292 0.427 0.24 0.062 
2005 0.219 0.396 0.188 0.229 0.542 0.26 0.604 0.458 0.188 0.104 0.333 0.156 0.458 0.292 0.427 0.24 0.062 
2006 0.219 0.396 0.188 0.229 0.542 0.26 0.604 0.458 0.188 0.104 0.333 0.156 0.5 0.292 0.427 0.24 0.062 
2007 0.219 0.396 0.188 0.229 0.5 0.26 0.604 0.458 0.188 0.104 0.333 0.156 0.5 0.292 0.427 0.24 0.062 
2008 0.219 0.396 0.188 0.229 0.5 0.26 0.604 0.458 0.188 0.104 0.333 0.156 0.5 0.292 0.323 0.135 0.062 
2009 0.219 0.396 0.188 0.229 0.5 0.26 0.604 0.458 0.188 0.104 0.333 0.156 0.5 0.292 0.323 0.135 0.062 
  PRODUCT MARKET REGULATION 
1995 0.399 0.454 0.441 0.185 0.435 0.139 0.436 0.545 0.463 0.209 0.599 0.239 0.239 0.56 0.46 0.271 0.19 
1996 0.376 0.405 0.421 0.193 0.405 0.137 0.405 0.52 0.429 0.216 0.552 0.225 0.239 0.512 0.431 0.254 0.188 
1997 0.353 0.355 0.401 0.201 0.375 0.135 0.375 0.496 0.394 0.223 0.505 0.211 0.24 0.465 0.401 0.237 0.187 
1998 0.33 0.305 0.381 0.209 0.345 0.133 0.344 0.471 0.36 0.23 0.459 0.196 0.24 0.417 0.372 0.22 0.186 
1999 0.307 0.255 0.361 0.217 0.315 0.131 0.314 0.447 0.326 0.237 0.412 0.182 0.241 0.37 0.342 0.203 0.185 
2000 0.284 0.205 0.341 0.224 0.285 0.129 0.283 0.422 0.292 0.244 0.366 0.168 0.241 0.322 0.313 0.186 0.183 
2001 0.441 0.568 0.543 0.35 0.421 0.235 0.514 0.545 0.403 0.39 0.5 0.425 0.374 0.56 0.499 0.409 0.304 
2002 0.298 0.395 0.428 0.263 0.393 0.259 0.381 0.438 0.371 0.315 0.397 0.326 0.302 0.449 0.409 0.254 0.31 
2003 0.273 0.372 0.413 0.27 0.413 0.228 0.307 0.434 0.354 0.255 0.364 0.316 0.248 0.483 0.411 0.245 0.268 
2004 0.262 0.343 0.333 0.234 0.314 0.148 0.29 0.401 0.287 0.23 0.335 0.327 0.239 0.415 0.376 0.216 0.259 
2005 0.294 0.316 0.4 0.21 0.343 0.133 0.31 0.437 0.344 0.251 0.374 0.313 0.236 0.417 0.375 0.23 0.282 
2006 0.357 0.418 0.425 0.315 0.401 0.275 0.377 0.444 0.411 0.333 0.433 0.372 0.327 0.455 0.396 0.34 0.358 
2007 0.366 0.42 0.451 0.319 0.407 0.279 0.391 0.436 0.417 0.334 0.439 0.378 0.339 0.459 0.407 0.329 0.365 
2008 0.37 0.421 0.384 0.31 0.409 0.28 0.397 0.446 0.426 0.34 0.445 0.379 0.34 0.438 0.399 0.317 0.354 
2009 0.366 0.422 0.379 0.307 0.403 0.285 0.388 0.445 0.413 0.351 0.435 0.369 0.337 0.429 0.398 0.32 0.353 
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Table A3 – Correlations of contextual variables across country and school-leaver 
cohort combinations (N=255) 
  VET EPL PMR UNEMP GPD  
VET 1 - - - - 
EPL -0.06 1 - - - 
PMR 0.06 0.36 1 - - 
UNEMP -0.09 0.28 0.26 1 - 
GPD  0.13 0 -0.34 -0.46 1 
 
 
 
Table A4 – Prestige of the first job: focus on PMR–gender interaction: 
coefficients 
  Model 3 (Table 2.3) + Gender*PMR 
Level 1 variables - Individuals 
Female (ref. Male) -2.54** 
Parental education (ref. Primary/lower sec.) 
    Upper secondary 1.42** 
    Tertiary 3.41** 
Level of education (ref. Primary/lower sec.) 
    Upper secondary general 3.86** 
    Upper secondary vocational 3.84** 
    Tertiary 16.80** 
Compulsory military service (ref. No) 0.59** 
Level 2 variables - Country*cohort of exit ETS 
    Employment Protection Legislation 1.44** 
    Product Market Regulation 2.09* 
    Vocational Orientation ETS 5.26** 
Interaction      Sex*Product Market Regulation 5.18**   Constant 31.15**   Unexplained variance level 2 1.05 
ICC (intra-class correlation) 0.00996   N subjects 87,558 
N country*cohort of exit ETS 255 
Significance levels **p<0.01, * p<0.05 
The model control for unemployment rate (15-64) and GDP trends. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Table A5 – Small Hsiao tests of the IIA assumption for the multinomial logistic 
models analysing contractual mobility (Table 3.2 – N=20,050) 
Omitted Cat. Log lik.(full) Log lik.(omit.) Chi2 df p 
Model 1 
Permanent -5179.19 -5162.77 32.84 28 0.24 
Unemployment -7111.86 -7098.38 26.97 28 0.52 
Inactivity -8250.87 -8239.41 22.93 28 0.74 
Model 2 
Permanent -5149.48 -5129.99 38.98 36 0.34 
Unemployment -7025.94 -7008.82 34.23 36 0.55 
Inactivity -8189.12 -8171.84 34.56 36 0.54 
Model 3 
Permanent -5167.88 -5148.31 39.13 40 0.51 
Unemployment -7065.78 -7050.97 29.62 40 0.89 
Inactivity -8146.75 -8131.03 31.45 40 0.83 
Model 4 
Permanent -5131.76 -5110.13 43.25 38 0.26 
Unemployment -6996.72 -6977.74 37.97 38 0.47 
Inactivity -8113.88 -8099.69 28.39 38 0.87 
Model 5 
Permanent -5102.3 -5082.42 39.76 42 0.57 
Unemployment -6935.64 -6916.71 37.86 42 0.65 
Inactivity -8065.16 -8047.5 35.3 42 0.76 
Ho: Odds (Outcome-J vs Outcome-K) are independent of other alternatives 
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Table A6 – Small Hsiao tests of the IIA assumption for the multinomial logistic models 
analysing occupational mobility (Table 3.3 – N=13,833) 
Omitted Cat. Log lik.(full) Log lik.(omit.) Chi2 df p 
Model 1 
Upward -2686.18 -2679.2 13.95 14 0.45 
Downward -3631.66 -3626.15 11.02 14 0.68 
Model 2 
Upward -2726.95 -2719.18 15.53 18 0.63 
Downward -3706.42 -3699.41 14.03 18 0.73 
Model 3 
Upward -2789.99 -2782.12 15.74 20 0.73 
Downward -3643.55 -3637.14 12.81 20 0.89 
Model 4 
Upward -2680.27 -2670.76 19.02 19 0.46 
Downward -3634.83 -3628.41 12.84 19 0.85 
Model 5 
Upward -2746.12 -2736.55 19.14 21 0.58 
Downward -3678.24 -3667.97 20.53 21 0.49 
Ho: Odds (Outcome-J vs Outcome-K) are independent of other alternatives 
  
 
Table A7 – Small Hsiao tests of IIA assumption for the multinomial logistic models 
analysing the relation between contractual and occupational mobility (Table 3.4 – 
N=13,833) 
Omitted Cat. Log lik.(full) Log lik.(omit.) Chi2 df p 
Model 1 
Upward -2681.3 -2676.32 9.97 15 0.82 
Downward -3586.36 -3580.41 11.89 15 0.69 
Model 2 
Upward -2694.36 -2684.45 19.81 19 0.41 
Downward -3642.58 -3634.89 15.38 19 0.7 
Model 3 
Upward -2757.09 -2744.81 24.54 22 0.32 
Downward -3600.84 -3590.44 20.81 22 0.53 
Model 4 
Upward -2757.43 -2747.77 19.32 21 0.56 
Downward -3643.24 -3634.16 18.16 21 0.64 
Model 5 
Upward -2791.25 -2777.98 26.54 24 0.33 
Downward -3659.26 -3647.94 22.64 24 0.54 
Ho: Odds (Outcome-J vs Outcome-K) are independent of other alternatives 
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Table A8  – Multinomial logistic models: Inactivity VS Temporary employment 
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
Female (ref. Male) 1.21*** 1.21*** 1.23*** 1.20*** 1.23*** 
Parental education (ref. Primary/lower sec.) 
       Upper secondary 0.13 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.04 
    Tertiary -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 
Level of education (ref. Primary/lower sec.) 
       Upper secondary -0.07 -0.12 -0.29** -0.14 -0.29** 
    Tertiary -0.57** -0.61*** -0.90*** -0.64*** -0.90*** 
Field of study (ref. General program) 
       Social sciences and humanities -0.22 -0.2 -0.05 -0.18 -0.05 
    Hard sciences and technical disciplines -0.27 -0.27 -0.13 -0.25 -0.13 
    Health and welfare -0.53** -0.50** -0.39** -0.48** -0.39** 
Age in 2009 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Time since last exit from ETS 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.09*** 0.12*** 0.09*** 
Macro indicators (country*year) 
        Total unemployment rate 0.09** 0.07*** 0.09** 0.07*** 
    Age divide (youth unemp – tot unemp) -0.03 -0.07*** -0.03 -0.07*** 
    GDP per capita 0.11* 0.02 0.11* 0.03 
    % Temporary employment -0.03** -0.04*** -0.02* -0.04*** 
    EPL regular 
 
-0.28*** 
 
-0.26** 
    Epl-Gap 
  
-0.17 
 
-0.19 
    Unions strength 
  
0.09 0.05 
      Constant -1.70*** -1.97** 1.04 -2.31** 0.75 
Observations 20,050 20,050 20,050 20,050 20,050 
Macro Area FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (clustered standard errors) 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Table A9 – Growth curve models for analysing the ISEI score: full table reporting the 
results plotted in Figure 4.1 (Italy: N individuals=3,153; N monthly-spells=354,524 – 
Netherlands: N individuals=2,340, N monthly-spells=264,060) 
  ITALY THE NETHERLANDS 
Career duration 0.151*** 0.504*** 
Career duration2 0.001 -0.013*** 
Entry Cohort (ref. 1950-1965) 
    1966-1980 -0.094 1.165 
    1981-1995 0.327 -1.588 
Social Origins (ref. EGP V,VI,VII) 
    Medium (III,IV) -0.681 0.379 
    High (I,II) 5.551*** 8.316*** 
Interaction Career duration*Cohort 
    Career duration*1966-1980 0.018 -0.227 
    Career duration*1981-1995 0.103 0.235 
Interaction Career duration2*Cohort 
    Career duration2*1966-1980 0.001 0.006 
    Career duration2*1981-1995 -0.021*** -0.046*** 
Interaction Career duration*Social Origins 
    Career duration*Medium 0.043 -0.037 
    Career duration*High 0.363** -1.188*** 
Interaction Career duration2*Social Origins 
    Career duration2*Medium 0.006*** -0.010* 
    Career duration2*High -0.034*** 0.068*** 
Interaction Social Origins*Cohort 
    Medium (III, IV)*1966-1980 2.375** 0.309 
    Medium (III, IV)*1981-1995 2.220** 1.095 
    High (I, II)*1981-1995 1.401 -4.290** 
    High (I, II)*1966-1980 -0.685 -3.474* 
Interaction Career duration*Social Origins*Cohort 
    Career duration*Medium (III, IV)*1966-1980 0.183* 0.558*** 
    Career duration*Medium (III, IV)*1981-1995 0.026 -0.381* 
    Career duration*High (I, II)*1966-1980 0.134 1.003*** 
    Career duration*High (I, II)*1981-1995 -0.486** 0.798*** 
Interaction Career duration2*Social Origins*Cohort 
    Career duration2*Medium (III, IV)*1966-1980 -0.029*** -0.030*** 
    Career duration2*Medium (III, IV)*1981-1995 -0.006* 0.048*** 
    Career duration2*High (I, II)*1966-1980 -0.014** -0.056*** 
    Career duration2*High (I, II)*1981-1995 0.035*** -0.018** 
Education (ref. <upper sec.)      Upper secondary 14.693*** 5.761*** 
    Tertiary 36.174*** 17.431*** 
Interaction Career duration*Education 
    Career duration*Upper secondary -0.022 0.109 
    Career duration*Tertiary -0.247 0.241 
continued 
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continued 
Interaction Education*Cohort 
    Upper secondary*1966-1980 -4.016*** -0.146 
    Upper secondary*1981-1995 -6.056*** -0.014 
    Tertiary*1966-1980 -5.211*** 0.764 
    Tertiary*1981-1995 -4.003** 3.630** 
Interaction Career duration*Education*Cohort 
    Career duration*Upper secondary*1966–1980 0.191* 0.032 
    Career duration*Upper secondary*1981–1995 0.253** 0.278 
    Career duration*Tertiary*1966–1980 0.32 0.042 
    Career duration*Tertiary*1980–1995 0.182 0.118 
Intercept 30.568 34.806 
Variance Between (level 2) 101.865 170.326 
Variance Within (level 1) 6.694 21.723 
Variance slope (career dur) 0.977 2.384 
Covariance intercept-slope -4.051 -10.529 
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Table A10 – Growth curve models for analysing the ISEI score: Full table reporting the 
results plotted in Figure 4.2 (Italy: N individuals=3,153; N monthly-spells=354,524 – 
Netherlands: N individuals=2,340, N monthly-spells=264,060) 
  ITALY THE NETHERLANDS 
Career duration 1.293*** 2.181*** 
Career duration2 0.001 -0.013*** 
Entry Cohort (ref. 1950-1965) 
    1966-1980 2.359*** -1.606 
    1981-1995 1.762*** 1.355 
Interaction Career duration*Cohort 
    Career duration*1966-1980 -0.027 0.074 
    Career duration*1981-1995 0.052 0.438* 
Interaction Career duration2*Cohort 
    Career duration2*1966-1980 0.001 0.006 
    Career duration2*1981-1995 -0.021*** -0.046*** 
Social Origins (ref. EGP V,VI,VII) 
    Medium (III,IV) 0.047 0.174 
    High (I,II) 0.18 1.440* 
Interaction Career duration*Social Origins 
    Career duration*Medium 0.015 -0.026 
    Career duration*High 0.566*** -0.814*** 
Interaction Career duration2*Social Origins 
    Career duration2*Medium 0.006*** -0.010* 
    Career duration2*High -0.034*** 0.069*** 
Interaction Social Origins*Cohort 
    Medium (III, IV)*1966-1980 0.102 -0.624 
    Medium (III, IV)*1981-1995 -0.188 0.388 
    High (I, II)*1981-1995 0.045 -1.247 
    High (I, II)*1966-1980 0.43 -0.606 
Interaction Career duration*Social Origins*Cohort 
    Career duration*Medium (III, IV)*1966-1980 0.272*** 0.615*** 
    Career duration*Medium (III, IV)*1981-1995 0.117 -0.330* 
    Career duration*High (I, II)*1966-1980 0.114 0.904*** 
    Career duration*High (I, II)*1981-1995 -0.450** 0.638*** 
Interaction Career duration2*Social Origins*Cohort 
    Career duration2*Medium (III, IV)*1966-1980 -0.029*** -0.030*** 
    Career duration2*Medium (III, IV)*1981-1995 -0.005* 0.048*** 
    Career duration2*High (I, II)*1966-1980 -0.014** -0.056*** 
    Career duration2*High (I, II)*1981-1995 0.035*** -0.018** 
Education (ref. <upper sec.)      Upper secondary 0.606 1.096* 
    Tertiary 1.027 2.602*** 
Interaction Career duration*Education 
    Career duration*Upper secondary 0.510*** 0.363*** 
    Career duration*Tertiary 1.081*** 1.049*** 
Interaction Education*Cohort 
    Upper secondary*1966-1980 0.589 0.114 
    Upper secondary*1981-1995 0.431 0.853 
    Tertiary*1966-1980 3.119*** -0.398 
continued 
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continued 
    Tertiary*1981-1995 1.690* 2.493** 
Interaction Career duration*Education*Cohort 
    Career duration*Upper secondary*1966–1980 0.034 0.037 
    Career duration*Upper secondary*1981–1995 0.01 0.279 
    Career duration*Tertiary*1966–1980 0.053 0.177 
    Career duration*Tertiary*1980–1995 -0.031 0.385*    ISEI first job 0.984*** 0.880*** 
Interaction Career duration*ISEI first job -0.037*** -0.048*** 
Interaction ISEI first job*Cohort 
    ISEI first job*1966–1980 -0.080*** 0.044* 
    ISEI first job*1981–1995 -0.057*** -0.060** 
Interaction Career duration*ISEI first job*Cohort 
    Career duration*ISEI first job*1966-1980 0.001 -0.007 
    Career duration*ISEI first job*1981-1995 0.002 -0.007    Intercept 0.314 4.07 
Variance Between (level 2) 13.095 38.811 
Variance Within (level 1) 6.694 21.723 
Variance slope (career dur) 0.848 1.894 
Covariance intercept-slope -0.648 -2.497 
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure A2 – Growth curve models: predicted average differences in ISEI along the first 10 
years of occupational career (and 95% confidence intervals) comparing youngsters hailing 
from the service and the intermediate classes with youngsters hailing from working class. 
Net of educational attainment and ISEI at labour market entry 
 
